Last week, the Cabinet of Ministers finally published a decree authorizing the construction and transfer of a network for the exchange of confidential information to state ownership. This was one of the conditions for the privatization of Ukrtelecom back in late 2010, when the operator committed to constructing a dedicated special-purpose telecommunications network (DSTN) using state funds (231,6 million hryvnias).
The network's legal successor is the State Service for Special Communications and Information Protection (DSCIP), established in 2006 on the basis of the liquidated Department of Special Telecommunication Systems and Information Protection of the Security Service of Ukraine. The State Service's responsibilities include ensuring government communications, confidential communications, information security, and the administration of Ukraine's radio frequency resources.
The State Property Fund (SPF), in consultation with the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, will determine the network transfer mechanism by the end of September. The transfer is expected to take place by November 1, but this time, it will be free of charge.
According to Ukrainian and EU telecommunications expert Olena Minich, this needed to be done immediately. The former director of Ukrainian Latest Technologies (FreshTel) is categorical: "The fact that security communications is in private hands, and in the hands of the oligarch Akhmetov and the former president, at that, speaks to the complete collapse of Ukraine's security system."
Protection is not for everyone
Against the backdrop of armed conflict in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the importance of stable, secure communications has become increasingly important. The coherence and success of Ukrainian military operations directly depend on how well they can coordinate their actions in real time, without fear of eavesdropping or other outside interference.
In an interview with Ukrainska Pravda, Captain Andriy Vovkunovich, commander of a unit of the 40th Territorial Defense Battalion of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Ukrainian Pravda), said that during the breakout, communication with command had to be maintained by telephone. This is nothing new; PrivatBank even organized a drive to collect unwanted CDMA phones from branches for distribution to soldiers in the ATO zone. These phones were intended to operate on the network of PEOPLEnet, a Privat Group-owned operator, thus ensuring the confidentiality of communications.
Shortly before PrivatBank's patriotic initiative, the newly appointed adviser to the Minister of Defense of Ukraine Alexander Danylyuk Citing military-technical expert data, he stated that shelling of Ukrainian military positions by enemy rocket artillery is being guided by mobile phone calls. He alleged that soldiers continue to use mobile phones, even on the front lines, in violation of regulations. In Vovkunovich's case, the situation was even more dramatic: the encircled soldiers were only able to maintain contact with their command via roaming data with Russian mobile operators. "Roaming consumed 2000 hryvnias in two days," the captain remarked in an interview with UP.
And this is despite the fact that Ukraine has a state service for special communications and information protection. However, Vitaliy Kuksa, advisor to the chairman of the State Service for Special Communications, assured Forbes that its responsibilities do not include providing communications to Ukrainian Armed Forces units. "Currently, the State Service for Special Communications provides government agencies and military command in the ATO zone with the available forces and resources of the government field communications subsystem and the mobile communications subsystem of the state government communications system," he explained.
In other words, in the case of the State Special Communications Service, we are talking about providing communications to specialized users. This includes all law enforcement agencies, but not field units—that is the prerogative of the Ministry of Defense. Moreover, the Ministry of Defense itself and its offices can be provided with communications by the National Confidential Communications System (NSCS), which is defined as a set of dual-use telecommunications systems (networks). Its responsibilities include, among other things, "ensuring the exchange of confidential information in the interests of state authorities and local governments, creating appropriate conditions for their interaction in peacetime and in the event of a state of emergency or martial law."
Suitcase without a handle
Formally, the State Special Communications Service receives a fairly powerful transport network with a guaranteed throughput of 10 Gbps. It connects to secure equipment with limited physical access, which was purchased in 20012-2013 and is located in all Ukrtelecom district offices in closed racks or locked rooms. Government agencies in any district can extend the last mile to these racks and install encrypted subscriber equipment. This creates a secure network.
When the National Communications Network (NCSN) was created back in 2004, it was envisioned that the state would build a parallel secure network—a kind of separate operator. And the Kyiv segment of this network was built. Ivan Petukhov, president of Adamant, points out that the initial technical specifications for the NCSN called for the use of dedicated fiber optic cable.
However, this was subsequently replaced by a cloud solution, or, in other words, dedicated public switch ports. "No one knows for sure what's going on inside. No one can guarantee that the signal path from besieged Donetsk to Kyiv isn't diverted, and that there aren't any third parties on the line," the expert explains. The official DSTZI website also states that the TSSN represents guaranteed capacity, not a physical facility. This circumstance, in particular, complicated the network assessment process in 2013.
Perhaps for this reason, Vladimir Zverev, head of the State Special Communications Service, stated the following in an interview with the IT Expert news agency back in the summer: "To some extent, we have become hostage to the technical decisions made by the previous leadership of the State Special Communications Service. Now, we can only take over the network that Ukrtelecom provides to us and utilize it as efficiently as possible." Now, Kuksa has almost verbatim repeated this earlier thought: "We are responsible for the portion of the network that we built for 220 million hryvnias (the terminal equipment), and we will essentially operate it. We accept the rest as part of Ukrtelecom's resources, and all questions regarding that are directed to them."
National interest
Ukrtelecom claims to have duly and timely fulfilled its obligations under the privatization agreement regarding the creation of the TSSN. Since September 2013, it has been operated by the State Special Communications Service in test mode. "The architecture and functional features are determined by the key technical requirements agreed upon by all special users in the interests of the state government communications system and the departmental special communications networks of special users," the operator's press service emphasized.
"Who needs such a secure network?" asks Petukhov. He believes Ukrtelecom should transfer the physical network to state ownership. At the same time, the TSSN is a kind of superstructure over the operator's infrastructure. But even if we assume that the physical optical fibers are transferred to state ownership, the manholes and other cable infrastructure will still remain in private hands. In that case, again, the possibility of unauthorized data interception cannot be ruled out.
"Only if all parts of the physical infrastructure are concentrated in state hands can we talk about building a military telecom system similar to, for example, the United States," Petukhov continues. "Every developed country has an operator that, in the event of war, is completely transferred to state control." Minich also speaks of the need to consolidate all special communications assets under the State Telecommunications Agency.
Earlier, Roman Khimich, an analyst with the Netton.Telecom expert group, expressed an opinion highlighting Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk's actions to disqualify Russian-owned companies from participating in the 3G license tender. In his blog, the expert explicitly states that "the main and sole beneficiary of this decision is Rinat Akhmetov (who owns Ukrtelecom through his subsidiary SCM – Forbes) and other, now unofficial, beneficiaries of Trimob (a subsidiary of Ukrtelecom and the sole holder of a 3G license in Ukraine)."
Minich doesn't see a patriotic motive behind the Cabinet's belated actions, one rooted in a desire to help the country, boost the economy, invest funds, enhance defense capabilities, and so on. "Everyone had simply forgotten that part of the special communications infrastructure was now in the hands of a private company. And then the war happened, and there was no reliable and secure communications," explains the former director of FreshTel. "It's all about motive. A once-powerful state-owned telecom operator was reduced to a state of near-death, sold off for 'lemonade' to 'friendly hands,' and the rest is history."
Better late than never
When adopting the budget for 2015 and subsequent years, the Ministry of Finance must allocate funds for the technical operation and maintenance of the TSSN. Zverev expects the modernization to give the network a "second wind."
Olena Minich believes it's necessary to inspect the entire special communications infrastructure, "because during the years of active division, the company's assets could have been acquired not only by Ukrtelecom but also by smaller companies." Furthermore, the expert proposes establishing, in addition to administrative, criminal liability for the transfer of special communications assets to private hands. The "specialists" involved should be included in the mandatory list of persons under Ukraine's lustration law. Minich's position is categorical: "The dispersal of special communications functions and the continued presence of infrastructure in private hands, while a neighbor with tanks stands at the door, is tantamount to suicide."
Ukrtelecom claims that a joint order from the State Service of Special Communications and the State Property Fund is expected to be issued soon to regulate the process of free transfer of the TSSN to state ownership. The operator considers the stated timeframe entirely realistic, and the network "modern, technically powerful, and meeting all international standards." In addition to its intended purpose, the state will be able to use it to implement e-government, self-government, and information exchange between Ukrainian citizens and all government agencies.
This would sound encouraging, were it not for the grim statistics from mobile operators. They remain a truly accessible means of communication for ordinary soldiers in the ATO zone. According to Volodymyr Kabanenko, Kyivstar's Director of Network Development, peak loads were observed in July and August, when Kyivstar remained the only available operator in several towns in Donbas. This, of course, excludes Russian roaming partners in border areas.
Sergey Mishko, Forbes.ua
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