Are the President's friends more important than reforms?

The Ukrainian government crisis has been exacerbated by a new war against yet another "grey cardinal"...

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Every public politician must possess a talent for the subtle art of persuasion. Regardless of whether they are democratically elected or striving for power through a coup, whether they are a hereditary aristocrat or have risen from the depths of poverty, they always need supporters. The more supporters they have, the stronger their position as a public politician—whether a member of parliament, a minister, a president, or a dictator. Conversely, if their ranks are rapidly dwindling, it's time to consider how to exit the stage gracefully and safely.

But the art of persuasion is based on trust. What's the point of convincing people who simply no longer trust you? Undermining trust is quite easy, and this is perhaps the only thing Ukrainian politicians have always excelled at. Especially when faced with a choice between the people and their entourage, or their entourage and their closest friends. And while in the first case they simply lost their ratings, in the second they found themselves on the brink of collapse...

The "reformers' landing force" is launching a counterattack.

They expected a scandalous resignation of the Cabinet of Ministers, but what they got was an even more scandalous resignation of Minister of Economic Development Aivaras Abromavicius. This unusual turn of events in the government crisis perplexed everyone, as it took it to a completely new level.

Until recently, the only negative characters in this political drama were the government, whose performance had left Ukraine at the bottom of the "deepest ravine" in economic indicators. Bankova is persistently, if not quite directly, seeking its resignation. The peak of their public confrontation was the well-known scandal between Mikheil Saakashvili and Arsen Avakov, which resulted in the sympathies of the majority of Ukrainians following events remaining with "honest Saakashvili," and therefore with the presidential team. It seemed that the presidential team was now in control, and all that remained was for them to score the winning goal against the vacillating Cabinet of Ministers.

But here, as they say, "their coach got the defense right." Or perhaps the presidential team simply got too carried away with the attack. Ultimately, Aivaras Abromavicius stepped in, accusing Ihor Kononenko—a close friend of President Poroshenko and deputy head of the BPP faction in parliament—of corrupt pressure. He allegedly promoted his people to ministry positions and management positions at major companies, and also attempted to block the minister's work, so to speak, to hinder the implementation of reforms. Seeing the impossibility of further reform in Ukraine under these circumstances, Abromavicius announced his resignation.

The exit was quite spectacular. The fact is that Abromavicius is a member of the so-called "reformer landing force," that is, foreign "specialists" invited to leadership positions in Ukraine. However, while Mikheil Saakashvili plays for the Presidential Administration's team, Abromavicius plays for the Cabinet of Ministers' team. It could be said that the government counterattacked the president with exactly the same weapon: through the mouth of an "honest reformer," accusing the opponent of corruption.

In this situation, the strength of this "reformist landing party" lies in the fact that it still enjoys the trust of some Ukrainians. One could argue about the effectiveness of the reforms they're implementing, the results of which are before everyone's eyes. One might wonder why they consider pressure and corruption merely attempts to lobby for the interests of the opposing team—even though they have their own lobbyists behind them, whom they take for granted. But many Ukrainians still continue to trust them. Apparently, tired of being disappointed in their own politicians for a quarter of a century, they're pinning their last hopes on the "outsiders." The old saying comes to mind: "When the Germans come, they'll restore order."

And it's precisely these two scandals (Saakashvili-Avakov and Abromavicius-Kononenko) that demonstrate how powerful a weapon trust is in public policy. Those who still have it can easily convince their audience of the corruption of those who have almost none left.

Four against the cardinal

President Poroshenko denied neither the accusations against Ihor Kononenko nor his very close relationship with him. Dismissing the latter would be foolish, after the media unearthed and published the full details of their long-standing friendship and business partnership, which began during their military service.

Of course, Kononenko isn't the only "childhood friend" in the current Ukrainian government. For example, the parliamentary committee on economic policy is chaired by Andriy Ivanchuk, who has been close since his pre-university days with Arseniy Yatsenyuk, who has many friends and patrons. They have also been involved in political scandals, notably the recent termination of Mykola Martynenko's parliamentary powers. But in this case, it seems the "Kononenko case" was intended to be more than just a counterattack by Yatsenyuk's team, but a new war against yet another "presidential power broker."

Such wars have played out in Ukrainian politics several times before and have always been part of the strategy of anti-presidential oppositions. The first, which many have already forgotten, was declared in 2001-2002 against Viktor Medvedchuk, the first to receive this nickname.

It should be noted here that Medvedchuk was a perfect fit, as his official and unofficial role in Ukrainian politics of that period was very significant. He made the SDPU(o) a pro-presidential party; he headed the Presidential Administration for three years, transforming the Presidential Administration into the country's main governing body and center of political intrigue; he helped the president send Tymoshenko and Yushchenko into opposition, and then successfully defended him against the "Ukraine without Kuchma" protests. Medvedchuk was a pillar of Kuchma's power and largely shaped his political image during his final years in office.

Accordingly, the then "orange" anti-presidential opposition demonized him in every way, effectively reducing their war against President Kuchma to a war against Medvedchuk. It was even believed that if Medvedchuk were successfully removed, Kuchma himself would "fall."

Yulia Tymoshenko shared this erroneous view when she declared war on Viktor Yushchenko's inner circle in 2005. At the time, the role of the new "gray cardinal" was played by Petro Poroshenko, who headed the National Security and Defense Council and for the first time gave this governing body real weight. Their war was turbulent, affecting Ukraine's economy with a series of crises, but short-lived. Yushchenko ended the conflict by dismissing both of them, like a stern father separating two rascals.

But a holy place abhors a vacuum, and "dear friends" stood tightly around Yushchenko, so Viktor Andreevich always had not just one "grey cardinal" but an entire synod! The gray mantle briefly passed to Prime Minister Yekhanurov, who, however, was more focused on economics than politics. Then the figure of Viktor Baloha emerged, heading the presidential Secretariat in late 2006 and returning the center of power to Bankova Street. Baloha did for Yushchenko what Medvedchuk did for Kuchma, and even more. The power and image of the "Ukrainian messiah" were then in tatters, but Baloha managed to resolve the political crisis of 2006-2007 so that the president emerged victorious.

Yushchenko's last "cardinal" was Vira Ulyanchenko, who replaced Baloha as head of the Secretariat in 2009. However, she wielded little political influence and was implicated only in corruption scandals. As a result, Yushchenko's grip on power began to weaken again, and he effectively abandoned the country to its own devices, turning to pottery and beekeeping. This was a strategic mistake: the lack of a strong political manager, either official or shadowy, led to a loss of control. The opposition skillfully exploited Prime Minister Tymoshenko's war against "Auntie Vera" to discredit all the politicians of the first Maidan wholesale – and won the 2010 presidential election.

Under President Yanukovych, the "shadow power" in Ukraine reached unprecedented proportions, splintering into independent clans and "families," and becoming so intertwined with the official system that it was impossible to discern who was truly running the country. Only its members navigated this corrupt system effectively, knowing who was "paying" and how much, and who was living under whose "roof." However, the following groups stood out among them:

The "presidential family" (Yanukovych's sons, Interior Minister Zakharchenko, Minister of Transport and Duties Oleksandr Klymenko, businessman Serhiy Kurchenko)
"the family" of Yuri Ivanyushchenko (known as Yura Yenikevsky), who was called "the overseer of the South-East"
"Donetsk", or the Akhmetov-Kolesnikov clan
the group of Sergei Levochkin (head of the Presidential Administration of Yanukovych), which also included Firtash and Boyko.
It was precisely the war between these groups that brought down Viktor Yanukovych. If he had had a true "grey cardinal," like Medvedchuk or Baloha, there probably wouldn't have been any Euromaidan or revolution. There would have been no annexation of Crimea or war in Donbas. Perhaps Yanukovych would even have been re-elected in 2015, and Yatsenyuk would still be touring the country with his "Rise Up, Ukraine" circus.

But back then, Ivanyushchenko and Akhmetov were fighting over influence over Yanukovych and control over the allied clans of the "Luhansk," "Kharkiv," and others. Meanwhile, the presidential "family" was merely lining its pockets, naively believing that power was permanent and invincible. Lyovochkin, on the other hand, was perhaps the first head of the presidential administration to defend the interests of his own business partners rather than his boss. Interestingly, Yanukovych ultimately blamed him for the senseless dispersal of the Euromaidan, which turned a peaceful protest into a radical uprising against the government.

In that situation, the opposition didn't have to declare war on the "grey cardinal" because there wasn't one. Their task was far simpler: to fuel public discontent with all these "Donetsk people," "Yenakiyevo people," corrupt officials, and lawless individuals as the offspring of the "Yanukovych regime." This wasn't difficult: "grey cardinals" know how to defend their president's position and image in public policy, even at the cost of drawing criticism, while disparate, squabbling factions can't even defend themselves. So the opposition could only use the infighting within Yanukovych's entourage against him...

Don't have a hundred friends

Although Igor Kononenko is a close friend of the president, he doesn't quite qualify as a full-fledged "power behind the throne." Most likely, he's simply a friend of the president, who, due to his closeness to the president, was appointed deputy head of the faction and also attempted to push his people into certain government positions.

Declaring Kononenko a "cardinal" and launching a war against him is a simple matter, but it will be no more effective than attacking "Yura Yenakievsky" or "Sasha the Stomatolog" during the Yanukovych era. If Ihor Kononenko isn't a "cardinal," then his removal won't weaken the president. It will simply be an information war against Poroshenko, nothing more. This, it seems, is precisely what the Cabinet's anti-presidential team is aiming for.

Here we make an unexpected discovery: the current president truly doesn't have a "grey cardinal." Just like his predecessor. Of course, Poroshenko doesn't allow himself to be manipulated so much by just anyone, and he understands politics far better than Fedorovich, and was even once Yushchenko's "cardinal," so he can stand up for himself. But it's still difficult for presidents to do everything themselves! Instead of numerous "childhood friends," it's far more important for them to have one reliable and capable assistant.

How will this escalating government crisis end? Poroshenko has now repelled the information attack and, without batting an eye, sacrificed his friend, handing him over to the mercy of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. But is he really handing him over to the mercy of the Anti-Corruption Bureau, if that bureau operates under the president? More likely, to exonerate him. But in any case, what's dangerous for Poroshenko isn't so much the accusations against his friend as the very act of demarching some of the "reformers" who have come out against the president. Because Ukrainians now trust these "reformers" more than the president.

But the problem is that the Americans trust them (and Ms. Yaresko is an American herself). Washington's support depends on which side this team is on. And here we have a strange problem: these "outsiders," divided, some play for the government, others for the president. How is it possible that they've assimilated so quickly into Ukrainian politics?! But there's another way to look at it: they never attack each other, and perhaps they're actually playing against the "locals," albeit on different teams.

But for whom and for what purpose? You know, despite the prevailing negative image of our "gray cardinals," they were, as they say, "pro-Ukrainian," because they worked in the interests of Ukrainian politicians and oligarchs. And these...

Well, some are predicting the government's resignation, early parliamentary and even presidential elections, and even a new Maidan. Optimists believe the American ambassador will sort things out amicably, and the matter will end with only a few resignations. But the current crisis, one might say, carefully conceals the failure of reforms—on the part of both the government and the president.

A new police force, the creation of some kind of investigation bureau, decentralization—these aren't the reforms Ukraine and Ukrainians desperately need right now. People don't have enough money for food, hospitals are in disarray, utilities are like the apocalypse—and yet the authorities are reporting to the people about creating a new patrol police force and introducing a system of prefects! It's reminiscent of the fairy tale about Ivan the Fool, who was sent to the market to buy bread and potatoes, but instead brought home a dog named Zhuzha. A few more such reforms, and Ukrainians will lose their trust in even foreign reformers...

In topic: Igor Kononenko, the President's Army Buddy

Andriy Ivanchuk, a friend of Yatsenyuk and a lobbyist for Kolomoisky's interests

Ulyanchenko – "Baba Vera": Komsomol member, thief, and the President's "mommy"

Levochkin. "The Gray Cardinal" and his sister

Nikolai Martynenko: Why is the "nuclear oligarch" being so actively dumped?

Victor Dyachenko, Ukraine News – From-UA

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