Mikhail Dobkin: Dopa is on Gepa's hook
Throughout his life, he was always second in command. Until his gray hairs, Mykhailo Dobkin stood behind his father, who ran the family business. Having become mayor of Ukraine's second capital, he earned the nickname "the second Ukrainian "professor," and remained the second man in Kharkiv even after rising to governor—since he was merely a puppet in the hands of his friend and business partner, Gennady Kernes. His only attempt to take on a solo career in big politics, replacing the absconding leader, ended in utter failure. However, for now, Dobkin remains one of the richest men in Ukraine. For now...
Mark Moiseevich and sons
Dobkin Mikhail Markovich Born on January 26, 1970, in Kharkiv, to Mark Moiseevich Dobkin (1947-2016) and Alla Nikolaevna Dobkina (born in 1947), he has a younger brother, Dmitry (born in 1975), who has served as a member of the Verkhovna Rada since 2012. It is to their father, Mark Moiseevich, that the brothers owe their successful lives as typical Ukrainian millionaires—and it all began back in the 80s.
Mark Moiseevich and Alla Nikolaevna Dobkin
At the time, Mark Moiseevich worked at the "1000 Little Things" store on the small Suzdal Ryady shopping street in the center of Kharkov, next to the Trade House and the Central Market, and had close ties with the management of the consumer goods wholesale depot located there. During times of shortages, this was a real gold mine: all you had to do was stash away fast-moving goods and then sell them at a markup. So the Dobkins had been involved in business even during Soviet times—albeit illegally. And where there was illegal money, there was crime. Near Dobkin's store, it materialized in the form of a gang of thugs and "swindlers" from the "Novie Doma" (Novie Doma is a large residential area of Kharkov) led by a certain Gepa—whom one could discern as the future Kharkov mayor Gennady Kernes.Read more about it in the article Gennady Kernes: Dark pages of the Kharkiv mayor's past) at the time, he was "earning" his living by playing shell games and "scamming suckers." Gepa had two nearby "spots": near the Start auto shop (Lopansky Lane) and near the Trade House, so Mark Dobkin's shop was within his territory. That's how they met.
Meanwhile, Misha, who graduated from high school in 1987, found work in a "manufacturing" facility—a practice common among young men of that era, awaiting a draft notice instead of entering university. However, it was rumored that he was only officially employed at the "manufacturing facility," while in reality he was helping his father in trade and opening the first cooperative sewing fashionable trousers from Soviet raincoat fabric procured by Mark Moiseevich.
Mikhail Dobkin in the army
In 1988, Mikhail Dobkin left for the Air Defense Forces to serve in the Kyiv Military District. And in 1990, he returned home not alone, but with... his young wife, holding the hand of an eight-year-old girl. Clearly, this wasn't Mikhail's daughter, but the child from his first marriage to Lyudmila Vikentyeva Molotokas, who, moreover, was eight years older than her new husband. But her father, it was said, wore large stars and was a high-ranking official in the military district's political directorate. To seduce a general's daughter—what more could a young conscript dream of? It seems that Mikhail Dobkin's subsequent military service was free of the expected hardships and privations. And after Lyudmila became actively involved in the family business, Mark Moiseevich fully approved of his eldest son's choice.
One of their first businesses, called "Golden Autumn," was registered at 12 Suzdalskiye Ryady Street and engaged in small-scale wholesale trade of warehouse contents, which had already officially migrated to the hands of resourceful "cooperators." Now Mark Moiseevich no longer needed to disguise his commercial activities, which he introduced Mikhail, his wife Lyudmila, who had returned from the army, and his youngest son, Dmitry, who was still in high school. He placed them in his other cooperative, the production and trade association "Progress-90." Dmitry served as a senior salesperson from 1990 to 92 (to the detriment of his studies, which affected his future), while Mikhail handled commercial relations, and in 1993, his father ceded the director's position to him. By that time, Mark Moiseevich already had other businesses, preferring the much more profitable trade of trousers and shoes.
The turbulent 90s: oil, Bush's legs, and VAT
In the 90s, every "cool kid" dreamed of owning his own gas station or auto repair shop (at least on the level of a tire shop), while smarter people, a few rungs higher on the social ladder, strove to get their hands on wholesale fuel trade: oil products, gas, coal. And this trade was utterly corrupt and even criminal; it was impossible to break into it "off the street," especially in Kharkiv, where the "mads" had even carved up vacant lots into their own zones of influence, creating spontaneous trading. Desperate loners, naive believers in a free market, were later found in the city's forest parks, severely mutilated before death, as Kharkiv's criminal underworld was known for its deranged, sadistic tendencies. The Dobkin family, however, entered this business easily and smoothly, thanks to Mark Moiseevich's long-standing and numerous connections in all the right spheres: business, government, law enforcement, and, of course, organized crime. However, the number of companies he opened remains elusive: sometimes Mark Dobkin would register a shell company for a single transaction. At the same time, he had several main companies involved in all his schemes, through which he not only profited from the deals but also significantly saved on benefits.
What happens next is even more interesting. Mark Moiseevich's companies purchased petroleum products and gas condensate through the Chernobyl-related enterprises Brig, Burtex, and Bizon, created with the participation of Alexander Bandurka. And the Bandurka family is a true legend in Kharkiv! Back in Soviet times, when Mark Dobkin was peddling scarce goods under the table, Alexander Bandurka headed the Kharkiv Department of Internal Affairs. And judging by the fact that Mark Moiseevich was never prosecuted, and criminal activity never bothered him, they could well have formed a fruitful partnership. Later, in the 90s, Alexander Bandurka played a significant role in replacing criminal protection in Kharkiv with a police one. He himself was involved in various businesses, from a yeast factory to arms supplies to Yugoslavia, and later became the rector of the National University of Internal Affairs. His eldest son, also named Alexander, received a leadership position in the Kharkiv tax administration in 2003 thanks to his father, and his other son, Sergei, became the head of the regional tax police. As they say, no comment!
Alexander Bandurka
Let's return to the "Chernobyl" firms: they received their name because they were registered in villages in the Kyiv and Zhytomyr regions affected by the Chernobyl disaster, and were therefore exempt from VAT. As enterprises with foreign capital ("joint ventures" in Soviet terminology), they enjoyed a number of import processing benefits. Furthermore, established before 1993, they were granted the right to include their "legal and administrative costs" in the price of imported goods. Most interestingly, in addition to direct profits from the direct purchase and sale of goods, these enterprises earned even more through cleverly devised schemes for compensating their "costs" from the state, as well as through VAT refunds—which they didn't even pay! There is information that the intricacies of this scheme were developed. Inna Bogoslovskaya, known at that time as a legal luminary of Kharkov.
Dobkin firms involved in shadow schemes
According to expert estimates, in the 90s, the state lost up to 3 billion hryvnias annually from such schemes in the petroleum product trade alone (at a rate of 1,75 hryvnias to the dollar), which ended up in the pockets of their owners. Of course, it wasn't just the Dobkins who engaged in this, but many other Ukrainian "first-wave businessmen." Furthermore, a significant portion of the profits had to be paid in kickbacks and bribes, but still, a considerable amount ended up in the Dobkins' hands. Moreover, Mark Moiseevich wasn't only interested in petroleum products: starting in 1996, using exactly the same schemes, he organized a channel for importing chicken legs, popularly known as "Bush legs," into Ukraine. The essence of this business was the same: after the Verkhovna Rada imposed duties on food imports in an attempt to formally support domestic producers, it became profitable only for those who had the relevant benefits. The Dobkins' firms had them, and since 1998, goods had been shipped through the ports of Feodosia and Mariupol, with clearance in the Azov and Donetsk special economic zones. This was handled by V. Skorobogach, a close business partner of the Dobkins, who later became a member of the Kharkiv City Council.
But Lyudmila Dobkina, who enthusiastically joined the business, set up sales of chicken legs through private stores in Kharkov.
Interestingly, the chief accountant for most of the Dobkin firms was a certain Adam Lidiya Petrovna (apparently another "family friend"), and they were registered at 52 Oshchepkova Street, Vysokyi village, Kharkiv Oblast. This address housed the "Camping" tourist center, later privatized by Ukrproftur CJSC, owned by Oleksandr Stoyan, the former head of the Federation of Trade Unions of Ukraine. What was his connection to the Dobkins, since they seemingly never crossed paths? What other secret connections did Mark Moiseevich have?
Mikhail Dobkin. Shoulder straps for Misha.
In 1997, Mikhail Dobkin enrolled in the National University of Internal Affairs, majoring in law. Thanks to the university's leadership, "Uncle Sasha" Bandurka, all he had to do was register and wait for his diploma to be officially awarded. But why, with no particular academic talent, did he suddenly become obsessed with higher education, especially at a police academy? Various rumors circulated about this. People close to the Dobkins said that back in the 80s, Mikhail had been deeply impressed by both Gepa's gang of street thugs, who operated near his father's store, and by his father's police acquaintances who visited them. This evoked mixed feelings in him: from a desire to become a tough criminal to a dream of earning police epaulettes. But his character was only enough to become the manager of his father's store, so the diploma and the accompanying police rank of an officer of the Ministry of Internal Affairs were completely useless to him, like a set of plastic Indians for a grown-up child.
And in 1998, Mikhail Dobkin was elected to the Kharkiv City Council, along with longtime family friend Gennady Kernes. The former "swindler" Gepa was no more: having married the daughter of prosecutor Yuriy Gaysinsky, Kernes became a new man and a respectable businessman—albeit with his old criminal ways. Essentially, Kernes had initially risen through his family connections with the prosecutor's office, which allowed him to assist the "brotherhood," and in turn, the "brotherhood" appointed him as the "overseer" of Kharkiv. When the "brotherhood" was gradually eliminated by the late 90s, Kernes, now a retrained businessman and politician, took over their "common funds" and businesses.
Mikhail Dobkin later repeatedly claimed that he never had a joint business with Gennady Kernes. However, this is far from true. Of course, his wise and far-sighted father would hardly have risked doing business with a man whom Mark Moiseevich had known since Soviet times as a professional con artist, emotionally unstable, and cruel. The Dobkins' business and that of Kernes, who also entered the gas and gasoline business in the 90s, were essentially "parallel" businesses; they bought and sold through the same companies. However, Mark Moiseevich understood the dangers of Kernes's partnership proposals. However, he failed to convince his sons of this and was unable to prevent them from falling under the influence of Gepa, who is adept at manipulating weak-willed individuals. This was largely made possible by Grigory Solomanin, Mark Dobkin's longtime business partner. By the way, there is information that Solomanin has two passports: one with the last name Salomanin, the other with the last name Solomatin.
Back in 1995, Mark Dobkin's old cooperative was transformed into Ukrtorginvest (OKPO 25611259, legal address: Kharkiv, Suzdal'skie Ryady, 12), co-founded by Solomanin. Essentially, the company was created for his youngest son, Dmitry (he became its director), just as East Oil Group LLC (OKPO 30772695, legal address: Kharkiv district, Vysoky settlement, Oshchepkova Street, 52) was created for Mikhail Dobkin in 1998, also co-founded by Grigory Solomanin. Solomanin himself, however, has a brother-in-law, Timur Tenishev, who is closely connected to Kharkiv's criminal underworld and a close associate of the Dobkin family (he is the founder of Nika Plus LLC). It was through him that the Dobkin brothers and Gennady Kernes began a new rapprochement, and this was not just a business connection. Rumor has it that it was Tenishev who introduced Mikhail and Dmitry Dobkin to cocaine, which Gennady Kernes was already using. However, the first drug scandal involving Dobkin and Kernes only erupted in 2007, by which time Dopa and Gepa had already become well-known figures in Ukrainian political folklore. At the time, it was reported that Kernes and Dobkin were the organizers of the beating of Kharkiv district council member Oleg Medvedev, who allegedly sold them low-quality cocaine. A criminal case was opened, but it was soon closed due to "lack of evidence."
The story of how Timur Tenishev became an "honest businessman" with no criminal record, while the criminal cases against Dobkin and Kernes mysteriously "disappeared," goes like this: Lyudmila Dobkina's daughter (from her first marriage) was friends with the son of Sergei Denisyuk, the head of the Kharkiv Regional Department of Internal Affairs. In 2001, the young couple were driving through the city at night and were involved in a car accident. Denisyuk Jr., the man responsible for the accident, survived, but the girl died. The story was carefully hushed up, and Denisyuk Sr.'s most trusted investigators arrived at the scene, so it leaked to the media only as a brief summary, without any names mentioned. However, Mikhail Dobkin, through Kernes's criminal connections, obtained details of this tragedy, and a little later, his father, Mark Moiseevich, exploiting his personal connections with Interior Ministry General A. Gapon and the head of the regional Internal Security Directorate, V. Kolesnik, brought a "major charge" against Denisyuk Sr. Responsible for his son's misdeeds, Denisyuk was forced to comply with numerous "requests" from the Dobkin family, including "cleaning up" the criminal records of their circle.
Mikhail Dobkin. Golden Age
In the 2002 elections, Mykhailo Dobkin, with some help from Gennady Kernes, was elected to the Verkhovna Rada in single-mandate constituency No. 174. Gennady Adolfovich himself entered parliament on the "For United Ukraine" bloc list, but later resigned his seat as a Ukrainian MP in favor of the position of Secretary of the Kharkiv City Council (he also won the local elections). Kernes clearly jumped the gun, as he lost this position just a month later in a conflict with the new mayor of Kharkiv, Volodymyr Shumilkin.
But new prospects opened up for Mykhailo Dobkin: he entered big-time politics and immediately began looking for a ally. During his three years as a member of parliament (2002-2005), the previously non-partisan Dobkin switched factions: United Ukraine, Democratic Initiatives, Center, SDPU(o), and the Party of Regions. He became a member of the budget committee and several investigative commissions, as well as the author of numerous bills and amendments—many of which lobbied for the interests of his family's businesses.
For example, when in December 2002, Ukraine eliminated benefits for enterprises under "special investment regimes in priority development areas," it hit the Dobkins' chicken drumstick business hard. And then came Bill No. 2569 of April 4, 2003.About making changes to the current laws of Ukraine for the creation and functioning of special (violent) economic zones" and No. 3375 of 04/23/2003 "On introducing changes to the current legislative acts of Ukraine regulation of activities in special (village) economic zones and in areas of priority development (for poultry meat)" , which Mikhail Dobkin helped draft and lobby for with the help of deputies Kateryna Vashchuk and Yevhen Sigal. Dobkin himself delivered the following speech from the parliamentary podium in support of the bill: "I am one of those who positively evaluates the activities of the zones where a special economic regime has been introduced, at least in the Kharkiv and Donetsk regions, where there have been positive changes and where genuine new jobs are being created."
Working in the Verkhovna Rada and his involvement in major economic processes inspired Mykhailo Dobkin to pursue a second degree: in 2004, he enrolled at Kharkiv National University of Economics, earning a master's degree in international economics three years later. However, Dobkin's circle mocked his two apparently bribed degrees behind his back, calling him a "second professor."
Meanwhile, the Dobkin family's firms continued to profit from VAT "refunds," a feat made much easier after Bandurka's sons took over the Kharkiv tax office. According to later published data, from 2003 to 2004, just three of Dobkin's companies (Olimp LLC, Nika Plus LLC, and Orbita Plus LLC), having transferred a mere 152,000 hryvnias to the state budget, subsequently "recouped" 80,5 million hryvnias ($17 million) from the budget. Nika Plus LLC, meanwhile, managed to obtain a VAT refund of 36,5 million hryvnias for a fictitious trading transaction (the alleged export of heating oil) that it never even conducted! Overall, from 2003 to 2005, the firms of Dobkin and his sons defrauded the state of 139 million hryvnias in VAT refunds alone! However, they had to transfer a significant portion of this income to the charitable foundations of the Bandurka family, which, in fact, was the main one in these schemes and worked not only with the Dobkins.
Moreover, from 2002 to 2005, the Dobkin firms were actively involved in a scheme to funnel money to offshore accounts through Ukrainian-Latvian insurance companies. The Dobkin brothers' operations were conducted through their insurance companies, Oberig and Gromada (the total amount transferred through their accounts exceeded 3 billion hryvnias). The scheme also involved the Golden Gate Bank, whose shareholders included close business partners of the Dobkin brothers and Gennady Kernes. By that time, Kernes, who had created his own parliamentary faction in the Kharkiv City Council, was actively using Mykhailo Dobkin as his man in the Verkhovna Rada, and through him and his brother, he gained close access to the Dobkin family business—much to the dismay of Mark Moiseevich. And yet, the money flowed into their hands, as the Dobkin family garage eloquently attested:
Mikhail Dobkin: Dopa is on Gepa's hook
However, the golden age of big, easy money ended after the first Maidan: power changed, and the new leaders wanted to make money themselves, pushing the representatives of the "old regime" away from the public trough. In the spring of 2005, the first criminal case was opened against the Bandurkas, father and son. There were personnel changes in the Kharkiv police and tax authorities, and the Dobkins' entire former business collapsed. Mark Moiseevich fell into depression for the first time in his life, and his youngest son, Dmitry, became heavily addicted to all kinds of drugs. However, the Dobkins only lost profits: despite high-ranking officials associated with their business losing their positions and even going on the run, they themselves were not prosecuted.
Dopa and Hepa
The breakdown of the connections and networks built over years forced the Dobkins to become closer to Gennady Kernes, who had successfully survived the first Maidan and even made a name for himself during the Maidan as one of the "orange leaders." Curiously, Kernes was actually in charge of Yanukovych's 2004 election campaign in Kharkiv, while Mykhailo Dobkin, the candidate's official confidant—and the one who would later bear the brunt of the blame—was Yanukovych's official confidant. And in 2005, on Kernes's advice, Mykhailo Dobkin staked his claim on the Party of Regions' eventual comeback, becoming a member of its political council and deputy head of the regional organization—and, after Kushnarev's assassination, the leading member of the Kharkiv Party of Regions. But this was only a formal title: even then, it was noted that the cunning Gepa was using the "slow" Dopa as his puppet. Moreover, it was believed that Gepa only avoided seizing the Dobkin family's wealth thanks to Mark Moiseevich's vigilance and connections. A striking example of the relationship between Gennady Kernes and Mikhail Dobkin was a recording of the Kharkiv mayoral candidate's campaign speech (December 2005), which later leaked online and became a popular political satire.
Despite the awkwardness of the tongue-tied Mykhailo Dobkin, who could barely read the text on the screen, he played the role of the opposition candidate from the Party of Regions brilliantly, and Kharkiv residents elected him as the city's new mayor in the spring of 2006. This, too, was seen as Kernes's cunning: he himself had every opportunity to secure the post, but he chose not to take advantage of it, given that power in the country was in the hands of the "orange" party, and a "blue" mayor from the Party of Regions could become a target for their persecution. Kernes himself became the secretary of the Kharkiv City Council, effectively Mykhailo Dobkin's "governing shadow." Thus, the duo of Dopa and Gepa, as they say, emerged in public politics.
Much less is known about their joint activities in Kharkiv's economy between 2006 and 2014, when Dobkin and Kernes effectively controlled half the city. However, not everyone surrendered without a fight. An attempt to seize the Barabashova market from a local oligarch Feldman ended in nothing: Arsen Avakov supported him (Read more about it in the article Arsen Avakov: The criminal past of the Minister of Internal Affairs), who, thanks to his close ties to Viktor Yushchenko's brother, was appointed governor of the Kharkiv region in 2005. At the time, there were intriguing rumors that among the "titushki" used in the raider takeovers were members of the Kharkiv right-wing radical organization "Patriot of Ukraine," which was allegedly financed by Gennady Kernes (who also provided it with an expensive office space in the city center at 18 Rymarska Street). However, Kernes and Patriot leader Andriy Biletsky then fell out, after which the right-wing radicals came under the wing of Avakov (in 2014, he created the Azov Battalion from them) and became consumed with a desire to care for the "health of the nation," beginning to crack down on the sale of smoking mixtures (which they themselves smoked heavily) and products from the pharmaceutical factory "Zdorovye." It was claimed that the smoking mixtures contained cannabinoids and ecstasy, and that Zdorovye was engaged in the production of synthetic drugs. This Kharkiv business belonged to the Russian "authority figure" Shishkin (of the Kemerovo gang), and its overseer was Igor Salo, a "buddy" of Kernes, whom he had placed as an advisor to Mikhail Dobkin. This was the second drug scandal involving Kernes and Mikhail Dobkin—and this time it involved not drug use, but the production and sale of drugs.
The development of Kharkiv Forest Park, which rapidly expanded under Mayor Dobkin, caused no less of a scandal at the time. While the park's territory covered 2385 hectares in the early 90s, by 2009 it had fallen to 2060 hectares, and by 2010, less than 1900 hectares. The main instigator of the distribution (or rather, sale) of plots was City Council Secretary Kernes, but the mayor merely followed his lead. Moreover, Mikhail Dobkin couldn't think of anything more clever than building a mansion there for himself, behind a five-meter fence. His neighbors also included a relative of Dmytro Perepilitsa, director of the Kharkiv Regional State Administration's Department of Family, Youth, and Sports; Serhiy Koval, head of the Kitaris Kharkiv charitable foundation; Oleksandr Saratov, owner of Kharkiv Yuvelirtorg LLC; and a dozen business partners and associates of Gennady Kernes.
Mikhail Dobkin's house in the forest park
After a small fire in this house in 2010, Mikhail Dobkin (now governor) moved to his country mansion in the village of Artyukhovka in the Zmievsky district. There, he enjoyed the hospitality of the district head, Yevgeny Muraev.Read more about it in the article Yevgeny Murayev: a new candidate from the old Kharkiv clan), to whom Dobkin paid such careful attention that rumors arose that Muraev was allegedly his relative. In fact, Evgeny Muraev is the son-in-law of Oleg Taranov, who was close friends with Vadim Rabinovich back in the 80s (read more about him in the article Vadim Rabinovich: Secrets of an Underground Billionaire) and Mark Dobkin. Thus, they share a long-standing relationship, "ancestral" to which, surprisingly, Gennady Kernes has nothing to do. Moreover, Yevgeny Murayev is under Vadim Rabinovich's protection and is not afraid of attacks from Kernes's semi-criminal cronies—making him one of the few close associates of Mikhail Dobkin not under Gepa's influence.
In 2009, Kharkiv was adorned with enormous blue billboards bearing the slogan "Ukraine for the People." Mykhailo Dobkin and Gennady Kernes, who became the leading members of the Kharkiv Party of Regions after Kushnarev's death, diligently supported Viktor Yankovych's second election campaign. Their efforts were rewarded: in March 2010, Mykhailo Dobkin was appointed head of the Kharkiv regional administration, and in October 2010, Gennady Kernes won the Kharkiv mayoral election by a narrow margin over Arsen Avakov (30,09% to 29,46%), amid numerous violations and scandals.
Mikhail Dobkin. When Everything Falls Apart
The law prohibits governors, like mayors, from personally engaging in business, so since 2006, Mikhail Dobkin hasn't owned any companies—or at least, he hasn't mentioned any in his asset declarations. The family business was registered to his father and brother, but the Dobkin family hasn't always been prosperous. In 2007, Mikhail divorced Lyudmila, who had been actively involved in their business for many years (she gave birth to daughter Alla in 1993 and son Nikolai in 2000), and married Alina Bozhenko, who gave birth to daughters Eva (2007) and Polina (2010). Rumor has it that Kernes facilitated his divorce from Lyudmila and marriage to Alina, thus depriving Mikhail Dobkin of the support of his strong-willed wife.
Lyudmila Dobkina with her daughter Alla
In January 2016, while returning from the Dominican Republic, Mark Moiseevich Dobkin died right on board the plane. The death of his father, who had been the family's lifeline since childhood, devastated Mikhail. He had also been the main obstacle protecting his sons from being completely absorbed by Gepa. Most importantly, Mark Moiseevich was the backbone of the entire family business, with most of the enterprises and shares registered in his name. The Dobkin family's once-mighty business empire had already begun to crumble: in the summer of 2016, six months after their father's death, his heirs clashed. Mikhail Dobkin, putting politics aside, began legal proceedings to disinherit his four-year-old half-brother, Tolik—Mark Moiseevich's son from his mistress, Maria, with whom he had effectively lived for almost ten years. Since the laws allow Tolik to claim the inheritance, the question of his guardianship arose, and someone (allegedly Kernes) suggested to Mikhail Dobkin the monstrous idea of having the court declare Maria incompetent (an alcoholic) and himself become Tolik's guardian—and the manager of his share of the inheritance.
Rumor has it this is just the beginning: a bitter division of their father's inheritance between brothers Mikhail and Dmitry is expected, during which they may also fall out with their mother, Alla Nikolaevna Dobkina—who, by the way, also owns some of the family's businesses. For example, it is in their mother's name that the house and plot of land in Kharkiv's forest park are registered, as well as the "Veresk Dacha Cooperative," the "Kiparis" housing cooperative, and the "Triumph" housing cooperative.
Mikhail Dobkin
This is currently Mykhailo Dobkin's main problem (for what is a man without capital in Ukraine?), but it is not the only one. For two and a half years now, he has been subjected to regular political pressure from the new government and pro-Maidan "activists." It all began back in February 2014, when Mykhailo Dobkin (like many of his associates) disregarded political prudence and openly opposed the second Maidan. He supported the police and the Berkut, initiated a congress of local council deputies from the southeastern regions in Kharkiv (dubbed "Severodonetsk-3" and declared separatist), called the coup in the capital "fascist," announced his participation in early elections, and chose the federalization of Ukraine as one of the main points of his platform.
The new government's reaction was immediate: on March 2, 2014, he was removed from his post as governor, and on March 7, an attempt was made to detain him on charges of separatism. On March 10, Mykhailo Dobkin appeared for questioning, and the charges against him were subsequently dismissed. However, his absence from Kharkiv allowed him to avoid subsequent accusations of involvement in the seizure of the regional state administration by supporters of the "Kharkiv Republic"—for which Gennady Kernes later had to bear the brunt.
However, this placed Mykhailo Dobkin between two fires of hatred from the turmoil-ridden masses. Those who supported the second Maidan saw Dobkin only as an enemy: a Party of Regions member, a separatist, a pro-Russian politician, a Yanukovych crony, a Gepa pal, and so on and so forth. When, in April 2014, he walked into the ICTV studio as a presidential candidate for a live broadcast on the program "Freedom of Speech," a crowd of "activists," shouting obscenities and shouting "Glory to the heroes!" doused him with green paint and flour. One wonders why flour, and what does this have to do with "heroes"? Just a few days before this incident, Mykhailo Dobkin was cursed, pelted with eggs, and nearly lynched in Luhansk. There, a crowd of pro-Russian supporters of the "Crimean option" (the proclamation of a "republic" and annexation to Russia) greeted Dobkin as a "traitor to the South-East" for his calls for peaceful political dialogue with Kiev.
In the 2014 snap presidential elections, Mykhailo Dobkin ran as the candidate for the already disintegrating Party of Regions—the Party of Regions had no other candidates, as all the potential "leaders" had simply fled. With 3,03% of the vote, Dobkin finished sixth, forever burying the Party of Regions as a political project. He was then elected to the Verkhovna Rada as number three on the Opposition Bloc list (having also bought a favorable seat for his brother, Dmytro). However, this was the twilight of Mykhailo Dobkin's short political career. Since then, he hasn't even been able to properly perform his duties as a member of parliament, possibly fearing further arrests or aggression from "activists." Only his brother, occasionally high, can be seen in the Rada, while Mykhailo himself has disappeared for two years, making his presence known only through Twitter messages. The only evidence that Mykhailo Dobkin is still a member of parliament was his 2015 income declaration, in which he reported income from "gifts" totaling 10 million hryvnias! He also declared: a 2007 Toyota LS, a 2012 Toyota LS 200, and a 2013 Toyota LS 200 (his own); a 2012 Mercedes GL 350, a 2012 Volkswagen Multivan, and a 2011 Porsche 911 Turbo (family members); Silver Hawk 520 and Bass Prote 520 boats (his own); a Tracker Tundra boat (family members); two houses, two apartments, and a 1,6-hectare plot of land. And, of course, no business!
It seems likely that in light of recent events (his father's death, the division of his inheritance), Mikhail Dobkin will be seen even less frequently. And since he's no longer a public official and is unlikely to ever be one, and his parliamentary credentials are of little use even to him, and he's lost all his major business connections, Mikhail Dobkin is unlikely to be of interest to his friend Gennady Kernes. However, the Dobkin family's wealth is of great interest to Gepa!
Sergey Varis, for Skelet.Org
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