Viktor Yanukovych and Rinat Akhmetov
The "Donetsk clan" of coal miners emerged in Ukraine long before the country's independence, almost immediately after the Great Patriotic War. Its founder is considered to be Alexander Zasyadko, the "Coal People's Commissar" who was a favorite of Joseph Stalin. He ensured that all major funds for the coal industry were allocated to the Donbas.
The "Dnipropetrovsk clan" was formed in exactly the same way; funds flowed there from Moscow to develop Ukraine's metallurgical complex. In the mid-1960s, Vladimir Degtyarev, First Secretary of the Donetsk Regional Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, took over from Oleksandr Zasyadko. He ensured that Donbas dominated other coal-producing regions of Ukraine. The highest salaries, pensions, and benefits for joining the Communist Party of the Soviet Union were found in our region. Degtyarev initiated the creation of an informal "Donetsk clan" in Moscow, which included ministers, state-level business executives, cosmonauts, and artists. During the Brezhnev era, the "Dnipropetrovsk clan" was protected by Vladimir Shcherbitsky, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukrainian SSR. The "Donetsk clan" was constantly prepared for "war." Neither Andropov nor Gorbachev were able to break their internal corporate solidarity. The war with the Kremlin began Efim Zvyagilsky In 1989, as director of the largest mine, named after Zasyadko, the informal leader of the "Donetsk clan" led the miners on the first strike in the Ukrainian SSR. The reason was the "intensification" of the coal industry, initiated by Gorbachev, and the transfer of most of the funds to the Kuzbass region. Afterward, Yefim Zvyagilsky entered the Ukrainian parliament and later became Chairman of the Donetsk City Council and City Executive Committee. Under President Kravchuk, significant sums were allocated in the budget in 1992 for the development of the coal industry, fearing separatism in Donetsk. This led to the emergence of a rift between Donbas and Western Ukraine. The process of ousting First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Yukhnovsky from the government began.
In the early 1990s, political parties with Donetsk registration and Donetsk capital were established in Ukraine. After Kuchma came to power, the "Donetsk" leaders began to be removed from power. Zvyagilsky headed the government, but not for long. In November 1994, the Verkhovna Rada approved his criminal prosecution, and the prosecutor's office opened a case against him for abuse of office. On June 15, 1994, Zvyagilsky resigned from his government post, and in November of that year, he fled to Israel.
In 1995, Vladimir Shcherban became the new governor of Donetsk. It was during this time that a new "Donetsk clan" formed, including Rinat Akhmetov.
According to Forbes magazine, Rinat Akhmetov's net worth in dollars as of September 2014 was 11,2 billion. Since 2013, it has decreased by 4,2 billion. He is the richest Ukrainian businessman.
His surname first appeared after he replaced Akhat Bragin (who is considered the founder of the largest criminal group in Donbass, also known as "Alik Grek") as president of the Shakhtar football club, who died as a result of the explosion at the Shakhtar stadium in Donetsk on October 15, 1995.
Thanks to his late uncle, Akhmetov managed to seize leading positions in both official and criminal business. In essence, Akhmetov became the godfather of the Donetsk Ridge after his relative's death. With Bragin's criminal enterprise managers under his control, Akhmetov managed to maintain influence in the country's highest circles, enabling him to legalize his position in all of Donbas's industrial sectors and privatize enterprises at a pittance. As a result, colossal damage was inflicted on the Ukrainian economy. He came to own metallurgy, coal mining, energy, mechanical engineering, and coke production.
Today, Ametov's structures own the following coal mining enterprises: Krasnodonugol Mining and Chemical Plant, Dobropolugol Mining and Chemical Plant, Komsomolets Donbassa Mine, Yuzhnodonbasskaya 1 and Yuzhnodonbasskaya 3 mines, Makeyevugol Mining and Chemical Plant, Krasnoarmeyskugol, Oktyabrskaya Central Processing Plant, Kirov Donetsk Coke and Chemical Plant, Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, Gorlovka Coke and Chemical Plant, Krasnoluchsky Machine-Building Plant, Donetsk Energy Plant, Druzhkovka Machine-Building Plant, Yenakiyeve Metallurgical Plant, and Azovstal Iron and Steel Works. All of these enterprises are located in the Donbass.
Why was it necessary to buy up all these enterprises if the Donetsk region is considered subsidized? Probably not in order to spend their own money and end up in losses.
For example, it costs 500 hryvnias to mine one ton of coal, but the paper price is reported as 1500 hryvnias for regulatory authorities. With a selling price of 1000 hryvnias per ton of coal, a subsidy of 500 hryvnias is required to cover the losses incurred during coal production. So, the coal was mined for 500 hryvnias, sold for 1000 hryvnias, and received another 500 hryvnias in subsidies from the state. The net profit is 200%. This 200% goes toward kickbacks to tax authorities, the prosecutor's office, and the police.
Here's another example of where public money goes. It concerns the coal industry. In Donetsk, we have the Donetsk Regional Directorate, which is responsible for mine liquidation and recycling. These activities require tenders, which require colossal amounts of government funding. Here's a scheme for developing a waste heap, for example. To do this, you need to find a contractor that owns a bulldozer, an excavator, and trucks for waste removal. Before announcing the tender, the client monitors the cost by interviewing contractors.
We have two contractors. The first is Akhmetov, the second is Ivanov. Akhmetov will complete the work for 20 UAH, and Ivanov for 5 UAH. Our "honest" Akhmetov has influence throughout the government, arguing that the work will be completed better for 20 UAH, of which 4 UAH will go directly to the client and the Kyiv Treasury, which allocated the funds. In fact, 5 UAH was spent on the tender. 8 UAH was returned to officials, and 7 UAH will be earned. In reality, all the deals are in the millions. Everyone is happy, and the state is losing money.
This is a toy scheme that monsters like Akhmetov have long since lost interest in. It's no secret that coking coal is practically the most valuable fuel resource in the world—black gold. By controlling these state-owned natural resources, one person becomes king of the world. With such a resource, one can be soft and fluffy, engage in charity work, and build stadiums, hotels, and so on.
Now let's look at another example: a simple resident of Donbass, a native and hereditary miner, followed the call of his heart and decided to get involved in the coal business in a "poor, subsidized" region.
A certain citizen named VV, a native of Makeyevka who graduated from the Donetsk Polytechnic Institute in 1997, and his partner established a company to repair and manufacture electric motors, which every mine desperately needs. Coming from a family of miners, he knows the region's problems from the inside. He capitalizes on this. Business is so good that by 2001, the businessman acquired mines closed during the Soviet era: Rivne-Komsomolskaya, Davydovskaya-Zapadnaya No. 3, and Davydovskaya-Zapadnaya No. 4.
Why is citizen VV taking such a step in a "loss-making, subsidized region"? Probably not to waste the capital earned on electric motors.
By 2004, he had acquired eight more mines. With God's help, the "Nedra of Donbass" corporation was successfully gaining momentum. Work on adjusting and repairing mining equipment was now underway at all mines in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
It must be said that Mr. VV is credited for his clear-headedness and conscience, which allows him to do without state subsidies and manage to build a large number of Orthodox churches throughout the Donbas and beyond. You'll agree that this noble endeavor is far from cheap. For example, the most famous of the religious businessmen is the coal magnate and owner of Donetskstal. Victor NusenkisHe ranks first in the unofficial ranking of church benefactors and spends millions of dollars a year on the needs of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.
Today, Mr. VV is the president of Coal Energy, the fifth-largest private coal producer in Ukraine. According to Forbes magazine, Mr. VV's net worth in 2012 was $112 million. And that's in just 15 years.
Using the example of one ordinary person, we showed how “unprofitable” our region is.
Another source of income that doesn't reach the state treasury is "kopanki." For those unfamiliar, this refers to the illegal mining of coal in abandoned mines, as well as newly dug pits in coal fields. This business is not disdained by any government official, from Akhmetov to the district police officer, each trying to own or control this type of mining.
The cost of extracting a ton of coal mined by illegal workers can be 50-100 UAH. The mine sells this coal as its own, at a cost of 1200 UAH per ton. Selling one ton of coal costs approximately 750 UAH, with the state covering the remaining 450 UAH.
So, for every ton of coal mined in illegal "kopankas," the public treasury is robbed of 300-400 hryvnias by inflating production costs. The shadow coal market is worth approximately 5 million tons per year—so billions are siphoned off the state budget through this scheme alone! (Around $200 million per year). Furthermore, the coal mined by artisanal miners in these "kopankas" is of poor quality; it burns poorly and has low thermal conductivity.
And for all these machinations, the state is incapable of finding and punishing those responsible. Although the phrase "the state is incapable of finding and punishing those responsible" is fundamentally incorrect, it's a mockery of nature and of a region completely under the control of the state. And the state is a system, with officials and security forces, and all this chaos belongs to them and is protected by them. This, in fact, is the main problem – the state in our country is against us. To count on its help and action within the law is, at the very least, naive.
Today, as the state grinds down hundreds and thousands of lives in Donbas, it's clearly not fighting for "loss-making regions"; rather, those in power are fighting for their own profits, while sparing no expense in spending millions of dollars on the war.
Pavel Gubarev
The article came to the site through the section “Send a skeleton«
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