Igor Bilous and Co., who took over the State Fiscal Service under the banner of fighting corruption and transparency, are taking the most radical measures to conceal the results of their work.
According to employees who have experienced the pressure of the new government, nothing like this has ever happened in either the tax or customs departments in all the years of their existence.
First of all, the leadership of the State Fiscal Service is taking unprecedented measures to stop leaks of information about the service's work.
A wide range of measures are being used: from intimidation of State Fiscal Service employees (for example, by losing their jobs) to surveillance and preventive conversations.
Moreover, we are not talking about confidential information, the scope of which is defined by law and, by the way, even by the recent internal order of the State Fiscal Service No. 88 of August 28, 2014 “On approval of the list of information that contains official information in the bodies of the State Fiscal Service.”
We are talking about generalized information on the results of work that the State Fiscal Service is obliged to share with the public.
Detailed statistics for August were unavailable on the State Treasury website at the time of publication. This is all the State Fiscal Service reported on its August work.
We still see only four or five indicators being publicly disclosed, which are essentially a "whitewash." Specific tax collection figures are absent. It seems the tax and customs officials have something to hide.
At the same time, there are no problems with classified information. Justice Minister Pavel Petrenko (Read more about it in the article Pavel Petrenko, the "pocket" boy of the Yatsenyuk "Family") recently at one of the round tables he said that tax and traffic police databases are sold on the “black market”.
"All the registries are freely available on the black market. There are clear price lists. For example, the tax database costs just $100, the individual database costs $200, and the traffic police database costs $150," he said.
Incidentally, the role of State Fiscal Service head Ihor Bilous in implementing the "secrecy" regime shouldn't be overestimated. He has absolutely no influence over the tax police and its head, Volodymyr Khomenko, who is close to Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
In other matters, including the secrecy of the State Fiscal Service's activities, according to tax officials, the tone is set by Bilous's advisor, SBU Major General Andrei Taranov, and his team.
According to State Fiscal Service employees, the general recently received a new assignment, although he still retains influence over the State Fiscal Service. At one point, EP sent a detailed inquiry to tax officials, including questions about Andrei Taranov's role in the service.
Of all the State Fiscal Service leaders, only Vladimir Khomenko responded to the call, and to his credit, he was not afraid to answer the most pressing questions.
As for Taranov, information about him can only be gleaned from the internet. Some sources mention him in connection with Israel, Lebanon, and Naftogaz. Whether this is true or not is unknown, but it makes for a fascinating read, reminiscent of a political detective story.
Despite extreme secrecy measures, EP managed to obtain the results of tax and customs officials' work for eight months of 2014.
Igor Bilous
The State Treasury Service reported that revenues to the general fund of the state budget (excluding VAT refunds) for this period amounted to UAH 234,5 billion, or 96,7% of the budgeted amount. Compare this with the statement "26,5% more than for the same period in 2013" from the SFS website.
The shortfall in taxes and fees in August amounted to UAH 8 billion. According to EP sources, compared to 2013, collections (excluding VAT refunds) increased by UAH 10 billion, or just 4,5%.
In August, revenue (excluding VAT refunds) amounted to UAH 32,2 billion, or 100,8% of the target. Compared to July 2013, revenue (excluding VAT refunds) increased by UAH 7,8 billion, or 29,8%.
Let's forget about Bilous and Khomenko's claims that before their arrival, 200 billion hryvnias a year were being siphoned off from the budget through various schemes. The result seems quite respectable, but that's only at first glance.
Firstly, August 2013 was a poor month for budget revenues. That month, former Revenue and Duties Minister Oleksandr Klymenko was on vacation, and without him, a spectacular disaster occurred. It's precisely in comparison to the disastrous August 2013 that the current statistics look decent.
If we compare August 2014 with August 2012, it turns out that in August 2014, UAH 0,3 billion less was collected than two years ago.
Yes, there are problems in Donbas, and yes, revenues from Crimea have been lost, but the 80% devaluation and 20% inflation (since 2011) more than offset these losses. Prices for many goods and services have nearly doubled, and nominal economic revenue should increase by tens of percent.
This is not to mention the promised elimination of the schemes.
The inevitable conclusion is that in August 2014, budget revenues were being embezzled, and on a significantly larger scale than in August 2012.
Collection into the general fund of the state budget, August, billion UAH
Secondly, strange things began to happen with the plan’s implementation – exactly the same as those that happened under the “predecessors”.
As of September 1, 2014, the State Fiscal Service's August plan was UAH 18,2 billion. Only 87,4% of it was fulfilled, leaving a shortfall of UAH 2,3 billion.
However, on September 1, the Ministry of Finance—likely at the request of the State Fiscal Service—retroactively changed the August plan, setting it at UAH 16,1 billion. This allowed Bilous to "almost completely" fulfill it—98,8%.
The shortfall now amounts to only UAH 0,2 billion. Accordingly, the eight-month plan's fulfillment has also improved, from 88,9% to 94,4%.
But you can't fool yourself. Over the past four months, the budget needs to collect UAH 139,1 billion—an average of UAH 34,8 billion per month. Since the beginning of 2014, the average monthly collection rate has been UAH 29,3 billion.
At the same time, the NBU has already fulfilled all of its budgetary obligations—22 billion hryvnias—and there is no point in counting on its “assistance” in the second half of the year.
It's not that meeting the budget's revenue targets was completely impossible given the current level of inflation and devaluation. However, it would be a far cry from the budget revenue projections that were initially adopted. Not to mention, combating these schemes is out of the question.
Third, based on the results of the first eight months, the Ministry of Revenue and Duties and the State Fiscal Service collected UAH 198,9 billion for the budget. This is UAH 3,1 billion, or 1,5%, less than the amount collected during the first eight months of 2013 under Klymenko, whom the service's current leadership associates with the theft of UAH 200 billion in budget funds annually.
We're aware of the budget losses due to the situation in Donbas, but Bilous himself estimated them at a maximum of 4,5-5 billion UAH over eight months. The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol represent losses of around 0,5 billion UAH. The total is 5-5,5 billion UAH.
Now subtract these amounts from last year's results and add 20% inflation and 80% devaluation. Tax authorities alone, and thanks to inflation alone, should have increased collections by UAH 18 billion.
Vladimir Khomenko
Now add to these results:
— the many times mentioned closure of schemes,
— increased fiscal pressure (a sharp increase in excise tax and rent rates, the introduction of a military tax, personal income tax on deposits and other passive income),
— the fact that the tax authorities continue to accumulate overpayments (since the beginning of 2014, they have grown by UAH 9,5 billion, while the debt for reimbursement remains at UAH 30 billion, despite the placement of UAH 5,7 billion in VAT bonds).
Simple arithmetic shows that the scale of money "leakage" outside the budget under Bilous-Khomenko increased by tens of billions of hryvnias.
The same is true for customs, perhaps on a slightly smaller scale. It's known that the devaluation has already reached 80%. Let's say the 2014 average is 50%. The decline in imports is estimated at approximately 22%. In the first eight months of 2013, customs collected 69,7 billion hryvnias.
The numbers don't add up. A simple calculation yields the amount customs officials were supposed to collect: UAH 81,5 billion. Where did almost UAH 12 billion go?
This is in addition to the money that was stolen from the budget during the import of liquefied gas and petroleum products, as well as many other smuggling schemes.
The icing on the cake was the collapse in single social contribution revenues, which occurred in August. Compared to 2013, the Pension Fund and social funds received UAH 2,5 billion, or 16,5% less. Since the beginning of 2014, the decline has amounted to UAH 3,6 billion.
Instead of PS: Recently, information emerged that the IMF has authorized Ukraine to "print" 150 billion hryvnias to pay off Naftogaz debts and a number of other operations.
If this crazy injection of money into the economy doesn't result in increased tax revenue, then the questions should be asked not by journalists, but at least by deputies of the new convocation of the Verkhovna Rada.
Andrey Vyshinsky, Economic truth
Subscribe to our channels in Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, VC — Only new faces from the section CRYPT!