In the eyes of many Ukrainians, foreign investors are "sucker" who can be "swindled out of their money." However, in the eyes of many foreign investors, Ukraine is also a territory that can be robbed. One such example is the Kazakh businessman Kenges Rakishev, who is still little known in our country and therefore mistakenly perceived by many as a respectable international businessman with a positive reputation. But what really lies behind his perpetually optimistic smile?
It's quite possible he'll reappear in Ukraine soon, and not just to collect another old debt from BTA Bank. Given the likelihood of a rapid reshuffle of ruling elite clans in his homeland, Kenes Rakishev could find himself an outcast. And while he's already decided on a new home, having pre-purchased expensive real estate in Europe for himself and his bosses, he won't shy away from the collapsing Ukrainian economy in his search for new "pastures" for his multi-million-dollar scams.
Kenes Rakishev and Mukhtar Ablyazov: The East is a delicate matter!
Kazakhstan is considered the most democratic of the Central Asian states—naturally, only compared to its neighbors (as it turns out, Kenes Rakishev and Mukhtar Ablyazov are most sensitive to this). Its socio-political system has its own unique characteristics, which have so far prevented the establishment of an isolated despotism like Turkmenistan or Uzbekistan, and have also prevented internal elite conflict and a descent into chaos like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. This is primarily a consequence of Kazakhstan's extensive "Russification." In 1991, almost half of its population was Russian and Ukrainian, and even after the mass exodus of the 90s, their share now reaches 25%. To this Slavic population, with its Christian, Russian-Soviet, and now pro-Western culture, should be added a significant number of "Russified" Kazakhs, with their distinctly "non-local," non-Central Asian mentality. This portion of the population, living primarily in the northern and northwestern regions of Kazakhstan, despite its passivity, rejects either Eastern despotism, radical Islamism, or Kazakh "nomadic" nationalism. It is also understandably unstructured by tribal clans, unlike the rest of Kazakhstan's indigenous population, concentrated primarily in the southern regions. By comparison, other Central Asian states have a very high percentage of "titular" ethnic groups (over 90%), less affected by past "Russification" and the influence of Western culture today, more conservative, and still living according to their ancestral customs.
therefore Kazakhstan's political clans differ from those of Turkmenistan or Kyrgyzstan, where even in Soviet times, the "red bey" relied on his numerous relatives, on his ancient tribal clan. Remember how "scientific Marxism," describing the development of humanity, once posited the gradual disintegration of the tribal system, with the emergence of noble families? This is precisely what happened in Kazakhstan, where power is held primarily by family clans created by Soviet bonzes—although some of them are, to varying degrees, connected to Kazakh tribal clans. But the latter lack the power to take control of the entire country—not even the presidential Shaprashty clan (the tribes of the Elder Juz), from which Nursultan Nazarbayev, who has ruled Kazakhstan since 1990, comes.
But Nazarbayev is no tyrant, but rather a political arbiter endowed with enormous official and unofficial power, maintaining the balance between clans and factions within Kazakhstan's elite for nearly three decades. In this, he is very similar to Leonid Kuchma in the 90s, just as Kazakhstan is similar to Ukraine, with its vastly different (politically and culturally) western and eastern regions, with its regional oligarchic clans (Donetsk, Vinnytsia, Transcarpathia, and so on). However, Nazarbayev has had the good sense not to pit one part of the country against another, as Ukrainian politicians have done. His methods are somewhat different: from time to time, under the guise of fighting corruption, Kazakhstan crushes one or another overly arrogant clan, including those within the presidential "family." Some are jailed, some are even killed (disguised as suicides and accidents), but many disgraced bigwigs manage to flee abroad, declaring themselves oppositionists. Yes, the media is abuzz with high-profile cases, exposing embezzlers and bribe-takers, but the sheer fictitiousness of this "anti-corruption fight" is obvious. Partly because, as I've seen, Skelet.OrgAll anti-corruption bodies of Kazakhstan are subordinate to Nazarbayev; they are created, abolished and reorganized by him.
Another unique feature of Kazakhstan is its very close economic and political relations with both Russia and the West (as well as China), making it the most open country in Central Asia. At the same time, according to all international corruption and civil liberties rankings, it ranks among the worst countries in the world. Corruption is commonplace there, including at the highest levels, but there's simply no one to publicly expose it. The opposition in Kazakhstan is in an even more dire situation than in Russia. Moreover, the reasons for this are similar: the Kazakh opposition is led either by disgraced, corrupt officials (often fugitives), radicals, or recipients of foreign grants—and none of them enjoys any significant support from their fellow citizens. So, behind the respectable Kazakh billionaires close to the throne, who claim to be international businessmen, there is often monstrous corruption, if not criminal activity. Some of them themselves come from organized crime groups, some have long since become close friends and even related to them.
It should be noted that the world of Kazakhstan's organized crime groups is extremely diverse. In addition to the classic territorial and ethnic groups, as well as the police and bureaucratic mafia, clan-based and tribal-based organized crime groups have emerged, closely tied to the government and law enforcement. There are still very powerful "transit" organized crime groups working with the international drug mafia; there are also groups with ties to Islamists. International organized crime groups (especially Kazakh-Russian ones) involved in the large-scale commodity business (oil, gas, metals) have risen very high, but there is constant fierce competition, as this is the main source of income for all major clans in Kazakhstan, with billions of dollars annually siphoned off from the budget. Compared to them, the notorious Ukrainian "Donetsk gang," and even the former henchmen of Mogilevich and Minin, look like simple law-abiding good boys. A number of Kazakhstan's most influential organized crime groups have long since assumed power and are now "fighting crime" by eliminating their smaller rivals. But all of this remains a mystery, especially for Ukrainians, who often mistakenly believe that nothing is worse than the domestic mafia and corruption. Far from it! Not only does it exist, but it regularly infiltrates Ukraine to profit.
Kenges Rakishev: Oligarch in Kazakh
Kenes Khamitovich Rakishev was born on July 14, 1979, to Khamit Koshanovich Rakishev, who by then was already a high-ranking official in the Kazakh SSR, and whose career continued to soar. After graduating from the Moscow Institute of Trade and the Academy of National Economy, his father assumed positions in the republic's leadership in the 80s, positions that were incredibly privileged at the time. According to Skelet.Org sources, at that time, Khamit Rakishev had contacts with the trade and cotton mafias, as well as with the "tsekhoviki" (workshop workers), who were controlled by both the corrupt government and criminal elements. Furthermore, a little later, Khamit Rakishev was involved in the so-called "trading houses," which in 1990-92 were involved in purchasing food abroad for foreign currency (the republic took out Western loans, which were then repaid with oil and metals), which was accompanied by large-scale fraud and theft. At the head of these “trading houses” stood Syzdyk Abishev, one of the “trading chiefs” of Soviet Kazakhstan, a relative of Nursultan Nazarbayev's wife and the founder of the presidential clan.
Of course, all this didn't make Khamit Rakishev the richest and most influential man in the republic: back then, the "party" mafia (clans of first secretaries and ministers) at the top of the corruption pyramid ruled everything, and the economic situation changed dramatically in the 90s. However, his established connections and authority (in every sense of the word) allowed him to quickly integrate into the turbulent life of newly independent Kazakhstan: in 1993, he took over as chairman of the republic's Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCI) (it was widely believed that this was not without Abishev's help), and he remained in that position until his death in 2007. Formally, it wasn't much of a position, of course, but behind the façade of the CCI, some very shady dealings were taking place and many sensitive issues were resolved in the 90s.
Khamit Rakishev considered the marriage he arranged for his son, Kenes, one of his greatest achievements. It wasn't just a marriage of convenience; it was a carefully planned and clan-based marriage, designed for years to come, cementing the merger of the Rakishev family with an even more powerful family—marriages like these are often planned and arranged over many years. Kenes's wife was Asel Tasmagambetova, his age, the eldest daughter of high-ranking official Imangali Tasmagambetov, close to President Nazarbayev himself.
In the 80s, Imangali Tasmagambetov suddenly rose from a simple provincial school geography teacher to the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Young Communist League of Kazakhstan. Numerous rumors claimed that this was due to the support of Dariga Nazarbayeva, the eldest daughter of the future "Kazakhbashi." She was a very active and progressive woman in every respect, independent to the point of regularly quarrelling with her father, and even befriended people of humble origin (her husband, Rakhat Aliyev, worked as a simple doctor in the 80s). She didn't even notice that Tasmagambetov belonged to the Younger Zhuz (the Nazarbayevs belonged to the Elder Zhuz), but many years later she realized that this was a political advantage for him as an ally of the president. Moreover, during the Soviet era, Moscow also began to support Tasmagambetov, and he remains one of the most pro-Russian politicians in Kazakhstan.
By the 90s, Tasmagambetov had become quite close to Nazarbayev himself, becoming his trusted confidant. From 1993 to 2004, he alternately held the positions of presidential aide, head of the presidential administration, and deputy prime minister. Then, from 2004 to 2014, Tasmagambetov served as akim (head of administration) of Almaty and then Astana. In 2014, he returned to the government (as defense minister and deputy prime minister), but in February 2017, he fell into disgrace and was sent into honorable exile as ambassador to Russia. What happened? The media reported a fierce struggle for the succession to the presidential throne, with many influential clans vying for the throne, foremost among them the clans of the president's eldest (Dariga) and middle (Dinara) daughters. This struggle reached its peak in 2006-2007, when several clans united against Dariga and her husband, Rakhat Aliyev, who rose from a simple surgeon to a political bigwig, overseer of Kazakhstan's intelligence services, and patron of numerous organized crime groups. As a result, Aliyev fled the country for Europe, was sentenced in absentia to 20 years in prison on a dozen counts, and his marriage to Dariga was dissolved. In retaliation, Aliyev wrote a book, "Godfather-in-Law," detailing corruption and clan infighting within Nazarbayev's inner circle, which was banned in Kazakhstan. The retaliatory blow came to Aliyev several years later: in 2014, he was arrested in Vienna at the request of Kazakhstani authorities, and in February 2015, he allegedly committed suicide in his prison cell.
In this conflict, Imangali Tasmagambetov sided with his former patron, siding with her sister Dinara's clan. Apparently, typical Eastern prudence prevailed, especially since Tasmagambetov's relationship with Aliyev was already strained. However, the circle of the president's middle daughter seemed more promising. Dinara is married to Timur Kulibayev (and bears his surname), who rose from a minor official in the State Planning Committee in the 90s to become a major businessman involved in finance, oil, and gas. Currently, Dinara and Timur Kulibayev are among the richest oligarchs in Kazakhstan, with a combined net worth of $6,4 billion (compared to $700 million for Dariga Nazarbayeva), and these are only official figures.
One of the stages of Timur Kulibayev's rise was the creation of KazTransGas CJSC in 2000. This company controls gas pipelines and storage facilities, sells Kazakh gas on domestic and international markets—in short, it's a veritable goldmine! And here we find some interesting facts from the biography of our Kenes Rakishev. In 1998-99, while Kenes was still studying at the State Law Academy, his father got him a job as an advisor at the Road Safety Fund of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan, so to speak, to gain experience. In 1999, Kenes married Asel Tasmagambetova, and by 2000, his father-in-law had given him a managerial position at KazTransGas CJSC. This means that even then, Imangali Tasmagambetov was already in cahoots with Timur Kulibayev and supported the family clan of the president's middle daughter.
Kenges Rakishev himself, having become close to Timur Kulibayev through his father-in-law, became his top manager and confidant (they even performed the Hajj to Mecca together). This can be traced back to his work history: in 2002, he became the head of the Foreign Economic Relations Department at KazTransGas CJSC, and a year later, the company's vice president. At the same time, he received the position of deputy director for exports at KazMunayGas Trading House CJSC (the Kulibayevs' firm, through which they control oil exports and refining). In 2004, he was already the general director of Mercury LLC (one of the Kulibayevs' firms), and since 2006, he has been chairman of the board of directors of SAT&CO (then also a Kulibayev firm; Kenges Rakishev only acquired it in 2015). At the same time, it is completely unclear how this young man, so busy with business, managed to become the holder of a diploma from the Oxford Saïd business school in 2007, which he constantly boasts about, calling himself an “Oxford graduate” (although this is not true; he simply received a diploma from the school at this famous university, which was simply bought for him).
Incidentally, Kazkommertsbank, whose director and co-owner was Kenges Rakishev, is now also owned by Halyk Bank of Kazakhstan, founded and owned by Timur Kulibayev. Therefore, Kenges Rakishev has long been considered not so much Tasmagambetov's father-in-law, but rather Timur Kulibayev's "accountant" and confidant, a member of his family clan. Through this, he gained direct access to Nursultan Nazarbayev himself, allowing Rakishev to carry out numerous scams with impunity.
With each passing year, his relationship with Imangali Tasmagambetov and his partnership with Timur Kulibayev became increasingly important, as the two were increasingly tipped to be Nazarbayev's successors. Tasmagambetov looked promising politically, as he could secure the support of the majority of Kazakhstan's voters: both the indigenous "southerners" and the Slavic "north." And Kulibayev, if one didn't emphasize his status as the president's father-in-law, could easily pass for a "successful businessman," a sort of Kazakh. Victor Pinchuk.
But while they were deciding which of them would become the new president and which the second-in-command of the state, a series of unexpected events occurred. Back in 2012-14, Timur Kulibayeva began to slowly fall out of favor—possibly due to a long-standing, high-profile public scandal surrounding his overly close relationship with Gogoi Ashkenazi, which he never broke as promised. And in 2014, Dariga Nazarbayeva, having reconciled with her father, returned to politics, first becoming deputy speaker of the lower house of parliament and then a senator in the upper house. She took control of the parliamentary factions of the ruling pro-presidential party, Nur Otan, and began actively promoting herself as a public politician. But most importantly, according to sources Skelet.OrgThe president's eldest daughter has found common ground with Kazakhstan's largest "independent" clans (for example, Bulat Utemuratov's clan), those who had contractual rather than vassal relations with Nazarbayev. These clans are currently seeking a new arbiter, a future president of Kazakhstan, and although they themselves are not involved in the succession war, their support is extremely important. They won't bet on just anyone—for example, according to rumors, these clans dislike the Kulibayevs due to their excessive greed and the risk that they, once in power, would initiate a major redistribution.
And then, in early 2017, Dariga dealt a powerful blow to her sister's clan. Imangali Tasmagambetov was sent as ambassador to Russia (and only thanks to the president's favor), and Timur Kulibayev and his partners, including Kenes Rakishev, began to slowly come under pressure. Of course, their business is currently untouched, as it remains tied to the president's middle daughter (and other influential clans), but Kulibayev is already, as they say, preparing for the worst, and is therefore taking some action with his assets. Kulibayev and his entourage are currently being attacked primarily politically, through information, and through the publication of compromising material. Fortunately, there is plenty of compromising material on them, including Kenes Rakishev.
Mukhtar Ablyazov: What happened to BTA?
For many years, two oligarchs who fled to Europe, Rakhat Aliyev and Mukhtar Ablyazov, were two very abundant sources of dirt on President Nazarbayev's inner circle. Now, Dariga Nazarbayeva's ex-husband is dead, and Ablyazov is forced to, as they say, do the work of two. How did he end up in exile?
Mukhtar Ablyazov was hailed as a financial scam genius back in the 90s, when he managed to buy shares in the state-owned Bank TuranAlem (BTA) using money borrowed from the same bank. However, genius alone wasn't enough, and no one would have allowed him to pull off such a scam single-handedly if Ablyazov hadn't been backed by Nurlan Balgimbayev, who was arguably the most influential person in Kazakhstan in the 90s. During Soviet times, he was a high-ranking official in the oil and gas industry, and in the early 90s, he became close to the Americans.His partner was businessman James Giffen, a figure in the Kazakhgate case), he created complex oil and financial schemes in collaboration with the presidential family, and was therefore informally known as "Nazarbayev's cashier." The scope of Balgimbayev's activities extended far beyond Kazakhstan: for example, he helped create oil schemes in Dudayev's Ichkeria and was a close friend and business partner. Ziya Bazhaeva, and helped the "Dudaevites" gain a foothold in Ukraine. It was with Balgimbayev's help that they took control of the Kherson Oil Refinery, where he was a board member. As for Ablyazov, he served as something of an accountant under Balgimbayev, playing the same role that Kenes Rakishev played under Kulibayev. However, his status within the clan was slightly lower due to the lack of the necessary family connections.
Sergey Varis, for Skelet.Org
CONTINUED: Kenes Rakishev: The Kazakh Mafia in the Steppes of Ukraine. Part 2
Subscribe to our channels in Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, VC — Only new faces from the section CRYPT!