During Petro Poroshenko's recent interview with leading Ukrainian television channels, the topic of constitutional amendments came up. It was clear from the outset that the topic couldn't be avoided, as it was a key part of the newly elected president's inauguration speech, was discussed extensively during the election campaign, and is frequently mentioned by experts and journalists. Ultimately, this is what the West wants Ukraine to do.
Ukraine's Constitution must be rebooted, at least for the sake of symbolic legitimation by the renewed nation that emerged after the Euromaidan and continues to shape itself in the war with Putin. Born out of a dubious and fatal compromise among political elites in 2004, the current version of the Basic Law underwent significant legal metamorphoses, first during Yanukovych's presidency and then after his fall.
Like any other topic hotly debated in society, constitutional issues are no exception—they have their own mainstream appeal. In the current constitutional debate, the main focus has been decentralization. Answering a media question this time, the president once again confirmed that this is indeed the case. Beginning with constitutional amendments, as if making excuses, Poroshenko once again made it clear that the main result of constitutional reform should be a redistribution of powers in favor of local self-government. In this, the president echoes the political discourse, as "decentralization" has become a common political meme. Discussing desired changes to the Basic Law today without mentioning the expansion of local authority is bad form. Therefore, anyone who values their popularity among the general public is forced to embrace the trendy "decentralization." Journalists diligently scrutinize all constitutional initiatives, primarily for the distribution of powers between the center and the regions. Some journalists have vehemently criticized the recent presidential draft constitutional amendments. They felt that it was overly centralized... Publications are full of calls for decentralization. Bohdan Hawrylyshyn regularly authoritatively promotes the "federalization" panacea for Ukraine, consistently citing Switzerland as an example. Many other experts, businessmen, and local government representatives, for the sake of appearances, constantly extol the odes to decentralization.
It must be acknowledged that the need to transfer some economic powers to local councils is generally relevant and long overdue. Communities are indeed limited in their ability to fully organize their daily lives. But is this the main reason for our prolonged stagnation? Public debates create the impression that only decentralization can save Ukraine and each of us. By repeating this ubiquitous theme, the trending political meme "decentralization" has been deprived of critical perception. A new pre-defined meaning has been implanted in the collective consciousness: the redistribution of powers in favor of communities will automatically lead to the common good.
But what if we stop, sit down, and think? Are we really going to believe that in times of peace, our fundamental problem was the imbalance of power between Kyiv and the communities?! If we abstract ourselves from the war for a moment, it's obvious to anyone with sight that Ukraine's internal mega-problem has been and will remain CORRUPTION, even after victory in the war and a return to civilian life. This is the first and foremost point. Secondly, if reforms begin with comprehensive decentralization, then all national reforms will fizzle out. It's clear to everyone that in the thoroughly flawed Ukrainian state apparatus, effective systemic reforms are only possible if they are implemented quickly and from the top down. In a situation of total bureaucratic corruption and a demoralized society, starting with deep decentralization of power will only perpetuate, and perhaps even worsen, the disgraceful state of our country. Currently, corruption is the fundamental principle of exercising power, primarily for the personal interests of nobles.
The starting point for real reform must be the centralized reform of law enforcement and the judiciary. Only then can we begin to eradicate the root of all our internal ills—corruption. Decentralization will make this much more difficult, as the emphasis of governance powers will shift significantly in favor of local corrupt elites. They will naturally sabotage any movement that might encroach on their sacred comfort zone.
Advocates for deep administrative decentralization often appeal to the reformist experience of the Baltic republics and the former socialist states of Central Europe. They claim that shifting the administrative focus to the local level was the key to effective structural transformation in these countries. On the one hand, this is true because, by abruptly cutting all ties to the past in the late 80s and early 90s, it was impossible to begin life under new conditions and retain the communist-derived vertical power structure. After all, Ukraine also abandoned the rudimentary Communist Party vertical power structure in local community governance at that time.
Considering the experience of successful reforms in neighboring countries, we must not forget that lustration was the starting point for positive change almost everywhere. Under those circumstances, it was a kind of anti-corruption reform, implemented immediately, centrally, and uncompromisingly. The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and the Baltic states—all began reforms almost simultaneously by condemning the past and seriously purging their administrative apparatus, thereby initiating systemic anti-corruption measures. Other reforms—economic, educational, administrative-territorial, and so on—were implemented in each country with varying intensity and with their own characteristics. A few weeks ago, a Slovenian academic complained to me in a private conversation that corruption was preventing Slovenia from realizing its full potential precisely because their country had not undergone the purgatory of lustration. Let's also recall the relatively recent reforms in Georgia. At the heart of Saakashvili and Bendukidze's reforms lay an initial anti-corruption impulse (also with elements of lustration). It was this impulse that became the prerequisite for all subsequent positive changes. Did anyone in Tbilisi talk about deep decentralization at the beginning of their difficult but swift reform journey? No! If everything had begun with strengthening the regions, we wouldn't even know who Kakhaber Bendukidze is today, Mikheil Saakashvili would be ridiculed as an upstart loser, and corrupt Georgia would be no better than its poor neighbor Armenia.
Unfortunately, the concept of "subsidiarity," borrowed from modern Europe and so fashionable in Ukraine today, is also not suitable for us in our current precarious state. If the European Union operates on the principle of resolving at the highest level only those problems that are beyond the capacity of lower-level decision-makers, then this would be completely inappropriate for us. At the beginning of systemic change, Ukraine needs "subsidiarity," but in reverse—problems that are ineffective at the top should be addressed at the lower levels of governance.
Let's return to Petro Poroshenko's interview. By speaking about the need for constitutional amendments solely in the context of decentralization of power, the Ukrainian president is mistaken on two counts. First, by speaking about delegating governance powers to the regions, the president defines his primary function as the guarantor of the state's territorial integrity. This is all very well, but for a tormented Ukraine, it is far too little. Beyond preserving the state's territory, only the president's name will be associated with systemic shifts for the better, if such are ever destined to occur in Ukraine. Second, when discussing constitutional amendments today, the main focus of the discussion must shift from the devolution of powers to the regions to the optimal distribution and balance of governance powers for the implementation of systemic anti-corruption measures, which will become the prerequisite for the implementation of genuine reforms in other areas.
One more thing. I'm not sure that President Poroshenko is the only or optimal candidate for Ukraine's quantum leap. However, I'm somehow certain that someday this leap will no longer be associated with the Verkhovna Rada, the Prime Minister, or the charismatic heads of local government. It is the President of Ukraine, within the framework of a reasonable balance of powers and checks, who must set the tone for change, since even the current Constitution of Ukraine, written for a parliamentary-presidential form of government, states: "The President of Ukraine is the guarantor of state sovereignty, the territorial integrity of Ukraine, respect for the Constitution of Ukraine, and the rights and freedoms of man and citizen." Time will tell who will become the president of radical change. May God protect the state from an aggressor, and most importantly, don't begin reforms with a deep decentralization of governing powers.
Mikhail Basarab
The mirror of the week. Ukraine
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