Dmitry Linko: Lawlessness and provocations of the "fecal radical." PART 1
If Ukrainians knew who Dmytro Linko is, they would be highly skeptical of the accusations leveled by Ihor Guzhva, editor-in-chief of the publication "Strana," accusing him of extortion, blackmail, attempting to denigrate the good name of the Radical Party, anti-Ukrainian activities, and working for the Kremlin. After all, the only "proof" of these accusations is Dmytro Linko's own words. But can one trust the word of a long-time professional provocateur like Dmytro Linko? And what are the words of a hardened liar, who told tales of his fictitious exploits in the ATO, worth when, in reality, even the notorious battalion commander and marauder Ruslan Onishchenko hastened to disavow Linko and his "brothers"? Well, this man deserves that his voters and fellow citizens, thanks to Skelet.Org, learn more about his biography – and perhaps never again believe either his promises or his accusations.
Dmitry Linko. Odessa History
Dmitry Vladimirovich Linko was born on July 14, 1987, in Kirovohrad (now Krapivnitsky), where he graduated from Secondary School No. 16. This is the only reliable fact from his childhood and adolescence that he has dared to publish. Surprisingly, the controversial people's deputy seemed to have no classmates or friends who could reveal anything about him that he himself was silent about. However, it was precisely these socially problematic individuals who joined the "Brotherhood," of which Linko was already an active member in 2007. It was then, in Odessa, that he first appeared in the media with a bucket of feces, poured on the head of the eccentric outcast Valeriy Kaurov – thus attempting to combat "Ukrainophobia" and "Russification," which the "Brotherhood" understood as the regional status of the Russian language. But this "patriotic" stunt turned out to be a simple provocation with the exact opposite effect: it only further inflamed political sentiment in society. Linko's hooligan debut on the public political stage lasted only a few seconds, and he didn't even introduce himself—but according to his associates, it was indeed Dmitry.
So how did Linko end up in Odesa from his native Kirovohrad region? It's an interesting and rather murky story! It began in the late 90s, when young Dima Linko was still attending school in his hometown of Kirovohrad and was interested not in politics but in collecting Turbo chewing gum inserts. At that time, the radical organization UNA-UNSO experienced another split, and its former "Mr. Providnik" Dmitry Korchinsky He began searching for a new outlet for his talent as a demagogue, as well as new sources of funding for his purely dependent lifestyle. Furthermore, due to his reputation as a provocateur, Korchinsky began to feel somewhat uncomfortable in Kyiv. In short, Korchinsky then began to frequent Odessa, where he had been mayor since 1994. Eduard Gurvits.
Due to the fact that the Gurvits clan was opposed by other Odessa clans and organized crime groups (for example, the Minin group-Angerta-Zhukova-Trukhanov), as well as influential people from Kyiv and other regions of the country, Gurvits sought allies wherever he could. Thus, he became close with the "Rukh" members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UNA-UNSO radicals, and the local Chechen mafia—all of whom were interconnected through their direct contacts with the then government of Ichkeria (independent Chechnya). The Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dominated by "national-patriotic" cadres and "friends of America," supported Dudayev and Maskhadov's followers politically and also collaborated with them in the oil business—for which the budding oligarch was responsible. Alexander TretyakovThis is precisely why the Chechens were so interested in the Odessa Oil Refinery at the time, which was controlled by the Minin-Angert-Zhukov faction. UNA-UNSO, although it had strained relations with the Rukh faction, had collaborated with Chechen militants since the wars in Abkhazia (1992) and South Ossetia (1993), in particular with the notorious Shamil Basayev. Since 1994, the organization had been sending its UNSO members and recruited mercenaries (directly supervised by Anatoly Lupinos) to the First Chechen War. Meanwhile, the Odessa Chechen diaspora in the 90s fell under the Maskhadov faction's control, closely collaborating with Gurvits, UNA-UNSO, and representatives of the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the People's Movement.
In turn, Gurvits also assisted them: in 1996, he organized a "Vainakh congress" in Odessa, supporting a "free Ichkeria," and Odessa orphanages accepted Chechen children. In February 1997, Gurvits attended Maskhadov's inauguration, and in May 1997, he received a delegation from Ichkeria's Vice President Vakha Arsanov in Odessa. Gurvits also facilitated the return of 34 Ukrainian construction workers from Kirovohrad from Chechen captivity. But why specifically Kirovohrad residents, when during the 1996 events, Chechen militants captured over 200 Ukrainian workers from various regions in Grozny? This question remains unanswered, but it was one of the first known examples of Odessa's special relationship with the "Kirovohrad residents."
Eduard Gurvits hosts Vakha Arsanov
Thus, during this close relationship between Gurvits and UNA-UNSO, Oles Yanchuk, a young school history teacher from Kalantayevka (Odesa Oblast), became close to the Odessa mayor. Yanchuk had been an activist in the UNA-UNSO's Odessa "oserednik" since his days at Odessa National University (1990-93), from which he never properly graduated (he only received a higher education diploma in 1999, allowing him to move on to graduate school). And so, in 1994, Yanchuk received his first lucrative position from Gurvits as an inspector at the Razdelyansky customs office. From that moment on, with sufficient cash in hand, Yanchuk assumed a leading position in the UNA-UNSO "oserednik" and began to form his own team of young radicals. The main target of their attacks became the head of the Odessa Regional State Administration. Ruslan Bodelan (based, in particular, on the Angert-Zhukov-Trukhanov group).
Oles Yanchuk and Dmitry Korchinsky
In 1998, Gurvits failed to re-elect as mayor of Odesa: the Kirovohrad Regional Court (Kirovohrad again) declared the election results falsified, and Ruslan Bodelan became mayor. Gurvits, who had also been elected as a member of parliament, left for Kyiv, but Yanchuk and Korchynsky, who had become a frequent visitor to Odesa, entered a busy period: they were tasked with promoting the opposition movement in the city and organizing various protests. This was precisely what the "Brotherhood" movement, founded in 1999 (registered in 2004), undertook. Although it subsequently established branches in almost all of Ukraine's regional centers, its active work was, for some reason, always limited to Kyiv and Odesa. Incidentally, an interesting coincidence: "Brotherhood" emerged at the perfect time, just as Putin launched the Second Chechen War, and the situation of the "Ichkerian friends" of UNA-UNSO and Gurvits changed dramatically: now, ties to militant leaders could become grounds for accusations of aiding terrorists. The Chechen diaspora in Odessa soon also disowned the "Maskhadovites."
But at the same time, a new conflict arose in Odessa: during the privatization of Odesaoblenergo, when the VS Energy group (Russian oligarch Alexander Babakov) and the oligarch’s Finance and Credit clashed over this “golden antelope” (the Oblenergo was also engaged in the export of electricity to Moldova). Constantine ZhevagoInterestingly, both parties also had close ties to Kirovograd. Babakov had previously privatized Kirovogradoblenergo, and many of its employees were later transferred to Odesaoblenergo, irritating locals with the "invasion of Kirovograders." Meanwhile, Zhevago's companies, Energy LLC and Ukrgazbyt CJSC, were co-owners of the Ukrainian Transport Union, along with Inkompraprka. Igor Sharov – an extremely influential oligarch from the same Kirovohrad. In other words, it could be said that two groups of "Kirovohrad" people were fighting over Odesaoblenergo. Naturally, local authorities and local political forces were involved in this conflict in one way or another.
Igor Fedorovich Sharov
The 2002 elections in Odessa were even more scandalous than those of 1998. Both the election campaign and the voting itself were marked by flagrant violations. Many candidates used dirty tricks, enlisting their own people to help them: titushki, hired students, actual gangsters, and even nationalist radicals were all implicated. And these weren't just members of the Brotherhood, who had their own specific "struggle front." Even then, Oles Yanchuk oversaw several "allied" marginal groups of nationalist radicals, whose members were unsuccessful in public politics but instead indulged in petty provocations and dirty tricks. They all worked for Gurvits's victory, but he only finished second, losing to Bodelan. He then rushed to accuse his rival of fraud, though the court dismissed his charges. Only in April 2005, on Yushchenko's personal orders, a new trial was held, ruling that Bodelan's victory had been fraudulent and handing the mayor's seat to Gurvits.
Oles Yanchuk's financial situation was immediately resolved. In 1999, he lost his job at customs and was forced to pursue a career in low-income "high culture." He finished university, entered graduate school, and defended his dissertation on the work of Yuriy Lypa (the writer was one of the ideological icons of the UNA-UNSO), aided by his established connections at Odessa University (apparently with the nationalist patriots in the dean's office). And in 2002, Yanchuk became the head of an organization with the grandiose name "Institute of Regional Policy and Contemporary Political Science," which became a branch of the Brotherhood. But Yanchuk then gave up this dalliance, receiving the position of deputy head of the Representative Office for Municipal Property Management of the Odessa City Council from the returning Gurvits in 2005. It was a veritable gold mine! A year later, Yanchuk became deputy chairman of the Primorsky District Administration, and in 2009, head of the Odessa Consumer Market Development Department. A number of Odessa markets, including Privoz, Uspekh-Auto, and Malinovsky, came under his control.
After Gurvits returned to the mayor's chair in Odessa (remaining there until 2010), the need for the Brotherhood's services by no means disappeared. On the contrary, Korchinsky and Yanchuk's men found themselves so busy in Odessa discrediting and intimidating Gurvits's opponents that they were forced to create several more public organizations. One of these was "Free Odessa," founded in 2007 and headed by "Brother" Mark Sokolov. He arrived in Odessa in 2003 and became famous for throwing eggs at Viktor Yushchenko. A few months later, in April 2004, members of the Brotherhood threw mayonnaise at George Soros, who was visiting Ukraine, declaring that they opposed his planned "coup, modeled on the Georgian scenario." These antics of the "Brotherhood" were quite puzzling: after all, Soros was one of Yushchenko's Western patrons, and Viktor Andreevich himself was the "roof" of Eduard Gurvits, having included him in the electoral list of "Our Ukraine" in 2002.
Why did Gurvits's people (whom the "Brotherhood" actually was) oppose Yushchenko and the upcoming "Orange Revolution"? And Korchinsky himself, having become the host of the "Prote" program on 1+1, openly expressed anti-Yushchenko rhetoric. This is difficult to understand, since, as a master of provocation, Korchinsky loved to perplex, donning one political mask after another. And immediately after the first round of the 2004 elections, he suddenly ceased being Yushchenko's enemy and sided with him.
No less surprising was the membership of a man like Vakhtang Ubiriya (nicknamed Vakha) in the Brotherhood. His membership was more of an honorary one, as Ubiriya is not the type to participate in the street circuses of the "brothers." This wasn't due to his age (he was born in 1950), but because Ubiriya was the "overseer of Odessa" for the notorious Semyon Mogilevich—with whom, incidentally, he was a classmate. Ubiriya controlled smuggling, arms and drug trafficking, and the oil business; he "handshaked" with the leaders of Kyiv's organized crime groups and Ukraine's largest oligarchs. Yet, at the same time, he was a member of the Brotherhood, where he headed the "Department of Economics." In 2005, he became deputy to Eduard Gurvits, the mayor of Odessa, and immediately began to take control of the Odessa seaport. In 2010, after the resignation of Gurvits, Ubiria
Vakhtang Ubiriya
He immediately disappeared from Odessa and from Ukraine in general: the media leaked the news that he allegedly had a massive heart attack. But sources Skelet.Org It was reported that Ubiriya had staged it in order to fly to Israel for treatment, where his ends were cut short.
Gurvits, Korchinsky, the Chechens, the "Kirovograd gang," Vakha Ubiriya and Mogilevich, the "brothers" and the "our Ukrainians"—what a complex combination emerged in Odessa! And then, somewhere around 2004-2006, our protagonist, Dima Linko, appeared, diligently avoiding military service, like most of the "brothers." Indeed, Yanchuk, Sokolov, and Linko all left their home regions immediately after graduating from school (Yanchuk from the Vinnytsia region, Sokolov from the Zaporizhzhia region) and plunged into a sea of street politics. Why the military recruitment offices didn't bother with them is anyone's guess. After all, did the philology departments where Yanchuk and Linko studied really have military departments? And Mark Sokolov was even expelled from his first year at Kyiv Polytechnic!
Dmitry Linko and Mark Sokolov
Dmitry Linko. Professional provocateur
According to his biography, Dmytro Linko graduated from the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in 2008. He may have forgotten to add the "correspondence" part-time diploma, as he simply didn't have the time for full-time study or any serious academic study. Having become a very active activist in the Brotherhood (and earning the nickname "Linux"), Linko spent his time shuttling between Kyiv and Odesa, participating in protests and provocations. Due to his somewhat eccentric personality and willingness to personally carry out the most specific tasks, he was quickly noticed and promoted: by the time of his "clash" with Kaurov, Linko was far from an ordinary member of the Brotherhood. Whether he was entrusted with direct leadership of the protests is unknown, but he was certainly their ringleader. As, for example, during the provocative “UPA march” on October 18, 2008, at the head of which walked Dmitry Linko with a megaphone in his hands.
Kyiv residents were warned several days before the march that this would be a simple provocation by the "Brotherhood." Moreover, the leaders of Tryzub, UNA-UNSO, the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Youth Ukrainian Congress, the Stepan Bandera Center for National Revival, Ukrayinska Sprava, and other nationalist parties and movements in Kyiv condemned the protest in the media, calling it a "provocation by unknown individuals." However, this didn't stop the "brotherhood" organizers from raising Tryzub and UNA-UNSO flags over the columns, thus simply framing these organizations.
However, the capital's residents had no time for "UPA marches": the global crisis was raging, the dollar and prices were skyrocketing, banks were closing one after another, and swindlers were stealing billions and siphoning them out of the country. One can only guess who needed to "shake the government" at this time! But the "bratchiki" played their role as professional Gapons with flying colors. This "alternative UPA march" (previously, the UPA anniversary in Kyiv had been quietly celebrated on October 14) was conceived as a radical rally, which is why they invited activists from Svoboda and the then-little-known Patriot of Ukraine. The latter was intended to be the column's shock force, breaking through the police line and attacking the communist and regional pickets. Incidentally, the Patriot unit was then commanded by Andriy Biletsky: his men armed themselves specifically for the skirmish with plywood shields (painted to resemble banners) and batons hidden behind them, as well as homemade protective vests and army helmets. All of this was an "invention" of the old UNA-UNSO of the 90s, and members of the Brotherhood helped the Patriot unit prepare for the action (or rather, for the riots and clashes). Interestingly, all of this "armor" would later appear at the Euromaidan in 2014.
Kyiv, October 18, 2008
However, the capital's Berkut police didn't stand on ceremony with the "children," especially since the use of force had been sanctioned by the Presidential Secretariat. After the column, led by Linko, holding a megaphone, began to break through the police cordon, the radicals were pinned face down on the pavement within minutes. 147 people were detained, including Linko and Biletsky, but they escaped with only minor injuries.
After the "UPA March": Among those lying down are future MP Linko and future Azov commander Biletsky.
But the Brotherhood's biggest work front at the time was in Odessa, where it had to simultaneously oppose some of Gurvits' opponents and feign joint protests with others—in order to provoke unrest. However, Gurvits himself was a master of provocation (or perhaps he learned it from Korchinsky). For example, there is ample evidence that he used radical pro-Russian political forces in Odessa against Bodelan and the Party of Regions. It was also reported that people associated with Gurvits orchestrated the provocations on May 2, 2014, which led to the tragedy at the Trade Union Building. But that was later; in 2008-2009, members of the Brotherhood helped the mayor disperse opposition protests, joining them and provoking conflicts. This created the appearance that only hooligans and extremists opposed Mayor Gurvits.
Sergey Varis, for Skelet.Org
CONTINUED: Dmitry Linko: Lawlessness and provocations of the "fecal radical." PART 2
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