Winter awaits Ukraine. But that's obvious. And revolution and dictatorship await Ukraine. And that's not so obvious. We'll talk about that, writes LiveJournal amphora.
Revolution
We're witnessing a truly revolutionary situation. It's practically Lenin-style. Those at the top can't, and those at the bottom won't.
Maidan didn't solve any problems; it only exacerbated them. Instead of petty thieves, real robbers came to power, not shying away from outright banditry. Poroshenko, Kolomoisky, Avakov—all of them had past ties to genuine organized crime groups. Even now, their activities are essentially one large organized crime group, only legalized and merged with the state.
Maidan wasn't a revolution at all; it was a replacement of one group of thieves with another. Hungry and aggressive thieves displaced the well-fed and sluggish. The big boars pushed the little pigs away from the trough. That's all there was to Maidan.
Incidentally, there was essentially no revolutionary situation at the time of the Maidan; it was a well-organized protest. First, students and office workers were herded to the Maidan. Then unemployed people from the provinces arrived. Finally, well-trained militants from the West arrived. Not only from the West, but mostly from the West.
Overall, there was no revolutionary situation in February. The people were certainly dissatisfied with many problems that had accumulated during Yanukovych's rule and over the previous 20 years, but this discontent was not so acute that it was impossible to wait for the presidential elections.
In February, the people were simply heated up. Like in the movies—heated up and fleeced. This was mostly done through television. The people were led to believe that Yanukovych alone was to blame for everything, and that if he were ousted, everything would be fine. There would be Europe, prosperity, a better life, and so on. But note that even this didn't compel people to take to the streets across the country. There was only a large rally in Kyiv. And this rally was centered around a special stage, from which specially trained hosts directed the proceedings, while tea and pies were handed out in the square—very tasty tea, after drinking which you become very cheerful and feel like you can move mountains.
And someone set up tents on the Maidan. And portable toilets. Some magical old ladies came out, set up tents, fifty portable toilets, and took them out every day.
But that was in February. And now it's September. And this time it will be for real.
The country is in the midst of a severe economic crisis. The country is on the brink of default. No one is rushing to issue new loans, and even if they did grant a few billion, they wouldn't change the situation—it would be a bummer, just enough to pay for gas for the winter. The hryvnia exchange rate and social benefits—there's no money for them. And money isn't the economy. Money is finance. And the economy is the production of goods and services. A quarter of industry has already been shut down. And another quarter will soon. Because the gas supply is sufficient for heating, at best, but there's none for industry. Not to mention that Donbas enterprises have been partially destroyed, and those that continue to operate will no longer pay taxes to Kyiv. Because they're now on their own.
The population no longer simply "doesn't want to live the old way"—it simply can't. Many don't even have the money to pay for utilities, let alone everything else. Workers are laying off workers, wages have been cut, the hryvnia is falling, and prices are rising.
And at the same time, there's defeat in the war. And not just defeat, but the loss of territory. And several thousand wounded, whose treatment also requires money. And then benefits for their upkeep. And several thousand more killed. In total, more than 10,000 families have lost their breadwinners. And several thousand more veterans, who back in August were faced with problems being recognized as such. Veterans who can now receive neither combat pay, nor daily allowances, nor pensions.
If this is not a revolutionary situation, then what can be considered a revolutionary situation?
It's especially important to note that Kyiv will have neither the strength, nor the means, nor the moral grounds to suppress the protests. The government that came to power through the Maidan, supposedly by the will of the people, has cruelly deceived those same people. What moral grounds are there? None.
The people will take to the streets again, but not because of television, but in spite of it. And the people will demand a change of power. And as one commander said, there will be no more stones or Molotov cocktails. Because there are weapons.
And the Berkut will be gone. The police, who proved themselves betrayed in February, will no longer defend the government, shielding it with their lives. This is precisely why the riots in Donetsk and Luhansk became possible—the police there didn't defend the government, but dispersed immediately as soon as a crowd gathered in the square. And it will be the same in Kyiv.
The only difference is that in Donetsk and Luhansk (and even earlier in Sevastopol and Simferopol), the people understood the situation immediately, without waiting for economic decline. They were aided by Ukrainian nationalists, who began persecuting the Russian language and culture and began rounding up activists of Russian movements. But in Kyiv and other cities of central and western Ukraine, it took war and economic decline for the people to understand who was running their country.
Therefore, there will be a revolution. There must be one. The only question is what its character will be. Will it be socialist, nationalist, or something else entirely? That remains unclear. The only thing that can be said with certainty is that the new revolution will no longer be bourgeois. The 1991 revolution in the USSR was bourgeois. The process of Ukrainian secession had a national-bourgeois orientation. After that, for 23 years, the bourgeois government plundered the country and brought it to the brink of ruin, to the destruction of all state institutions, to the halt of production and the collapse of the economy, to the loss of the war and the loss of territory. Therefore, the bourgeois government of the previous type is doomed. But who will replace it—that is the question.
Revolutionaries
Someone must govern the masses. There can be no revolution otherwise. But nature abhors a vacuum. If a revolutionary situation is ripe, revolutionaries will emerge. It's just a matter of time.
Candidates for revolutionaries may be:
1. Nationalists. On the one hand, this is a very strong candidate, due to historical reasons. The Ukrainian idea is strong in Kyiv, no matter what. This is especially true when Crimea and Donbas are not involved in the revolutionary process (the former resolved its problems by joining Russia, while the latter is separating). Defeat by the Russians in Donbas also, in some ways, plays into the hands of nationalists—some Ukrainians want a quick revanche, the return of their territories, and the completion of what they started. However, there is a downside. In the eyes of many, nationalism has already been discredited. According to polls, two-thirds of the population want to end the war at any cost. Even at the cost of losing Donbas. Back in June, sentiments of "let Donbas go wherever it wants" emerged, and today, with the scale of its losses becoming public, such sentiments are becoming dominant. Therefore, the nationalists' position is not particularly strong. Not everyone is ready to support them. This means they will not be the main force in the revolution.
At the same time, we can't rule out the possibility of a specific offshoot emerging—"peaceful nationalists"—those who would attempt to combine the people's desire for peace with the idea of a United Ukraine—a nation state moving toward Europe. Something like "United Ukraine through peaceful means." Or "Peace. Friendship. Europe." I'm not prepared to say how realistic this is. But it's a possibility. It suggests itself, based on the logic of current events and the demands of society.
2. Oligarchs. The complete failure of capitalism in Ukraine doesn't mean the capitalists will quietly retire. Like the nationalists, they will likely try to capitalize on revolutionary sentiments and once again place their man on the throne. And they might even succeed. However, this won't quite be capitalism in the traditional sense. And it certainly won't be democracy. Or rather, it won't be liberal capitalism. It will be something like a boyar becoming a prince. Only not like Poroshenko, but a real one, an autocrat. A sort of modern-day hetmanate. And no liberalism whatsoever. The other oligarchs will either be completely destroyed (expelled from the country) or will be forced to toe the line and operate with the highest approval, like businesses in Belarus—only where Batka allows.
3. The Donbas Army. If the revolutionary movement takes a pro-Russian turn, it is quite likely to attract support from residents of the southeast, including the Donbas. Part of the Donbas Army could even reach Kyiv, where it will support the revolution. It could even receive a completely new name to gain broad popular support. Without mentioning Donbas and Novorossiya, which evoke mixed feelings in central Ukraine, it could be called the Russian Army. Or, even better, the Liberation Army of Ukraine. In this case, a clash with the nationalists is inevitable, but popular support will be the decisive factor. If more than half the population of Kyiv and the center supports the idea of a pro-Russian Ukraine—roughly 50% plus one vote—then the pro-Russian revolutionary forces will prevail. The nationalists will then concentrate in the western regions and will most likely declare independence. And it must be assumed that no one will be able to restrain them, especially by force.
4. Local supranational militia. The term "militia" refers to certain popular formations, for example, frontline soldiers who had never been involved in politics before the Maidan. Ordinary Ukrainians and Russians, perhaps even those who had been on the Maidan and then experienced the war, reassessed what had happened, and decided to restore order in the country, based on the understanding that if they didn't take care of themselves and the people, no one else would.
Supranational means that issues of national reconstruction will be prioritized over national issues. Logically, this is the optimal scenario, one in which the peace desired by the majority of Ukrainians can be achieved and the country's recovery can begin. In this scenario, the confrontation between Russians and Ukrainians ends, and the issue of relations with Donbas is sidelined, based on the principle of "first fix what we have, and then negotiate with Donbas." In this scenario, no one seeks (or rather, should seek) enemies among Russian or Ukrainian nationalities. The main thing is the country, and everything else will follow.
But it's not a given that there will be enough people willing to put aside national disputes and focus on pressing matters. On the one hand, life and the approaching winter should suggest that Father Frost is international. And hunger isn't a friend either; it has no national preferences. On the other hand, Ukrainians have demonstrated so many times that they are willing to go to any lengths for the sake of their national identity, even to the point of burning their grain reserves to spite the Muscovites—which means a supranational solution to the issue may not materialize. Although, from the standpoint of survival and a speedy economic recovery, that would be just the thing.
5. Military. Career military personnel and veterans under the command of a senior officer who has retained authority among his subordinates. Whether there is a respected general or even a colonel left in Ukraine after all the events of the war in Donbas is a big question. But such a person could be found among those who retired before the Maidan events and thus retained their authority. If the military takes over the revolution, everything will happen quickly. And then a real junta will come to power. Poroshenko and his comrades are not, and never have been, a junta. A junta is a group of military personnel who have come to power by force as a result of a coup. Poroshenko, Turchynov, Avakov, and Yatsenyuk are not military personnel at all. Therefore, calling them a junta is fundamentally wrong. A junta will exist if one of the generals or colonels, or a group—several senior officers—comes to power and establishes a dictatorship. And they will have neither a constitution nor a Verkhovna Rada, but only some kind of state council that will make decisions and they will be carried out like in the army - quickly and clearly, with arrest for failure to comply.
This scenario is actually quite likely. And it might not even be as bad as it might seem. If only because the military isn't necessarily nationalist. It's said that during the war in Donbas, the armed forces have developed a general resentment toward the National Guard and the nationalists from the territorial battalions. This means that the military junta could become "supranational," that is, focused on rebuilding the country rather than finding blame and waging a war against the Muscovites until victory. Moreover, the military knows better than anyone the cost of this war and the kind of victory it will lead to.
Personnel
Of the prominent figures who could take an active part in the upcoming revolution, Kolomoisky and Tymoshenko are the most prominent.
Kolomoisky might play at revolution for the simple reason that he has essentially nothing left to lose. If he doesn't join one revolutionary force or another, he risks losing everything. Although, perhaps it's time for him to simply cash out his capital and disappear somewhere in Latin America. Or Israel. Or somewhere else. If, of course, he has anything left to cash out.
Tymoshenko will likely not abandon the revolution without her participation. Did everyone notice how easily she acknowledged Poroshenko's victory in the presidential election? She knew, the devil, where this was heading. She knew that Poroshenko had actually climbed not to the throne, but to the scaffold. She knew that the pig wouldn't be devouring the coveted orange for long. And now the moment is coming for Yulia to scurry about braiding her bun.
It's noteworthy that Tymoshenko could play for various forces. He could try to play for the nationalists, or even with the military. A military junta doesn't mean the generals will remain in power forever; they could resolve the most pressing issues and call presidential elections. The winner is already known.
Yarosh and Tyahnybok are minor figures, and it’s unlikely that anyone will follow them.
Lyashko could become a revolutionary leader of the nationalists. He'll do a better job than Kolomoisky, but frankly, Lyashko should also leave the country. If he has the money, of course.
Yanukovych. Some believe the Kremlin might try to bring Yanukovych back to Kyiv. Including using the bayonets of the Donbas army. I don't believe it. Yanukovych is a lost cause. It's best to forget about him.
Dictatorship
After the revolution, Ukraine will inevitably fall into dictatorship. Inevitably, no matter who carries out this revolution or who wins.
The inevitability of a dictatorship is determined by the very situation in the country. The chaos and the level of problems that have arisen during Poroshenko's rule are too great to be resolved by any means other than a dictatorial approach.
Any liberalism, any democracy, simply reveals a host of problems and disputes. Ukraine today doesn't need two points of view and endless debates in the hopes of finding the truth. There were points of view and debates before. For all of 23 years. Today, Ukraine has reached a point where all power must be concentrated in the hands of a single decision-maker. He may listen to many people—Ukrainians, Russians, Kyivites, Galicians, parliament or the State Council, military or civilians—but he must make decisions himself. Quickly and decisively. And his decisions must be implemented. That would be a dictatorship.
In a situation of devastation, a lost war, and lost territories, a dictator always, or almost always, comes to power. Hitler came to Germany. In the USSR, after the civil war and the New Economic Policy (a kind of analogue of the 90s under Yeltsin), Stalin came to power. In Italy, there was Mussolini. In Spain, there was General Franco. In France, there was General de Gaulle—not a dictator, of course, but the French had a somewhat simpler situation. Incidentally, the French also had Bonaparte.
However, the inevitability of dictatorship does not mean it will arise immediately after the revolution. In Russia, after the 1917 revolution, there was first a civil war, then a brief "interregnum," and only then did Stalin come to power.
Another war could also break out in Ukraine after the revolution. If nationalists or, conversely, anti-fascists take power, another round of war is inevitable. But given the size and state of the country, a protracted war is unlikely. Perhaps six months, perhaps a year—no more. And then—dictatorship.
If, of course, a suitable dictator can be found.
Ukraine has always had problems with strong leaders. For example, over the past 23 years, Ukrainians haven't found their Putin or General de Gaulle. True, there was a local Margaret Thatcher, but something didn't work out with her. She didn't rise to prominence.
So there's a chance that the Ukrainians, as they sometimes do, will create a historical precedent. It will be a dictatorship without a dictator. Or rather, without their own dictator. They'll find one elsewhere.
Where can Ukrainians find a good, high-quality dictator who will feed and rule, who will be responsible for everything (that is, guilty of everything), who will also speak in a language they understand... where?
Well, it's clear where.
Especially since this has happened before. And more than once.
And what? Pereyaslavskaya Rada is not the worst option.
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