This resulted in a wide response from the decision of NKREKP for the companies of the DTEK group (Rinat Akhmetova), which did not limit the licensed ones to the minimum reserves of carbon dioxide in TES warehouses. This situation will require a thorough professional analysis.
This past winter, a very difficult situation has arisen, worse since 2014, if there was a significant power outage in the region. A severe shortage of vugill, a sharp loss of dozens of TPP units undergoing emergency repairs, and the out-of-connection of the Zaporizka TPP - all at once caused critical problems and hectic public discussions.
Let's analyze the skin factor of this situation.
The position of the DTEK company, various experts and politicians, that the situation was caused by economic problems, insufficient income of the company and accusations against various government bodies.
It’s true that the revenue of the DTEK Energy company for 2020 showed a net surplus of UAH 19 billion. Prote, once we analyze the nature of this surplus, it is clear that such a surplus was caused by accounting revaluations of some financial assets and currency exchange, and not by statistics, which generated real penny expenses.
The most visible indicator is EBITDA (operating income before payment of taxes, contributions and depreciation), which is used by financial analysts. For 2020, EBITDA was reported at UAH 9,3 billion, and EBITDA margin was 20%. Such margins are a premium for the average market, as for a coal-energy company.
The company earned 17% more, and made plans for payments to creditors inflows (forecast: UAH 8 billion). Of course, in absolute terms, in 2020 there was a decrease in income in 2019. This is explained by the decrease in the growth rate and the sharp increase in “green” generation, which increased by 50% in 2020 and other types of generation increased (DTEK is the biggest driver and "green" energy).
Blaming imports from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus, which was only in the first quarter of 2020 and accounted for less than 0,17% of our income, is extremely frivolous and unprofessional.
And the fourth quarter of 2020, according to the estimates of analysts from Concorde Capital and Dragon Capital, was the furthest away for DTEK in the last two years. This appeared in the “penny koshti” display on January 31, 2020 - 1,6 billion UAH were lying on the company’s shelves, the price was 514% higher, which is also true.
1,6 billion UAH - this is approximately 800 thousand tons of vugilla at the prices of the chest, but it is important to remember.
Vinovok - pennies for vugilla bulli, but they didn’t vikorist for vugilla. And of course, there was a merciful decision from the point of view of business, and from the point of view of image/reputation, and from the point of view of political friendship - and that’s why.
Business.
In order to cover the shortage of electricity, Ukraine is rapidly importing electricity. Over the past seven months, 777 million kW-year have been imported. Import (bottom line on the graph) once production has increased (top line), and TEC units (middle line) have been removed from emergency repairs - all is clearly visible on the graph.
Thus, DTEK, through the shortage of vugill, simply gave its share of the market to importers. From these obligations, no less than 500 million kW-year (which requires 250 thousand tons of coal) may be generated by DTEK itself. And the premium prices for insurance are equal to that of Sichni-lyutoy, which means a profit of at least 250 million UAH. However, this profit was not made through the presence of vugilla.
Also, the DTEK company actually reduced the export of electricity from the fiercest EU to the extreme, wanting to absolutely realistically export 800 million kW-year in just 2 months, for which 400 thousand tons were required Vugilla. Given the super-premium prices on the European markets this month, the company spent about UAH 800 million in profits that it could have earned.
Therefore, in order to produce the necessary fuel for Ukraine’s needs and for export, the DTEK company needed 250+400 = 650 thousand tons of coal.
Let’s remember that the company had 1,6 billion UAH on its shelves, which was equivalent to 800 thousand tons of coal. In fact, the company spent more than UAH 1 billion in profit, which it could have taken from the world-famous market, giving such opportunities.
Politics, lobbyism, gain, irrational behavior.
On February 1, the Ministry of Energy held a meeting for coal shortages. A number of proposals were made by the DTEK representative: 1) remove the “price cap”, 2) protect traders on the RDN (without them it’s easier to work on prices), 3) establish that the price on the domestic commodity market will be higher than on RDN (a completely non-Rink idea, which is in line with all European practices).
Well, there was a warning that up to 15 fierce vugill on TES could completely run out. The tone of such was due to the fact that the difficulties in the energy system could be exploited to push through other viable solutions, rather than looming before the crisis due to Vugill deficiency in the severe case.
At the same time, loyal “experts”, politicians and deputies on various TV channels, with motives of patriotism, insisted on stopping imports, although at the same time the imports themselves were vying for strong connections.
Before speaking, I haven’t written much here about emergency repairs of TES units. It’s simple - but in my opinion, they didn’t exist. Well, that's it, but it's not on the paper. As a matter of fact, mass “emergency repairs” appeared as soon as frosts and growing temperatures set in, and they also appeared as soon as there was a shortage of electricity.
The answer is simple - the power system has a rule that all power plants are required to comply with the commands of the Ukrenergo dispatcher. In times of crisis or serious threat, the live dispatcher, for reasons of operational safety, gives the command to raise the power unit.
The skin vugular energy unit has a reserve burning gas. It was not economically possible to run on gas. Therefore, in order not to lift the blocks at the command of the dispatcher, TES DTEK designated their blocks as “emergency repairs”. As soon as the power shortage passed and Ukrenergo dispatchers stopped issuing commands to turn on, all TES units were rapidly “repaired.”
Throughout this winter, that unacceptable story has been unfolding. The country experienced a 30-day shutdown during the same day, the system operator Ukrenergo balancing the system on the edge of the possible. The DTEK company not only lost the opportunity to earn more than 1 billion UAH in profit for the shareholder, for creditors, for miners, for taxes on the budget, but also put the whole country under risk.
Having examined the entire complex of factors, I respect the decisions of NKREKP as correct and fair. My main goal is to ensure that this situation does not happen again.
The power in its own right can develop different types of solutions, in short: the greater the diversification, the more alternatives, the less storage per resource, the smaller the risks for the energy system, the greater the reliability energy systems
PS Just yesterday evening on the Ukraine 24 TV channel there were already two (!) films “Traces of Tarasyuk...” (Tarasyuk is the head of NKREKP). Perhaps now everyone may be angry and make decisions only in their interests - what is this idea?
PPS This year, the import of electricity to Ukraine from the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus amounts to 0 kW-year. The same zero will be on weekends. There is no consumer market for Ukrainian food, which is sold at a fair competitive price.
Andrey Gerus
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