Yuri Tereshchenko
Judging by the government's actions, "lustration" is a formal process. Instead of Vladimir Demekhin, head of the State Expocontrol Service, who was dismissed in accordance with the law "On the Purification of Government," the Cabinet of Ministers has appointed corrupt official Yuriy Tereshchenko to the vacant position.
Here is the track record of official Yuriy Tereshchenko:
Yuriy Tereshko is a military-industrial corrupt official.
Following the publication of the first part of our report, dedicated to the activities of the Head of the State Export Service of Ukraine, Yuriy Petrochenko, the latter took sick leave just in case, having urged his partners in law enforcement agencies to investigate the source of the information leak. God, as they say, help us. Meanwhile, we will continue... As promised, we will first focus on the activities of Mr. Petrochenko's closest friend and accomplice, Yuriy Tereshchenko. This man held various positions at various times in his life, but they were primarily related to the arms trade. Perhaps because Mr. Tereshchenko is part of the so-called "Smeshko pack," about which much has been written in the pages of ORD. Naturally, Mr. Tereshchenko has been and remains on the radar of many law enforcement agencies; naturally, he has served as a witness in several criminal cases; and, quite naturally for our country, these cases have not been pursued. One of the recent scandals associated with Yuriy Tereshchenko was the disruption of Ukrainian-Indian military-technical cooperation projects.
We quote the statement of the Chairman of the Board of JSC MAVT M. Bershadsky:
"To date, not only have we received no support from the government, but on the contrary, we are subject to colossal pressure and persecution, which hinders not only our work in India but also the work of a number of Ukrainian defense industry enterprises. To confirm this, I will cite a very striking example related to the presence of Ukrainian defense industry enterprises in India at the AERO-INDIA-2007 aviation exhibition in Bangalore, which took place from February 7 to 11 of this year. At this exhibition, representatives of the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine prohibited the President of the Artem State Joint-Stock Company, S.M. Smal, from continuing cooperation with me and my Ukrainian-Indian team, thereby disrupting crucial negotiations between the management of the Artem State Joint-Stock Company and the high command of the Indian Air Force and with the CEO of the Indian state-owned company of the Indian Ministry of Defense and his deputy.
According to the President of the Artem Holding Company, this ban was prompted by a decision by the Chairman of the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control under the President of Ukraine, Yu.F. Tereshchenko, which was made in December 2006. The consequences of this decision caused enormous damage to the Artem Holding Company, as the company will inevitably lose orders it had been preparing, namely:
— delivery of a large number of R-27 missiles;
— delivery of laser-guided anti-tank missiles “Combat” of various calibers;
— delivery of a new complex for testing aircraft missiles and bombs GURT-M for the BDL company;
— extension of service life, repair and renewal of R-27 missiles;
— modernization of six complexes for testing GURT aircraft missiles and bombs, which were previously supplied to the Indian Air Force;
- development of a new short-range air-to-air missile in collaboration with the Indian Ministry of Defence's Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO);
— development of a new air-to-ground missile for helicopters in collaboration with DRDO.
Most importantly, Artem DAHK will lose the opportunity to cooperate on very favorable terms with the Indian company BDL, which is authorized by the Indian Ministry of Defense to purchase ready-made missiles for various purposes and jointly produce and sell them in India and abroad.
On February 7, 2007, S.M. Smal, President of the Artem State Agricultural Holding Company, informed me (right at the exhibition near the Ukrainian pavilion) that he had been categorically advised by the Security Service of Ukraine and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to immediately cease cooperation with me and my Ukrainian-Indian team. Otherwise, the company's special export license would be revoked.
Unfortunately, the president of the DAHK, Artem Smal S.M., heeded the demands and cancelled all planned meetings with the Indian Air Force command and the management of the Indian state-owned company BDL, with which he had previously signed a confidentiality agreement and a memorandum of cooperation.
With these actions, S.M. Smal dealt a blow to the reputation and prospects for further cooperation of the Ukrainian-Indian team, which had worked productively and systematically for five years, investing millions of dollars of its own funds to promote Artem JSC products in the Indian market.
Smal S.M. also provoked a situation in which the Artem State Joint-Stock Company will be included in India's list of unreliable companies, as already happened with the Ukrainian company Motor Sich OJSC.
Having lost the Indian arms market, the Artem Defense and Nuclear Power Plant will go bankrupt, as Artem's management hopes that orders from Russia and China will not materialize, as these countries themselves produce similar products.
I'd like to know what motivated Yu.F. Tereshchenko and the SBU and MFA officials? Who in Ukraine can deal with this outrage and who will ultimately restore order to military-technical cooperation and the sale of weapons, military equipment, and technology?
In June 2006, the Artem nuclear power plant was attacked by so-called "well-wishers" from Ukraine (and we have such information from our Indian colleagues), which led to the disruption of a new contract worth hundreds of millions of dollars to supply a large number of R-27 missiles to the Indian Air Force.
These same "well-wishers" reported to Indian regulatory authorities that the contract for the supply of 216 R-27 missiles between the Artem Joint-Stock Company and the Indian Air Force was signed at inflated prices and without effective negotiations or a competitive, transparent policy.
Indeed, the Artem State Agricultural Holding Company signed this contract, fulfilled it, and received a large sum of money. My team, who drafted this contract, also received compensation.
A parliamentary inquiry into the matter has been ongoing for nine months now, which has stalled the signing of new contracts for the supply of R-27 missiles to the Indian Air Force in 2006 (Addendum No. 1)
And this begs the question: who was “not indifferent” to the success of the Artem State Agricultural Company and the work of my Ukrainian-Indian team?
As I informed you earlier, Tereshchenko V.F. is settling scores with me for not handing over to his pocket company, DGZP SpetsTekhnoExport, all the projects that my team had developed in India over eight years, as well as for critical remarks addressed to him.
On August 30, 2006, Tereshchenko Yu.F. called me back on my mobile phone and threatened that he would stop my work in India and that I would have trouble in general.
The call caught me at Delhi Airport in India. Members of the Ukrainian delegation and I—V.P. Petenko, Executive Director of Ukroboronservis; S.M. Smal, President of Artem Holding Company; V.V. Vakulenko, Deputy Director General of Malyshev Plant, Chief Designer of the Kharkiv Morozov Machine-Building Design Bureau; and S.O. Alekhine, General Designer of the Kharkiv Engine Design Bureau—were flying to Chennai for talks with Indian tank builders, after holding talks with K.P. Singh, Secretary General of the Indian Defense Ministry.
I told those present about Tereshchenko's threats against me and showed them the number from which the call originated. Petenko V.P., who was present, confirmed that the number indeed belonged to Tereshchenko Yu.F., who either doesn't understand that it's prohibited to abuse his official position for personal gain or ignores Ukrainian laws.
It's a great shame that, without fully understanding this man, he was appointed to such a high-ranking position—First Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine—as Chairman of the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control under the President of Ukraine. It was from this appointment that the collapse of the military-technical cooperation system began.
Having such a cover in the person of Tereshchenko Yu.F., the director of the State Defense Enterprise "SpetsTekhnoExport" I.V. Gladush at the aviation exhibition AERO-INDIA-2007 in Bangalore (February 7-11, 2007) tried to take away from the State Enterprise "Ukroboronservis" the project to promote the anti-tank missile system "Skif" on the Indian market, developed by the Kyiv Design Bureau "Luch".
Thus, at this exhibition, during negotiations with the BDL company, I.V. Gladush categorically stated that only his company, DGZP SpetsTekhnoEksport, has the right to promote the Skif ATGM and generally work in India, because it has the support of the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control under the President of Ukraine.
By the time of the meeting and negotiations between the director of the State Enterprise "SpetsTekhnoExport" I.V. Gladush and the company BDL, the latter had already signed the Agreement "On the Protection of Commercial Information", signed by the State Enterprise "Ukroboronservis" on February 6, 2007. And the representatives of the company BDL were very surprised by such an incorrect attitude of Gladush I.V.
O.M. Sharapov, Director of the State Enterprise "UkrOboronService," informed I.V. Gladush, Director of "SpetsTekhnoExport," in advance about working with BDL and the Skif ATGM project, as well as about obtaining a permit from the State Enterprise "UkrSpetsExport," and asked him not to create unnecessary competition. However, I.V. Gladush, Director of the State Enterprise "SpetsTekhnoExport," ignored this, as he was accustomed to using force.
All my requests, set out in this and previous appeals, boil down to the following.
I believe that the Supreme Council of Ukraine must immediately intervene and change the foundations of Ukraine's military-technical cooperation with foreign countries and reform the system of trade in weapons, military equipment, and technology.
The adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Military-Technical Cooperation with Foreign States" by the Armed Forces is of paramount importance. First and foremost, it will enable the military-industrial complex to freely enter international arms and military equipment markets and secure substantial orders for new types of weaponry. This, in turn, will enable the Armed Forces of Ukraine to order and receive the latest weapons and military equipment.
My experience in this area gives me the right to propose to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to introduce the following proposals to this Law:
1. Ensure equal conditions for military-technical cooperation entities and enable all (state and non-state) entities to obtain licenses to carry out the necessary work without restrictions.
2. Prevent the monopoly of one entity in military-technical cooperation both in Ukraine and abroad.
3. Grant non-state entities the right to operate as special exporters.
The above-mentioned rights of subjects will make it possible to attract funds and intellectual property of non-governmental structures to research, development, modernization of production, testing and extension of the technical service life of weapons, military, special equipment and property, their components, special components and materials, educational, auxiliary equipment, management, scientific and technical information on tangible media, special equipment and technologies, special software and mathematical support with the development of relevant technical documentation.
Involving non-governmental entities in the trade (purchase and sale) of weapons, specialized military equipment and property, and the technical means for their use will eliminate the existing monopoly and create necessary but reasonable competition in this sector, enabling national manufacturers (developers) of weapons and specialized military equipment to choose the intermediary (state or non-state) with which to work. This, in turn, will inevitably lead to significant revenue streams for the Ukrainian state budget.
Ukraine should not lose India as a strategic partner in general, and the Indian arms market in particular.
In support of this, I will cite the intentions of the Government of India, as voiced by Indian Defense Minister A. Anthony at the Global Forum of the Indian Diaspora, which took place from January 7-9 this year in New Delhi, India. Specifically, he called on the diaspora to provide various forms of assistance to India in developing important areas of cooperation with foreign countries, including attracting private companies with Indian capital to implement certain national projects. Particular emphasis was placed on areas such as trade, merchant shipping, and military-technical cooperation.
According to A. Anthony, the total value of contracts for the purchase of various types of weapons in India in 2005 amounted to $5,4 billion. Between 1998 and 2005, India was the largest importer of arms among developing countries…
That is, with skillful coordination of the work of Ukrainian enterprises, Ukraine can earn billions of dollars annually in India.
Having gained extensive experience over eight years of work in the Indian arms trade market and established reliable and strong ties in India, MAVT JSC is ready to receive special exporter authority from the Ukrainian government and continue to officially manage all projects in India, which will enable Ukrainian military-industrial complex enterprises to receive large orders, which, in turn, will significantly replenish the Ukrainian budget.
I am also ready to report to the Supreme Council of Ukraine and the top leadership of Ukraine on the prospects for cooperation with India and my vision of this issue in more detail.
Chairman of the Board of JSC "MAVT"
M. Bershadsky"
Now, Yuriy Tereshchenko, after serving at the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC), Spetstekhnoexport (Spetstekhnoexport), and the Committee on Military-Technical Cooperation and Export Control under the President of Ukraine, has become deputy director of the firm "Tasko," which recently received the right to trade in arms.
But let's return to Yuriy Petrochenko. In his absence, SBU "bedside" Lenya was tasked with conducting a covert investigation into the publication of our article. This somewhat distracted Alexander Sergeyevich from his daily drinking sessions at work with the deputy director of one of the departments, Alexander Anatolyevich Pereverzev. Meanwhile, at the Export Control Service, everything is as usual. The corrupt vertical of the Expertise Department Director, Yuriy Livchin, is in effect, the extortion racketeered by the head of the 13th Department, Gritsai, is orchestrating, and the general chaos and bribery are worsening. Naturally, extremely shady contracts are also easily passed through the State Committee. For example, recent negotiations between Ukraine and the Georgian and Azerbaijani Ministries of Internal Affairs regarding the supply of anti-personnel mines and booby traps to these agencies were successful and did not provoke any protest from the civil service. However, it is quite obvious that Ukraine is being drawn into yet another international scandal. After all, it is clear that the Ministry of Internal Affairs can only acquire anti-personnel mines for war against its own people.
Sergey Nikonov
***
In connection with the massive scandal that erupted in Ukraine after the August Georgian-South Ossetian war, when the entire world became aware of the scale and some previously carefully concealed "peculiarities" of Ukrainian-Georgian military-technical cooperation in recent years, materials on this topic, published at the end of last year in "GA" ("Ukraine does not interfere in conflicts?", September 27, "Strategic shoulder", December 22), have acquired new relevance.
Let us recall that these articles published irrefutable facts, relating primarily to the “peculiarities” of the same cooperation between Ukraine and Azerbaijan.
Specifically, the aforementioned articles, citing official and other open, reliable sources, demonstrated that as early as the early 1990s, Ukraine, contrary to a UN resolution calling for abstention from arms supplies to conflict zones, was supplying weapons and military equipment to the Caucasus region. For example, it openly and unilaterally armed the Azerbaijani side during active hostilities, prompting the Armenian Foreign Ministry to issue an official note of protest in September 1993, which the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry attempted to refute. Meanwhile, the same Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry, in its report for the same year, submitted to the UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCD), acknowledged the transfer of 100 tanks and 10 combat aircraft by Ukraine to Azerbaijan. Since then, arms supplies to the Caucasus region have never been interrupted, nor have Ukrainian attempts to deny this undeniable fact. A telling example was the assurance given by Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine Sergei Kirichenko during a press conference during his visit to Yerevan on May 24, 2006: "Ukraine does not interfere in conflicts between countries and does not supply weapons to either side. This applies to light weapons, tanks, and aircraft."
This statement, which we regarded as false and cynical, was convincingly refuted in the article by indisputable data obtained through both our own journalistic investigation and the extensive work carried out in this area by Azerbaijani journalists. Today, this statement has been refuted by the Ukrainians themselves. We are referring primarily to the conclusions reached by the Temporary Investigative Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine to clarify the circumstances and establish the facts of the supply of Ukrainian military equipment to Georgia. Numerous statements by its chairman, Valeriy Konovalyuk, and previously published data, in particular the list of weapons supplied to Georgia in recent years, allow us to assert that all the facts and assumptions disclosed in the aforementioned "GA" articles have been confirmed with absolute certainty. Furthermore, they clearly demonstrate that Ukraine's "military-technical cooperation" with Georgia and Azerbaijan is similar in so many ways (from the types of weapons supplied to corruption schemes) that we can confidently conclude that they are identical. This circumstance, in our opinion, is extremely important for both those studying (investigating) Ukrainian-Georgian and Ukrainian-Azerbaijani relations in this area.
For example, a comparison of open source data on the list of weapons supplied by Ukraine to Georgia and Azerbaijan in 2006-2007 gives grounds to speak of their identity. Hence the question, which is not at all academic for Armenia, addressed to the experts of the Special Investigative Commission of the Verkhovna Rada: does a similar identity exist in 2008, in particular with regard to the supplies of the following types of weapons to Azerbaijan: BTR-70 armored personnel carriers; BMP-1 and BMP-2; T-72 tanks; anti-aircraft missile systems (for example, Strela and Igla); Smerch multiple launch rocket system; Tochka-U divisional missile system; anti-aircraft guided missiles; MiG-29; SU-25; L-39 combat training aircraft; launchers; rockets, etc.?
In our opinion, to obtain a more complete picture of the illegal arms shipments to the region, the investigative commission must also pay attention to another, far from unimportant, circumstance. In 2006-2007, a significant volume of spare parts for various types of weapons was shipped from Ukraine to Azerbaijan. The wide range of spare parts suggests that these shipments were essentially disassembled weapons, with final assembly taking place in the Republic of Azerbaijan (indirect evidence of this is the rapid growth of the production capacity of the Ministry of Defense Industry of the Republic of Azerbaijan). Of particular interest in this regard are the spare parts intended for completing the equipment in service with the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, which is not listed in the UN Register.
On the other hand, the well-known fact that the Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems were operated by Ukrainian crews during the military operations in South Ossetia was sensational news for the investigative commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.
Here's what Pavel Zvonarev, Deputy Director of the Institute for the United States and Canada, has to say on this matter: "We can say with a fair degree of certainty that Ukrainian personnel assisted the Georgian armed forces, because there are specific regulations for the supply of weapons and military equipment. The country that supplies weapons and military equipment is generally required to train its personnel for their operation and combat use. Furthermore, the data on the Georgian personnel's readiness to operate modern air defense equipment is highly questionable. Therefore, it's likely that Ukraine illegally supplied not only weapons and military equipment but also sent specialists."
Incidentally, this very fact is particularly stubbornly denied by the Ukrainian leadership. A parallel with Ukraine's military-technical cooperation with Azerbaijan may help clarify the situation. Let's cite just one fact. While supplying L-39 combat-trainer aircraft to Azerbaijan, Ukraine assumed certain obligations for their maintenance, periodically sending specialists to Azerbaijan for this purpose. Here, for example, are excerpts from a correspondence on this matter between A. Kovalenko, First Deputy General Director of Ukrspetsexport State Corporation, and A. Rahimov, General Director of AIRTECHSERVICE Corporation.
On June 16, 2006, Mr. Kovalenko informed Mr. Rahimov that Ukrspetsexport was able to provide practical training for MiG-29 aircraft pilots of the Azerbaijani Air Force at the customer's premises. He then offered aircraft for training and the necessary electronic flight support equipment for the Sitalchay airfield, where Ukrainian pilots could also be trained. All of this is certainly interesting. However, in this case, we are interested in the following question: What professional conduct would Ukrainian instructors and pilots demonstrate if the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resumed?
By the way, in light of the above, the following fragments of correspondence between representatives of Ukrspetsexport and Mr. Rahimov may be of interest, such as a letter from Acting Deputy Director O. Kostenko, who on December 20, 2006 reports that on the same day, Chief Engineer of OARP Odesaviaremservis Valentin Gostishchev is leaving for Azerbaijan from Istanbul, and asks to ensure his meeting and access to the site of operation of L-39 aircraft. On December 22, First Deputy Director of SpetsTekhExport, a subsidiary of Ukrspetsexport, A. Nemirovich reports in Baku "the composition and passport data of the team of specialists of the State Enterprise MOU CHARZ (9 people), who will be seconded to assemble and hand over the second batch of L-39 aircraft in accordance with contract NSTE-2-43-K/KE-2005 dated 12.08.2005." January 26, 2007 The director of another subsidiary of the State Corporation "Ukrspetsexport", "Ukrinmash", D. Peregudov, informs the same Mr. Ragimov that "to carry out work on installing the BUR-4-1 on six L-39 aircraft... two specialists from the State Enterprise "Chuguev Aircraft Repair Plant" will be sent to Azerbaijan from 03.02.2007 to 03.04.2007, who should be provided with access to the place where the work is being carried out and the transfer of the necessary equipment."
Whenever mentioning any agencies or companies involved in arms supplies from Ukraine, discussions of corruption are inevitable. This is especially true since corruption in this sector has finally begun to be discussed openly in Ukraine. In this regard, we note Valeriy Konovalyuk's statement of November 4, in which he claimed that Ukrainian President Yushchenko received valuable gifts from his friend and godfather, Saakashvili, when arming the Georgian army. For example, two Land Rovers, each worth over $100. We, of course, are not aware of any presidential-level deals, but we are convinced that, in order to identify elements of corruption on the part of Ukrainian officials (including the highest-ranking ones), it would be extremely useful to investigate the connection with the equipment supplied by Ukraine to Azerbaijan, especially since Interpol has already completed some of the work in this area (see publications in Real Azerbaijan from March 6, 2006 and September 27, 2007, or their summary in GA).
A special commission of the Verkhovna Rada, as is known, compiled a list of equipment supplied by Ukraine to Georgia over the past 10 years, not least to establish any elements of corruption in these deliveries. In this list, under the heading "Supply channel and supplier of weapons and military equipment," it is indicated that in August 2007, the American company VVS Engineering LTD was responsible for the delivery of 12 T-72 tanks and spare parts for them. We refer anyone interested in the technology of corrupt transactions involving this company to the article "Is Ukraine not interfering in conflicts?" We assure you, you will learn many interesting things.
Mr. Konovalyuk stated in an interview that "over the past four years, Ukrainian arms sales abroad amounted to $2,5 billion, but the treasury received 10 times less. This fact will be investigated by the Prosecutor General's Office." We strongly recommend that the Prosecutor General's Office of Ukraine review the materials published by Azerbaijani journalists in "GA." We are confident that the origins of the missing billions can be found not only in the highly publicized corrupt deals with Georgia (to which, according to competent authorities, the weapons were sold at 20% below the official price), but also, possibly, in even more unprofitable deals with Azerbaijan.
Or here's another scandalous "sensation." It turns out that Ukraine's leadership is supplying weapons to Georgia, thereby undermining its own defense capabilities. We quote our article "Strategic Leverage": "To the detriment of its own armed forces, Kyiv is arming Baku with the best of its military-technical arsenal..." The article uses specific examples to demonstrate how this is done.
And today, it seems appropriate to quote the final section of this article: "The reader may have noticed that in this article we have not touched on the political aspect of the issue at all, at least within the framework of GUAM relations. However, this, in particular, does not mean that Georgia, which graciously and unrestrictedly provides its transit capabilities (air and land) for the GUAM bloc, is in no way involved in the dirty deals between Ukraine and Azerbaijan. And here, too, the question arises: how does the Ukraine-Azerbaijan tandem pay for the shipping duties? Perhaps with unaccounted-for weapons?"
A year ago, we could afford to talk about military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, while ignoring the political and other aspects of the problem. But today, it is openly acknowledged that Ukraine bears responsibility for what happened in the South Caucasus, for the fact that its equipment and weapons were used to kill civilians and Russian peacekeepers. There is no escaping the questions that, in our opinion, the Verkhovna Rada Investigative Commission is obligated to answer:
What are the reasons for Ukraine's active participation in the militarization of the South Caucasus? What political goals does the Ukrainian leadership pursue by fostering the growth of militaristic potential in the South Caucasus? How can we explain the geography of Ukraine's arms exports, which practically coincides with the geography of conflict regions: Azerbaijan, Georgia, Chad, Nigeria, Guinea, Rwanda, Kenya, and Iraq? And finally, at whose behest and in whose interests is this being done? After all, these are, first and foremost, questions of political responsibility to the peoples—Ukrainian, Georgian, Azerbaijani, and all others—in accordance with the full geography of the supplies...
Based on materials from Ruspres
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