Civil activists working on lustration issues consistently note that the greatest resistance to purging the country of corrupt officials and members of the Yanukovych regime comes from the judicial branch. The "Rostov fugitive" has completely destroyed the country's legal system, transforming the courts into a "family" of servants, tightly bound by a conspiracy of corruption at all levels and ready to commit any violation of the law at the mere wave of the "autocrat's" hand.
The "untouchable" caste has proven to be a remarkably resilient community. It's as if there was no Revolution of Dignity, no public desire to change the country's rules, no laws designed to purge and reboot the judiciary. The scale of the problem is demonstrated by the countless high-profile and outrageous incidents in which judges deliberately sabotaged attempts to punish the murderers of the Heavenly Hundred, to jail the sponsors of separatism among the former Party of Regions and communists, and to punish corrupt officials who believed they could escape punishment and therefore didn't flee to the Kremlin's wing. Numerous odious judges continue to operate more effectively than Russian sabotage and reconnaissance groups in the war-torn Donbas—they are gradually killing millions of people's faith in reform, real change, and the correctness of the chosen path. And if they are allowed to continue to operate outside the laws that shape society, they will become a millstone around the neck of the Ukrainian state, capable of scuttling any good initiatives.
On April 8, 2014, under public pressure, parliament passed the Law "On Restoring Trust in the Judiciary in Ukraine." Clearly, the past year has failed to fundamentally change the situation in this area. Moreover, convinced of their own impunity, the architects of lawlessness and the grey cardinals of judicial arbitrariness are once again aiming to regain influence over the country's judicial system.
Therefore, neither the persistent efforts of civic activists nor the laws already passed aimed at curing the judiciary of chronic corruption are a deterrent for them. Kivalov's name remains among the main puppeteers striving to remain the main "fixers" in the judicial sphere.Read more about it Sergey Kivalov, the Godfather of Corruption and Justice) and Medvedchuk. They are once again trying to control processes, place their own people in the right positions, and, consequently, continue to spread the metastases of corruption within the state using long-tested and proven methods.
Take ALL
To effectively control the Ukrainian judiciary at all levels, it is necessary to control the High Council of Justice. This assertion was made axiomatic in the recent past by the power brokers of the country's legal system—Serhiy Kivalov, Viktor Medvedchuk, and Andriy Portnov. It was Portnov, after Yanukovych's rise to power, who quickly perfected a foolproof mechanism for intimidating and controlling judges, one of the key components of which became the High Council of Justice. The High Council of Justice can punish and pardon, appoint and dismiss, and can rein in any undesirable or overly ambitious judge. It performed this function precisely to the extent assigned to it by the architects of the "Yanukovych-style" dictatorship. If the fugitive ex-president had not gained such total control over the High Council of Justice, Tymoshenko and Lutsenko might not have had to languish behind bars, and the Euromaidan participants would not have been tried so shamefully and unfairly at the height of the protests.
After the Maidan, the situation changed. The selection of members of the Supreme Council of Justice is now proposed to be conducted according to new, much more democratic and civilized rules.
In January of this year, the Law "On Ensuring the Right to a Fair Trial" was adopted, which also includes amendments to the Law "On the High Council of Justice." The appointment process to the High Council of Justice will now be public. Furthermore, the term of office for Council members has been reduced from six to four years, and the Council's head is elected for only two years. Furthermore, members of the High Council of Justice will now serve on a permanent basis, significantly increasing their responsibility for the quality of their duties.
The Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) consists of 20 members, elected by quota. The parliament, the president, the congress of judges, the congress of lawyers, the congress of law schools, and the conference of prosecutors all have their own quotas. Three more seats are allocated to those who hold them ex officio—the Prosecutor General, the Minister of Justice, and the head of the Supreme Court.
In early April 2015, the old Supreme Council of Justice (SCJ) resigned. This meant an opportunity to thoroughly renew it with people capable of organizing its work according to the new rules. But it was at this moment that the Yanukovych-era power brokers—Viktor Medvedchuk and Serhiy Kivalov—reappeared, joined by another controversial politician and newly minted judicial fixer, David Zhvania.
Currently, this trio has no influence over presidential and parliamentary appointments, so they've focused their efforts on the necessary candidates from the Congress of Lawyers (held April 24-25) and the Congress of Law School Representatives (held April 28). It's around the candidates from these congresses that the main intrigue unfolds: will the trio of power brokers succeed in introducing their malicious "viruses of the past" into the new system?
The names of candidates from both congresses are already known, and many of them raise serious suspicions. If they make it to the Supreme Court, the public demand for a renewed judiciary will suffer a crushing defeat.
There's nothing new to say about Kivalov and Medvedchuk; everyone knows the role they've played and continue to play in our country's recent history. But regarding David Zhvania, the question arises: how did he end up in this company?
It's worth noting that David Vazhaevich's period of significance in serious political scenarios has long since ended. Of Zhvania's most recent "achievements," the only ones worth mentioning are the collapse of the TVi television channel, which recently ceased broadcasting, and his inglorious defeat in the majoritarian elections in the Odezhda region in the fall of 2014, where he ran as a candidate for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc.
While Zhvania was still listed as a representative of the presidential political party in the fall, according to some reports, he is now firmly barred from Bankova Street. The reason for this "excommunication" is simple: David Vazhaevich loved to manage his own affairs, flaunting the name and will of the head of state, something he naturally had no authority or permission to do. Rumor has it that it was precisely this lack of integrity on Zhvania's part that was the main reason he is no longer allowed within striking distance of the presidential circles.
Zhvania quickly made new "friends." And now, together with Medvedchuk and Kivalov, they are trying to gain control of the High Council of Justice by installing their protégés. Moreover, their channels of influence are still intact. It is known that Medvedchuk maintains a powerful lobby within the Ukrainian Bar Association, and Serhiy Kivalov still wields enormous influence over the leadership of the country's law schools. Naturally, given these initial circumstances, it is difficult to believe that the selection of candidates for membership in the High Council of Justice was fair.
However, the Lustration Law may prove to be the main "antivirus" for the "malware" launched by the aforementioned trio in the Supreme Court. Candidates must comply with its requirements, and there should be no doubt about their honesty and integrity. Perhaps this is why Sergei Kivalov, who remains a member of the Venice Commission, has worked hard to repeal this law, calling it unconstitutional and a violation of human rights. After all, if it is applied responsibly and principledly, neither Kivalov himself nor his puppets have any chance of returning to power.
The names of the candidates from the Congress of Law Schools and the Congress of Lawyers are already known. It's also easy to trace the connections of several of the candidates to the trio of "fixers" discussed in the article. Perhaps this information will give pause to those responsible for electing members of the High Council of Justice. After all, the future of Ukraine's judicial system largely depends on them.
Candidates from the Congress of Advocates
Sergey Ostrovich
Serhiy Ostrovich is a judge of the Supreme Administrative Court of Ukraine. In the 90s, he worked as a lawyer when Viktor Medvedchuk headed the Ukrainian Bar Association. According to some reports, they still maintain a close relationship. In 2001, Ostrovich became a judge of the Kyiv Commercial Court of Appeal, and in 2010, he was appointed a judge of the Supreme Administrative Court. In 2014, the Supreme Administrative Court staff did not support Ostrovich in the election for head of the court; by that time, he had resigned, but he was unable to lead the court for a second term.
However, it wasn't a lack of trust among colleagues that became the real dark spot in Ostrovich's biography. In 2007-2008, he served as First Deputy of the State Tax Administration (an appointment lobbied by Medvedchuk). Meanwhile, in 2004, Ostrovich was elected a judge for life! As is well known, judges are not allowed to hold any other positions, meaning he committed a gross violation of the law. Then, all of this...
They turned a blind eye. However, now, in the context of the public election of members of the Supreme Court of Justice, such an example of a defiant violation of the law should become an insurmountable obstacle for a candidate. It is simply impossible to ignore such a fact when electing the person who will be responsible for ensuring the legality of the judges' actions.
Moreover, Ostrovich (like many other applicants) may simply fail the property audit required by the Lustration Law. Can someone who, according to their most recent income declaration, earned 272 hryvnias last year own a 224 square meter apartment in a luxury building, 800 square meters of land on the outskirts of Kyiv, a 500 square meter house, as well as two Mercedes-Benzes and a Lexus? Considering that family members have 900 hryvnias in their accounts, while earning 12 hryvnias? Stories about a piggy bank where the entire family's hard-earned money has been hoarded for decades in such cases only evokes Homeric laughter.
Kateryna Koval
Another contender, Kateryna Koval, has closely tied her work to Odesa, where Serhiy Kivalov is considered the "chief lawyer." It was under his patronage that she was appointed deputy head of the Union of Lawyers of Ukraine in 2007.
In 2010, Viktor Yanukovych appointed Koval a member of the Working Group on Judicial Reform, after which her career rapidly took off: she became a member of the Qualification and Disciplinary Commission of the Bar under the Cabinet of Ministers, then a member of the Public Council under the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Registration Service.
In 2012, Koval lost the parliamentary elections in her home region of Vinnytsia, and since then has held the post of Deputy Head of the Ukrainian Bar Association and the Bar Council.
Her declaration also raises many questions. Koval owns three cars, a 1120 square meter plot of land, and a 285 square meter house. Yet, she earned only 258 hryvnias last year, 220 of which came from her legal work. Such a modest income for a high-class lawyer should be seen as a condemnation of her own professional integrity. Therefore, it's far more reasonable to question the veracity of the income figures Koval declared in her declaration.
Pavel Lutsyuk
Pavlo Lutsyuk ran for membership in the Supreme Court of Justice as the head of the Rivne regional branch of the Ukrainian Union of Advocates. Lutsyuk's career skyrocketed during Viktor Medvedchuk's tenure at the UAU. He served as vice president of the organization in 2011, when Lidiya Izovitova was elected president. In 2012, she and Portnov founded the National Bar Association, and Lutsyuk headed its Rivne branch.
Lutsyuk's candidacy for the Supreme Court of Justice is being actively promoted by Kivalov and Zhvania. It's not surprising that Lutsyuk, who lives and works on the other side of Ukraine, has very close ties to Odesa. The problem is that the candidate is extremely careful to conceal his connection to his twin brother, Petro Lutsyuk, a figure already legendary in the Odesa region. Until May 3, 2014, Petro Lutsyuk headed the Odesa regional police department. Following the tragic events of May 2, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov dismissed Petro Lutsyuk, who soon disappeared from the country without even appearing for a meeting of the Verkhovna Rada investigative commission. Perhaps this is why the current candidate for the Supreme Court of Justice mentions his brother so modestly in his autobiography. Lutsyuk the policeman is best described by his nickname, "Petya the Piggy Bank," as he owns expensive and extensive real estate in western Ukraine. But Lutsyuk the lawyer, judging by his declaration, is very modest, declaring a modest income for a lawyer of his stature—only 357 hryvnias, of which 30 hryvnias came from family members and 250 hryvnias from real estate sales. His apartment is small, measuring 72 square meters. However, Lutsyuk owns four cars: two old VAZs and two Mercedes. His family also owns another car, an inexpensive KIA. In any case, Lutsyuk's income clearly doesn't match his expenses, which should undoubtedly raise questions during the candidate discussions.
Candidates from the Congress of Law Schools
Vyacheslav Tulyakov
Vyacheslav Tulyakov heads the criminal law department at the Odesa National Law Academy. Since 2005, he has served as the Academy's vice president. Naturally, he is entirely Kivalov's man, who surrounds himself with people based on personal and unquestioning loyalty.
Tulyakov will also inevitably face problems with the lustration law, primarily after a property audit. The problem is that he failed to list his family members in his declaration. With a modest income of 221 hryvnias, the Kivalov university employee was able to pay for his daughter's education in Greece. Tulyakov himself owns a 700-square-meter plot of land in Zatoka (an elite neighborhood), where he owns a 120-square-meter house, and lives in Odessa in a 116-square-meter apartment. He drives a modest car by today's standards—a 2008 Toyota Camry.
Nikolay Khandurin
Nikolai Khandurin can also be considered Kivalov's man, even though he is a retired judge of the Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine. In 1994, he served as Deputy Minister of Justice, and from 2002 to 2014, he served as head of the Supreme Commercial Court of Ukraine.
Khandurin could be called a Soviet-era judge, and that wouldn't be an exaggeration. According to the civil service law, which sets the age limit at 65, 67-year-old Khandurin should have been dismissed immediately after his election to the Supreme Court of Justice. However, it would have been far more prudent not to appoint Khandurin to the Supreme Court, as the issue isn't age at all, but rather the reputation the "contender" has carried with him since his time at the Supreme Court of Justice.
For example, Khandurin was once known as the "patron of Kyiv's notaries." Notaries in Kyiv paid bribes of up to $75 to obtain a license. Khandurin oversaw the notary profession.
Ironically, it was the High Council of Justice that recommended the current candidate for the Supreme Court of Justice be dismissed for violating his oath. The Minister of Justice then saved him from disgrace. Alexander Lavrinovich, who found a way to fire Khandurin, as they say, “retroactively.”
But the purely formal obstacle to Khandurin's accession to the Supreme Council of Justice is the law prohibiting administrative judges from serving on the Council. So, if Kivalov succeeds in getting his protégé into the High Council of Justice, it will be a true "magic and wizardry" of legislative manipulation.
Regarding his declaration, it's clear that the judge's income also doesn't match his expenses. Khandurin owns three apartments in Kyiv and a house in Brovary. His annual income is only 372 hryvnias, including 161 hryvnias from his pension, which is clearly insufficient to qualify as the owner of the aforementioned properties.
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It's clear that all candidates for membership in the Supreme Judicial Council must undergo the most thorough screening process to ensure they meet the legal requirements. It's also crystal clear that passing these screenings will be extremely difficult.
It remains to be hoped that, in selecting members of the High Council of Justice, both the congress of law schools and the congress of lawyers will demonstrate prudence and a balanced approach to decisions, and, most importantly, will demonstrate that a fair selection of candidates in Ukraine is possible, despite the plans and appetites of the "gray cardinals."
Of course, both civil society activists and the media must be as actively involved as possible in the selection process. The High Council of Justice must not fall back into the hands of corrupt officials and the "fixers" of the Yanukovych era. Otherwise, Ukraine's judicial system will have no chance of cleansing and developing.
Ultimately, Kivalovism must come to an end in our country.
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