In today's media, it's very difficult to distinguish between truth and lies. What's genuinely breaking news and what's a massive, well-paid information attack. Our consciousness is being manipulated, and they're doing it ever more cunningly, sneakily, and stealthily. However, it's still possible to distinguish reliable information from falsehoods. Through legal proceedings and personal analysis. But, unfortunately, a professionally inflated information scandal usually leads to personnel decisions. And proving one's own innocence won't help the target of the information attack. The attackers' goal is achieved, and interest in the victim is immediately lost.
This is exactly the scheme used to launch the information attack on the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs. Sergei Ivanovich ChebotarIf you enter his last name into a search engine, you'll immediately see a huge number of websites (mostly Russian) "propagating," for example, the "news" that "gold bars were found during a search of Chebotar's office." Or that he was arrested in Finland with suitcases of cash and under a different name. A huge number of websites propagating the same dubious news, described in the same terms, is a sign of an information attack and... big money. Websites don't republish such things for free. And, generally, they don't republish anything for free.
Even more money is spent "reinforcing" a story with a newsmaker. For example, a member of parliament. In the information attack on Chebotar, MP Serhiy Kaplin played the role of the main newsmaker.
Sergey Kaplin, ORD reference
Sergey Kaplin is the founder of such publications as "Ukrainian-Russian Newspaper," "Iskra Predprinimatelya," and "Iskra Prostoye Lyudi." He is also the author of several Ukrainian-Russian commercial projects.
998-2002 – head of the public organization Ukrainian League of Young Entrepreneurs.
2000-2004 - Member of the Political Council of the Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine, Member of the Board of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, Advisor to the Chairman of the State Committee for Entrepreneurship Development and Regulatory Policy.
Since 2006 – founder and chairman of the public organization Union of Depositors.
Since 2008 - member of the public board at the State Customs Service of Ukraine, the public board at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.
From 2007 to 2010 - Advisor to the President of the Ukrainian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (USPP) Anatoly Kinakh (People's Deputy of Ukraine from the Party of Regions).
Since 2012, he has transformed from a pro-government and pro-Russian figure into a champion of "ordinary people" and an opposition figure. In 2012, he founded the public organization "Movement of Ordinary People," then founded the Party of Ordinary People. That same year, he became a member of parliament representing the "UDAR" party. There is reason to believe that it was during this time that he was infiltrated into the Ukrainian opposition by Russian intelligence services, which, in part, explains his rapid "political rise."
DETAILED INFORMATION ABOUT SERGEY KAPLIN: Sergey Kaplin. Levochkin's "Project," aiming for opposition leadership
Auxiliary newsmakers in the information attack on Sergei Chebotar also included BPP MP Olga Chervakova, former MP and presidential adviser Mykola Tomenko, and two Svoboda MPs. Andrey Ilyenko And Yuri Levchenko. You'll agree, a very good and expensive set. If Kaplin was acting on orders from external handlers, then Tomenko, Ilienko, and Levchenko were quite expensive. Chervakova may have been cheap, if not completely free. This woman, who began her career at Moskovsky Komsomolets, continued to lie even after becoming a member of parliament through a strange misunderstanding. Specifically, she spread information that after Chebotar left his post, his nephew, Alexei Takhtay, was appointed in his place. Naturally, Takhtay is in no way related to Sergei Chebotar, but does that matter if she's working on a contract?
However, a serious information attack must be accompanied not only by bribed deputies but also by "forceful support." Quite serious forces were hired against Chebotar, namely the Prosecutor General's Office and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). Moreover, high-ranking security officials were involved. For example, within the SBU, the entire First Deputy Chairman of the SBU, Yuriy Artyukhov, nicknamed "Yura-Mercedes," was tasked with the "war" against Chebotar.
How a narrow specialist in car smuggling became the first deputy chairman of the SBU during the war is a separate question. The client was paying handsomely to have Chebotar removed from office by any means necessary—and Artyukhov, naturally, couldn't resist such a lucrative opportunity. Furthermore, the "war" with Chebotar had a political subtext. The client wanted not only to bring down Chebotar but also to destroy Minister Avakov's team.
To carry out the order, Artyukhov hired a mole within the Ministry of Internal Affairs leadership. This was Vasily Pisny, nicknamed "Antibiotic," who served as the head of the Department for Combating Economic Crimes.
Pisny was frankly bored at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, as under the leadership and supervision of Sergei Chebotar, he couldn't pursue his life's passion—theft and smuggling. Artyukhov, however, promised not only money but also a transfer to the SBU. So Pisny took the plunge. He arranged for SBU "specialists" to enter the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs' central office, and without further ado, they installed a hidden video camera in Chebotar's office.
Pisny and Artyukhov knew full well that they wouldn't be able to record any incriminating conversations with Chebotar because they weren't available. Besides, they weren't needed. They needed several dozen hours of recordings from Chebotar's office so that the "specialists" of another deputy head of the SBU, Frolov, would have something to edit. The bug was eventually found, Pisny was fired, and as for the video recordings from the office... what happened to them? Procedurally, nothing. Because they initially contained no incriminating evidence and were impossible to use legally. The recordings were used as part of an information war against Chebotar. Artyukhov simply began posting the edited recordings to YouTube, accompanying them with his own commentary. In fact, there were two episodes. Both were of abysmal video and audio quality (deliberately degraded, as modern technology allows for high-quality recording), as the supposedly poor quality was meant to conceal the editing. One video allegedly shows Arsen Avakov's son and Chebotar negotiating some kind of absurd backpack delivery. The second shows vague conversations between someone unknown about the sale or purchase of sand. Both incidents were investigated by the prosecutor's office, and both were found unconfirmed.
How did the SBU's operational footage end up on YouTube? The investigation is currently underway. Why did Artyukhov do this? To whip up a wave of hysteria in the press regarding Serhiy Chebotar. Artyukhov achieved his goal; the wave was unleashed. To maintain it, Artyukhov, Kaplin, and company regularly dumped more "fakes" into the press. A search of Chebotar's office found gold bars!! Chebotar was detained in Finland with suitcases full of cash and under a different name! Chebotar fled Ukraine!! Naturally, it soon became clear that the information being aired had nothing to do with reality. But... equally naturally, none of the lying deputies like Kaplin and Chervakova were willing to apologize.
The campaign against Serhiy Chebotar was conducted on several fronts simultaneously. Members of parliament and the media released fake "incriminating evidence," the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) engaged in wiretaps, surveillance, and editing of recordings, and the Prosecutor General's Office (GPU) attempted to extract incriminating information against Chebotar by pressuring firms associated with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, for over a year, the GPU pressured Petrovsky, director of the Spetsservis Department of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, to incriminate Serhiy Chebotar. Moreover, the prosecutor's office investigators no longer hesitated to make these indecent proposals in the presence of a lawyer.
It should be noted that the information war against Chebotar ultimately achieved its goal. The media hype was artificially inflated, corrupt deputies issued statements, and this eventually began to interfere with the ministry's work. Sergei Ivanovich resigned. But the war didn't end there for him. They decided to physically eliminate Chebotar. And the bandits almost succeeded.
After Chebotar's resignation, the information attack ceased within a day. The goal had been achieved, and Chebotar could be forgotten.
The obvious question arises: who paid for this rather expensive information attack? And what was the cause?
Chebotar was a thorn in the side of many. First and foremost, the EDAPS corporation, which had been milking the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ukrainian state budget for years. An openly criminal organization, headed by citizen Sidorenko, who is wanted for murder, naturally couldn't forgive Chebotar for destroying such a profitable business. Furthermore, as a result of internal investigations at the Ministry of Internal Affairs conducted by Serhiy Chebotar, the EDAPS consortium is under investigation for receiving an illegal benefit of 96,6 million hryvnias. Naturally, for that kind of money one could hire members of parliament, deputy chairmen of the Security Service of Ukraine, or simply kill them.
Who else could have been involved in the persecution of Serhiy Chebotar? The embezzlers he expelled from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who are also under investigation for embezzling hundreds of millions of hryvnias. Chebotar's internal investigations uncovered embezzlement totaling over 442 million hryvnias! A monstrous figure.
Sergey Ivanovich not only disrupted old theft schemes but also prevented new ones from being created. As a result, the Ministry of Internal Affairs purchased fuel, uniforms, and weapons at lower prices than other Ukrainian security agencies. And this, too, disrupted schemes. This happened in those very "other" security agencies. For example, the SBU simply classified its procurement data. To avoid exposing the "artificiality" of the tenders, which resulted in the SBU purchasing the same fuel, uniforms, and weapons at significantly higher prices than the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Based on Chebotar's performance, only one thing can be said. Unlike the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Guard are well-equipped, their combat boots don't get damaged by water, their uniforms don't rip after a week, and they don't burn like a torch. This is because Chebotar didn't allow various profiteers to profit, didn't succumb to pressure from various MPs, and didn't sell out positions. Does modern Ukraine need such a leader? As it turns out, no. He's dangerous because he refuses to participate in "schemes" and doesn't allow them to be constructed.
And what about those bold, truth-telling MPs? Chebotar, naturally, filed lawsuits against the MPs and media outlets who defamed him. He won every one. He holds writs of execution, clearly ordering the court to publish and publicize retractions. But even this isn't being enforced. Because our MPs are a sacred caste, able to lie with complete impunity and systematically harm the country.
And what about the other participants in the persecution? Artyukhov was removed from his post for his smuggling schemes and is now busy developing his chain of car dealerships. As befits a businessman from the SBU.
Vasyl Pisny serves in the SBU, but they don't trust him. Who knows who, and on whose orders, he'll bug next? He was publicly and deservedly disgraced by MP Volodymyr Parasyuk.
EDAPS has been suspended from all business in Ukraine. Will it be possible to recover the stolen funds? It remains unknown.
What's the moral of this story? We live in a time of professional information manipulation, information attacks, and wars—attacks from both hostile governments and corrupt officials and other criminals of all stripes. And the state, in order to protect itself, must develop methods to combat such information attacks. Otherwise, by exploiting artificially inflamed public opinion, our enemies will gradually push the few honest people and professionals out of power, even though they're already in a position of power.
And one more thing. Serhiy Chebotar was "knocked out" to weaken Arsen Avakov. Now, it seems, they'll try to "knock out" the Minister of Internal Affairs himself. Why? Apparently, to secure absolute and lasting power. Appetite comes with eating.
Sergey Nikonov, ORD
ON THE TOPIC, INFORMATION ON SERGEY KAPLIN: Sergey Kaplin. Levochkin's "Project," aiming for opposition leadership
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