What's happening in Zelenskyy's team and how war is changing power. Photo: Vitaly Nosach, RBC-Ukraine
The difficult battle for Donbas and the dim prospects for ending the war have not halted political life in Ukraine. The article below discusses what's happening in the triangle of the Verkhovna Rada, the Opposition Chamber, and the Cabinet of Ministers, how the government is building relations with the opposition, and what unexpected competitors the presidential party may face. RBK-Ukraine.
Ukrainian politics is increasingly reminiscent of pre-war times. The Verkhovna Rada no longer displays the same unity as it did in the first weeks of the Russian invasion. After the Ukrainian army repelled Russian troops from Kyiv, the war seems to be "over" in the minds of the parliament. Although, of course, no politician would dare admit this publicly.
The usual tension between the government and the opposition has gradually begun to rise. And, according to the publication's sources in the government, the parliament as a whole, including the Servant of the People majority, at times feels "abandoned" by the Presidential Administration.
One influential SN MP recalls the events leading up to and on the very first day of the war. They were reassured that there was a clear plan of action, and that each MP had supposedly already packed an emergency kit, and that for those without their own transportation, several assembly points had been designated in the capital.
When the first missiles fell on Kyiv and other cities, it turned out there was no plan. It wasn't even clear where the deputies were supposed to meet and, at a minimum, approve the decree declaring martial law.
There was also no talk of a centralized evacuation of MPs and their families. By evening, Servant of the People MPs received a message in their faction chat, the gist of which was that in these difficult times, a MP's primary goal was to preserve their own lives.
Some pro-government MPs remained in the capital, while many dispersed throughout Ukraine. Their actions also varied greatly: some quickly launched, for example, the production of bulletproof vests, others helped evacuate people from the war zone, and others sought weapons, medicine, and other supplies needed for the front abroad. Still others essentially fell into stupor and showed little activity.
During the first weeks of the war, the parliamentary corps still worked harmoniously: all contentious issues were settled in advance during Zoom conferences, which could last up to eight hours. However, once under the dome, votes were taken quickly and almost unanimously—the deputies understood that the risk of an air strike on the Rada building was objectively very high, so it was not advisable to linger there.
The introduction of online voting for MPs could have solved many problems, and such an initiative was indeed actively considered, but ultimately abandoned. This was due in part to the stance of Servant of the People's traditional partners: the Dovira and Za Maybutne groups. According to the majority, they realized that online voting would radically diminish their role as a "golden share," as collecting 226 votes from Servant of the People in such a format was an entirely realistic goal.
The groups created on the ruins of the Opposition Platform - For Life (OPZZh) proved more receptive to negotiations: the Platform for Life and Peace, led by Yuriy Boyko, and the Renewal of Ukraine, led by Igor Abramovich, Vadym Stolar, and Maksym Yefimov.
FILE: Vadim Stolar. The notorious "sneaker"
Maksym Yefimov: The Kramatorsk Werewolf in the Petro Poroshenko Bloc. Part 1
"The remnants of the Opposition Platform — For Life party—those under Lyovochkin and Boyko—are very constructive now. They're now for everything—the president, privatization, and the land market. Apparently, they're afraid they could all be lustrated or imprisoned," noted one informed source in the ruling party.
FILE: Levochkin. "The Gray Cardinal" and his sister
RBC-Ukraine's sources, both in the parliament and at Bankova, assure us, the possibility of holding early elections is currently off the table. Moreover, it's possible that this parliament will function much longer than its allotted term—for as long as the war continues and martial law is extended.
FILE: Yuriy Boyko – "Untouchable"
The next Rada elections are scheduled for October 29, 2023, and Zelenskyy's team is not confident that the war will end at least six months before that date.
Not everything is in place
Even before the war, the Presidential Administration was often criticized for turning parliament into a sort of "office" for the Presidential Administration. Now, the Rada's role in government processes has diminished even further. The Cabinet of Ministers or the Presidential Office are now responsible for developing and implementing most decisions. To pass the necessary bills or resolutions, deputies only need to meet once a week, as they currently do.
All this also impacted communication within the triangle of the "Operative Chamber," the Verkhovna Rada, and the Cabinet of Ministers. While in peacetime, the president would gather with members of the Cabinet, representatives of the minor faction (the faction head and his deputies, as well as the heads of Servant of the People committees – ed.), and the head of the Office and his deputies on the eve of each plenary week, such meetings were completely absent during the first month of the war. Then, signals began coming from senior party representatives in the Rada that these meetings should be held again. And around the beginning of May, consultations resumed, but via Zoom video conference.
During the war, many deputies felt their importance had diminished significantly. Due to a lack of understanding of their place in the current processes, everyone began to pursue their own interests.
"Everyone's trying to fit in, to find something to do. Some deputies get offended and introduce controversial bills to make a name for themselves. There are deputies who've only been in Ukraine for about 10 days in three months. Others, on the contrary, constantly travel to their districts to work and help. Some volunteer. But the Rada's strategic significance in these circumstances isn't entirely clear—it's fulfilling tactical objectives," says one of Zelenskyy's sources.
Another problem that emerged during the war was a lack of understanding between deputies and the heads of local military administrations. The communication gap between them arose long before the war, says an influential source in Servant of the People.
Bankova did not coordinate the candidacies of some regional state administration heads with the MPs or the local elites who backed them. Moreover, the Office often deliberately appointed individuals to their regions who were at odds with local "feudal lords" in order to create a balance. Now that the regional state administrations have acquired greater powers, this problem has become more acute in some places.
"The heads of the regional state administrations consider themselves to be the president's employees because they are led by Kyrylo Tymoshenko. They are also accountable to the Cabinet of Ministers and Chernyshov. And they had everyone else in mind. Although, most of the deputies also approached the regional state administrations for personal matters, like appointing a friend as head of forestry. And then they get upset that this doesn't happen," explains a source in the SN.
Objectively, the president is now forced to communicate more frequently and rely more heavily on the Cabinet of Ministers, which is causing some "jealousy" among members of parliament. Due to the threat of airstrikes and the activities of Russian saboteurs in the capital, the government was immediately divided: one part went to western Ukraine, including First Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Svyrydenko, Minister of Communities and Territories Development Oleksiy Chernyshov, and others. The rest of the Cabinet, led by Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal, remained in Kyiv.
According to the publication, several prominent members of the Presidential Administration have also left the capital, including Deputy Head of the Administration Kyrylo Tymoshenko and First Aide to the President Serhiy Shefir. RBC-Ukraine's sources gave varying assessments of the extent to which their departure from Kyiv and the activity (or, conversely, passivity) of individual members of the ruling team affected their position in the political hierarchy and their closeness to Zelenskyy.
"On the one hand, the president knows who was where. But the issue isn't really about who was physically where, but rather who did what and how they performed during the most difficult weeks," says one politician.
In any case, no top-level leadership changes are currently in the offing. In private conversations, sources recount the grievances that have accumulated at Bankova Street against SBU head Ivan Bakanov. But this dissatisfaction remains only verbal and has not yet matured into a decision to resign.
"If the war drags on and a decision is made to extend martial law beyond August 23, then rotations are possible closer to the fall. Perhaps Svyrydenko will push Shmyhal aside, or Shmyhal will push Svyrydenko aside. Perhaps they'll reopen the grievances that had been building against Shkarlet (Education Minister – ed.) and Lazebna (Social Policy Minister – ed.) before the war," a source in the ruling party speculates.
Several sources acknowledged that the war has undermined the position of the National Security and Defense Council and its secretary, Oleksiy Danilov. Before the war, the NSDC was one of the country's main newsmakers, in part due to the imposition of sanctions against top politicians and businessmen. But after the February invasion, the Security Council faded into the background.
Danilov himself has also noticeably decreased his appearances on the telethon in recent weeks. Sources within the presidential team attribute this to his overly harsh statements on the war, which clash with the government's unified line. Many were dissatisfied with his statement that with Russia, "the only thing we can sign is its capitulation."
"After that, they sent us a 'hello' by firing two dozen missiles in one evening," says one of the Servant of the People MPs.
RBC-Ukraine contacted the Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council for comment, but had not received a response by the time this article was published.
Telefilter and other voltage lines
The government's information policy needs to be adjusted. This is the conclusion reached by several members of Zelenskyy's team with whom the publication spoke. This primarily concerns coverage of the main topic—the situation on the frontlines. This has become especially evident in recent days, as Russian troops, albeit with great difficulty, are advancing in the vicinity of Severodonetsk and the surrounding regions.
Even one of the government's key spokesmen, Oleksiy Arestovich, adviser to the head of the Presidential Administration, was forced to acknowledge the gravity of the current situation. The public associates him exclusively with tales of Ukrainian military victories and the endless failures of the occupiers. Arestovich recently publicly described the situation on the front lines as "horrible."
"Now we need to promote several key messages: first, victory is not as close as many would like. Second, the Russian army is still far from collapse; it still has significant human resources, and especially an advantage in weapons. And third, it's time to stop asking, 'When will the counteroffensive begin? When will we finally take Kherson?' For now, our task is defense. We'll stockpile Western weapons in a couple of months, and then we'll talk about a counterattack," one of the OP functionaries told RBC-Ukraine.
The government's key information tool for promoting these and other messages is the "United News" telethon. Participating channels have retained a certain degree of autonomy in selecting speakers. For several weeks now, government officials have been discussing changes to the telethon—the current format has become boring to viewers after three months.
"On the one hand, there are some strange stories, and strange people are put on air. On the other hand, ministers are very poorly represented, and people don't have answers to a ton of questions: what should displaced persons do next, what about social benefits in the occupied territories, and so on. All of this needs to change," says one of the publication's sources.
But for now, we're only talking about cosmetic changes. No one is planning to return to political pluralism, abolish the unified news marathon format, or allow channels to independently develop their editorial policies, as they did before the war.
The opposition, deprived of its usual access to television as a primary campaign tool, is naturally unhappy with this situation. And this directly impacts even the format of parliament's work.
"Batkivshchyna submits 300 amendments. Then Tymoshenko goes and haggles to be included on the telethon three times. For example, if she's shown twice, she gets offended and starts spamming out amendments again. Poroshenko haggled over a trip to the NATO parliamentary assembly," says a source in Zelenskyy's team.
The faction leaders' demands for at least 10 minutes of airtime per day will not be met for now, but they still plan to gradually introduce the opposition into the marathon.
Sometimes the authorities themselves, and deliberately so, create new tensions within the political establishment. This is most clearly evident in their confrontation with their predecessors and with Petro Poroshenko personally. Recently alone, two incidents occurred: Viktor Medvedchuk issued new accusations against Poroshenko, and a few days later, the former president was prevented from leaving Ukraine.
The government team says that Medvedchuk's public testimony regarding the leader of European Solidarity is only the first "series."
"There are no plans to jail Poroshenko right now; it's unlikely to come to that. At the same time, this shapes the framework for our relationship with him. After each such incident, he even behaves differently, for example, in parliament. This is useful for keeping him on his toes," the source says.
Poroshenko's team also believes the government is likely preparing more "exposing stories" for them. It's worth noting that on the day Medvedchuk's testimony was released, it was played in every slot on the telethon. However, according to one source in European Solidarity, this hasn't had much of a negative impact on their ratings.
Bankova also sees Poroshenko's hand in the rumors about the creation of a new, supposed "military party." According to one of RBC-Ukraine's sources, the former president may try to rely on it to even aim for the post of prime minister in the next parliament.
However, there is also contrary information on this matter—that Bankova, at the very least, is not opposed to the creation of such a party. And, perhaps, in the future, it will try to use it to its advantage.
According to several sources at RBC-Ukraine, this movement is currently being moderated by a section of the "Voice" faction, which previously formed the "Justice" group and joined forces with well-known volunteer Serhiy Prytula.
"There's an attempt to create such a movement coming from people around Prytula, some of the Voice factions, and Zaluzhny's advisers. It's all being moderated by Yaroslav Yurchyshyn and others. They're trying to gather military personnel. But it's mostly volunteers," says a well-informed source on Zelenskyy's team.
Bankova believes that, amid post-war public demand, Zelenskyy may face a new serious competitor: Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Armed Forces Valeriy Zaluzhny, whom the Office suspects of political ambitions.
"Zaluzhny is politically active. And he seems to be a true team player. He himself declares that he doesn't want to go into politics. But sometimes his behavior suggests otherwise. Some foundation has appeared, and it's putting up billboards. He has some consultants and advisors, and they're probably the ones instilling these ideas in him," Zelenskyy's team adds.
However, in difficult times at the front, as now, political ambitions, as well as a certain "jealousy" that some prominent generals feel for Zaluzhny's media popularity, fade into the background, and everyone gets back to business.
In topic: Boyko under the EU flag, Medvedchuk with dirt. How the Opposition Platform – For Life party is disintegrating and considering revenge.
Subscribe to our channels in Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, VC — Only new faces from the section CRYPT!