Petro Poroshenko
On August 29, during the National Reform Council, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko announced the resignation of his head of administration, Boris Lozhkin, and his transfer to work for the National Investment Council.
Petro Poroshenko expressed gratitude to Boris Lozhkin for his two years of service in this position "during the most difficult time for the country." As Lozhkin himself stated: "I am leaving, but I will remain working on the president's team." On the same day, the former governor of the Kharkiv region was appointed to replace Boris Lozhkin. Igor Rainin.
And immediately, two messages were sent to the “masses” from the media controlled by the current Ukrainian government:
1) Lozhkin wanted to leave himself. He was simply tired. Burned out. But he remains in the squad. And in the team as well;
2) Rainin is a superb crisis manager who brought the Kharkiv region to second place in Ukraine after Kyiv in a number of key socioeconomic indicators, such as attracting investment. And in May 2016, the Cabinet of Ministers even named the Kharkiv region the most successful region in the country based on the results of monitoring regional socioeconomic development. In short, it was a complete victory and no betrayal.
Even in the distant past, less than a year ago, the end of the political summer of 2015 was a heated one in Ukraine. The domestic political conflict between Poroshenko and Kolomoisky was in full swing. The recalcitrant oligarch was still unwilling to "live the new way." The clash of political heavyweights was watched with interest beyond Ukraine's borders, especially in the United States. At stake was the success of their second project in the last ten years, "Ukraine is not Russia."
In the summer of 2015, the internal political conflict between Poroshenko and Kolomoisky was in full swing.
The project was beginning to show cracks, and they needed urgent patching. That's why, in the upcoming fall local elections, it was decided to test Ukraine's new political reality—the creation of a two-party system consisting of the two main political forces at the time, both loyal to Washington: the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and the Opposition Bloc. This idea was first attempted during the Yanukovych era, when negotiations were held between the two political giants of the time (the Party of Regions and the BYuT) on the suppression of remaining democracy in Ukraine. The parties failed to reach an agreement, and the "Nazi Ukraine" project was launched, the first stage of which was Svoboda's entry into parliament, despite all polls and ratings.
This idea was apparently voiced to Mr. Poroshenko by Valeriy Chaly, the US "overseer" in the Presidential Administration, who officially held the title of Lozhkin's deputy. Lozhkin's second task was to "freeze" the conflict with Kolomoisky and stop the mutual destruction of pro-Maidan forces, at least until the end of the election campaign. A staunch opponent of this plan was First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Vitaly Kovalchuk, who represented the interests of Klitschko's UDAR party (and simultaneously the oligarch Firtash's group) in the Administration. Ultimately, the Chaly-Lozhkin line prevailed, and, as the unforgettable Mikhail Gorbachev used to say, "the process has begun."
It was decided to go to the local elections with a "united front" of the BPP, UDAR, and Yatsenyuk's People's Front
To accomplish the first task, Lozhkin decided to further "close ranks" around his beloved "Communis...ugh," the country's only truly patriotic party—the BPP. It was decided to go into the local elections as a "united front" of the BPP, UDAR, and Yatsenyuk's "People's Front," whose ratings were already at the level of statistical noise. This was Lozhkin's first "curtsey" toward Kolomoisky, who had long, and not selflessly, "loved" the selflessly money-loving Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk. This "curtsey" was, of course, agreed upon with the "boss." Well, as agreed upon—the "boss" nodded without saying anything.
The quotas for the single list were distributed as follows: 40% to the BPP, 30% to UDAR, and 30% to the People's Front. At the same time, the order was given to prevent any "cotton-wool" opposition except the Opposition Bloc from participating in the elections. The primary objective was achieved. The US was pleased and even authorized the IMF to provide a loan for this… well, half… less, of course.
The local elections held later, on October 25, ended in a spectacular failure. The Petro Poroshenko Bloc won the planned percentage of votes in only three regions: Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Odesa. The Opposition Bloc also won in only three regions: Dnipropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhia. The mayoral elections fared no better. Petro Poroshenko Bloc candidates won in Kyiv and Rivne, as well as in Odesa (future mayor Trukhanov managed to "convince" Lozhkin of his loyalty), while the Opposition Bloc won in Kryvyi Rih. This was a failure that needed to be urgently addressed, meaning a return to the negotiating table with the victorious Kolomoisky.
The BPP received the planned percentage of votes in only three regions: Kyiv, Zhytomyr, and Odesa.
A good "pretext" was needed for this, and so Igor Valerievich's trusted friend, Gena Korban, was released, imprisoned in the heat of the moment. The conflict surrounding Ukrnafta was also amicably put on hold, in Kolomoisky's favor. Benya and his partner Bogolyubov became frequent guests of Boris Yevhenievich at the Presidential Administration, during traditional late-night tea parties where key agreements on Ukraine were negotiated behind the scenes, later approved by the "first." However, this categorically displeased Vitaliy Kovalchuk and the oligarchs Firtash and Grigorishin who stood behind him. It was Kovalchuk who drew Poroshenko's attention to the potential danger of such a "friendship." But Poroshenko decided to wait and not interfere. At stake was the US attempt to privatize the most valuable pieces of state property—the Odessa Port Plant and several other facilities, as well as land. Lozhkin continued to balance between the interests of the US on one hand and the oligarchs on the other. Boris Yevgenyevich also didn't forget about his relationship with the "aggressor." He established a "working relationship" with the head of the Russian Presidential Administration, Sergei Ivanov, trying to convey a simple message to the "occupier": "Guys, let's live in peace. Everything will be like under Viktor Fyodorovich, but without Yanukovych himself."
Dual-vectorism 2.0, so to speak. To this end, he even included several controversial passages in his book about how we can't escape Russia and need to improve relations. Moscow, fed up with this dual-vectorism "right down to the 'outskirts,'" didn't heed the message. The situation began to reach a dead end. Balancing US interests with Poroshenko's was becoming increasingly difficult.
Foreigners in Power: Yaresko, Kvitashvili, and Abromavicius
The first rumors of Lozhkin's resignation began circulating in February 2016, amid the escalating scandal surrounding the dismissal of the Yatsenyuk government. Kolomoisky, a "heart partner," agreed to resign only on the condition that the so-called "reform special forces" be removed from the Cabinet. This was the name given to the foreign ministers invited by Boris Yevhenovych (but in reality, installed by the US and EU to oversee them)—Yaresko, Kvitashvili, Abramovichus, Zguladze, Dekanoidze, and others. This categorically displeased the US, and Poroshenko was forced to make a dilemma. Having removed the foreigners from the economic bloc and the Prosecutor General's Office, he was forced to retain them within the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Lozhkin was categorically opposed to this decision. This was the first wake-up call for the president: "This bastard will betray you at the first opportunity."
He remembered well how Yanukovych's chief of staff had arranged a great "relocation" for his boss two years earlier from Mezhyhirya to Rostov. And he'd been lucky. The second wake-up call was Lozhkin's categorical unwillingness to negotiate with the president's "Vinnytsia" comrades-in-arms on the principles of the new Cabinet, whose composition had been actively discussed since March 2016. But the final blow came from the conflict between Lozhkin's first deputy, Filatov, and the president's most powerful group of "dear friends"—Kononenko and Granovsky, who categorically refused to compromise on any control over the judiciary. Even the influence of American overseer Valery Chaly didn't help.
Petro Poroshenko and Boris Lozhkin
On March 18, on the sidelines of the presentation of Lozhkin's book, "The Fourth Republic," one of his closest associates told the media that his resignation was inevitable:
"He's tired. He's simply burned out after two years. He'll be leaving soon. He'll be focusing on attracting investment."
This was Poroshenko's message: think carefully about who and what you're losing. The message was understood and accepted. During the formation of Groysman's new Cabinet, Lozhkin was "gently sidelined." After that, "stagnation" set in on all fronts. The Presidential Administration (PA) overlooked the US attacks (offshoregate, the US loan, the fight against corruption). The voices of grant-hungry MPs dissatisfied with Poroshenko's policies grew louder. The US began provoking a conflict between the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) on one side and the Prosecutor General's Office (GPU) on the other. Poroshenko realized he couldn't wait any longer; he'd be devoured. By late May, it became clear that Lozhkin would leave "with the start of the new political season."
"Who is Mr. Rainin?"
The search for a successor continued all summer. First, they needed to "give Boris a proper sendoff." That's why they dug out of the political closet that strange institution—the Investment Council. In a country at war, where the system relies heavily on corruption, the word "investment" sounds ridiculous from top to bottom.
The second and key issue was maintaining balance within Poroshenko's "team." Lozhkin's resignation upset this balance. Initially, Lozhkin's first deputy, Vitaliy Kovalchuk, was in contention for the position. But the other "comrades" decided that this would be too much for Vitaliy Klitschko (that is, for those hiding behind him). He had already "exceeded" his quota for the summer of 2015. And it was still unclear how he would behave in the fall; what if he went into self-government and thereby undermined the president?
Then the "first" man's gaze turned to Chaly. But he categorically refused: "We'll do it ourselves, we'll do it ourselves," "I'm a US agent, a private and untouchable figure, and here you can get burned." Interesting point. Chaly = US. Does the US really no longer believe in the long-term viability of the "President Poroshenko" project?
A short bench and a reluctance to have someone capable of reaching agreements behind his back (the example of the Lyovochkin-Yanukovych tandem is still fresh in the memory) played a cruel joke on the president. So the outgoing Lozhkin proposed the candidacy of a completely neutral technocrat, a man without political ambitions, Ihor Rainin. Poroshenko approved the choice. Because there simply wasn't a candidate that all his "dear friends" would agree to.
Lozhkin proposed the candidacy of a completely neutral technocrat, a man without political ambitions, Igor Rainin.
He needed exactly this kind of person—a tough technocrat who obeys his boss in everything, doesn't play his own game, and is independent of any financial-industrial group in the president's inner circle. A kind of Mykola Azarov.
Aftermath
Since September 1st, Poroshenko's de facto Presidential Administration has been headed by... Poroshenko himself. Rainin will simply be the executor of his boss's will. No unnecessary initiative. No backroom dealings (Vitaliy Kovalchuk, a master of such maneuvers in the Administration, is the first candidate to leave). Now his task is to implement the "boss's" highly complex plan: the gradual elimination of all competitors from the political arena. Some will need to be bought off (negotiations on the possible entry of part of the People's Front faction are slowly beginning), some will need to be kept from getting too greedy (Kolomoisky, hello), and some will simply need to be eliminated.
The issue at stake is too important and too painful for the "boss"—he wants to become president for a second time. And in two years, at least one silver lining—in a hopeless series of treacherous victories on both the domestic and foreign fronts. Enemies are growing, friends are dwindling. Will Rainin pull through? We won't know the answer to this question until the spring of 2017. Unless, of course, everything explodes sooner...
Georgy Nizovoy
Read more: Petro Poroshenko: Biography and the Truth About Ukraine's "Chocolate King"
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