Deputies of the Crimean "State Council" have made a bold move on the State Duma board—they are essentially asking for an amnesty for members of the "Aksyonov self-defense" group who committed criminal offenses and administrative violations during the occupation and annexation of the peninsula. Although the word "amnesty" is absent from the text, it simply proposes exempting the "people's militia" from liability for unlawful acts "resulting in harm or damage," deeming them actions "committed in a state of extreme necessity." Everyone—both those already convicted and those not yet held accountable—is exempt, without further clarification or specificity.
Aksyonov initially submitted the corresponding bill to the State Council, but they apparently didn't risk adopting the "hybrid" bill, which blends amnesty and pardon. Instead, they distinguished themselves with another proposal. They ask State Duma deputies to "amnesty" the Self-Defense Forces members... in advance, that is, to exempt them from liability not only for their past actions, but also for crimes yet to be committed. The period covered by this masterpiece of a bill, enriching the already colorful legislative framework of annexed Crimea, is specified as: from February 27, 2014 (the day before the seizure of the Verkhovna Rada and Council of Ministers buildings by Russian special forces) to January 1, 2015. It sounds very much like the joke about planning the work of a district police department "to prevent murders," except that the crimes aren't simply planned—the criminals are preemptively amnestied.
The events of the past week have provided grounds for understanding such preemptive concern. Self-defense forces face the task of seizing dozens, and if things continue as they are, hundreds of private properties.
Following the seizure of Chornomornaftogaz, Ukrtransgaz, and the Feodosia oil depot in the first weeks of the occupation, the May robbery of the NBU and Oschadbank offices, and the June "nationalization" of Ukrainian state property in the agro-industrial complex and resorts, the turn has come to "nationalize" private property, although initially both Simferopol and Moscow generously guaranteed its inviolability. More than 70 properties, whose ownership is attributed to oligarch Ihor Kolomoisky and PrivatBank, have already been declared subject to seizure. The Zaliv plant in Kerch has been seized (another Ukrainian oligarch, Kostyantyn Zhevago, has been punished), as has Krymgaz, controlled by Dmitry Firtash, and even markets belonging to the collective owner—the shareholders of Krymprebsouz.
The reason for this is simple: the treasury of the "state of Crimea" is empty. The economy of annexed Crimea is generating no revenue, the resort season is a bust, land and real estate markets are at a standstill, not a single transaction has been officially completed in six months, and most Ukrainian businesses are in no hurry to re-register under Russian law—they're waiting until the end of the transition period (just in case!).
Multi-billion-dollar investments in Crimea's socio-economic development program from the federal budget have been solemnly announced, but the sources for their funding, alas, have not yet been fully determined. This is causing justifiable concern among residents and other constituent entities of the Russian Federation, who have already paid handsomely for "Crimea Is Ours" with frozen target programs. And while President Putin's cronies are registering new companies on the peninsula in anticipation of future victories in public construction tenders, Crimea's leadership is forced to raise funds for itself and its "self-defense" forces in the usual way: raiding, extortion, and seizure. But all this is happening under the guise of "nationalization" and, of course, in the interests of the people and Crimea.
It should be noted that there is no specific law on nationalization in Russia, and where it is mentioned—in the Civil Code—it envisages a completely different scenario than what is happening in Crimea. Article 235 of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation, for example, states that nationalization (as the basis for terminating ownership rights) is carried out in accordance with the law, with compensation for the value of the property and other losses in the manner established by Article 306 of the same Code. This Article stipulates that losses incurred by the owner of nationalized property (including its value) are reimbursed by the state.
In an effort to lend some semblance of legality to the seizures, Crimean deputies passed their own "law" on the specifics of property buyouts in the Republic of Crimea, a little over one page long. It stipulates that property buyouts (forced, it should be understood) may be used to prevent threats to the life and health of the population, to ensure the functioning of vital infrastructure, and in cases involving the need to evacuate people due to disasters, epidemics, epizootics, and other emergencies.
It's difficult to say which of these cases, for example, the seizure of the Zaliv shipyard falls under. But, judging by information from the Ukrainian joint-stock company, everything unfolded according to the scenario of a classic corporate raid. A few days earlier, a clone company, Zaliv Shipyard LLC, had been registered in Moscow, and its representatives, with the forceful support of fighters from the "Aksyonov self-defense," took control of the shipyard.
Sergei Aksyonov frankly admits: the law on the forced buyout of "strategic assets" will be applied selectively, meaning, one must understand, selectively. So, a truly legal method is out of the question. Therefore, lyrical rhetoric is used. For example, about moral duty. Moreover, as is clear from the statements of Aksyonov and Speaker Konstantinov, this is not so much to the people of Crimea, but to the residents of the "Southeast," who are being murdered by the "bloodsucker Kolomoisky."
It's worth noting that the "Kolomoisky list" also includes real estate in Simferopol and Yalta owned by Ukrainian MP Andriy Senchenko, which he, incidentally, always declared in his income declaration. The MP denies the theory, floated by pro-Aksenov media outlets, that these properties could have been collateral acquired by PrivatBank. According to Senchenko, he and his partners "have never dealt with PrivatBank and have never taken loans from it." Therefore, it can be assumed that, along with Kolomoisky, Aksenov and Konstantinov have decided to deal another blow to the business of the intractable Senchenko, who is attempting to restore broadcasts from the destroyed Chornomorskaya shopping center.
Of course, many in Crimea, including this author, have something to say about the owners of PrivatBank, which has frozen the accounts of hundreds of thousands of individuals and legal entities and stubbornly refuses to return Crimeans' deposits even on the mainland. However, Kolomoisky certainly didn't "earn" the expropriation of his property by this means. He earned it, firstly, by publicly insulting the Russian autocrat and, secondly, by providing resources to volunteer battalions in the east.
The "targeted" confiscation of Ukrainian businessmen's property is determined precisely by these criteria: loyalty to the Russian government and non-involvement in military operations in Donbas. Plus, of course, a willingness to pay taxes into Crimea's leaky budget. This is precisely why "self-defense" forces will soon descend upon the luxurious and well-kept park of the Aivazovsky boarding house, owned by Donetsk Governor Taruta.
On the other hand, we see quite "correct" behavior in the occupied territories from Rinat Akhmetov, who re-registered Ukrtelecom's Crimean subsidiary, and whose Avlit plant in Sevastopol handled grain exports. And, most importantly, he's doing well not only in Crimea—in Kyiv, his "Russian business" seems to be unquestioned, too.
Following Aksyonov's demonstrative threats to nationalize Crimea's major chemical facilities, Dmitry Firtash demonstrated a tenacious scheme "for both sides." At the beginning of the occupation of Crimea, he re-registered Crimean Titan to a Kyiv address (since the plant requires raw materials from leased Ukrainian deposits) and established a branch in Crimea. And by early summer, Titanium Investments LLC was registered in Moscow, where Crimean Titan workers were transferred and began receiving their salaries in Russian rubles, as demanded by the Crimean leadership. Apparently, the Ukrainian leadership pretended not to notice.
Against the backdrop of these unfolding stories, it might not be surprising to see an announcement posted on the website of Crimean Fruit Company, a private joint-stock company, that this week's shareholders' meeting plans to consider the issue of bringing the company's constituent documents into compliance with Russian law.
81,9% of the company's shares are owned by Myronivsky Hliboproduct, a subsidiary of Yuriy Kosyuk. The agricultural oligarch, as is well known, has held the position of First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration of Ukraine since July 3rd. Therefore, the question of how this private interest relates to the state's interests is not for businessman Kosyuk, but for President Poroshenko, who staffed his administration with successful business managers who never fully became civil servants.
According to ZN.UA, Yuriy Kosyuk is currently not at Bankova Street, but on his beloved boat, said to be the longest in the domestic oligarchic yacht club, with the telling name "Ace" (translated from English). Until recently, Kosyuk oversaw the security services in the Presidential Administration. However, neither the war in the east nor the gravity of his duties prevented the billionaire official from spending weekends at an expensive Italian resort in August, including, according to media reports, in the company of an oligarch from a country at war with us, Roman Abramovich. According to several ZN.UA sources, Kosyuk has submitted his resignation. If this is indeed the case, then he has made his choice. The question arises: why has Petro Poroshenko not accepted his resignation, as they say, for two weeks now? Is he waiting for Kosyuk to register Druzhba Narodov Nova, in addition to the Fruit Company, with the Unified State Register of Legal Entities of Russia? If there was no statement, then a simple question arises: why?
Of course, there would have been far fewer of these unsightly and foul-smelling stories if the Cabinet of Ministers had prepared and submitted to the Verkhovna Rada a coherent bill on economic activity in annexed Crimea in a timely manner—that is, within the 15-day period specified in the law on occupied territories—with clear rules on what Ukraine permits and what activities are prohibited. Instead, as we have reported in detail, a bill (authored by S. Terekhin and K. Lyapina) on the creation of a fake free economic zone was introduced. Public activists are demanding that the president veto this bill, as it essentially recognizes the annexation of Crimea and could lead to discrimination against Ukrainian citizens living there. According to experts from the Maidan of Foreign Affairs foundation, the bill was lobbied by a group of businessmen in parliament and their oligarch clients, who are seeking, by hook or by crook, to continue making money in the occupied territories. In short, everything is as before here – corruption continues to kill the country, vilely shooting in the back those who come to defend it...
Valentina Samar. Mirror of the Week. Ukraine
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