In September, the question of the actual launch of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, which had been painfully taking shape since late last year, came to the fore again. The importance of this issue is determined not only by Ukrainian realities but also by pressure from EU countries, where the launch of a genuine fight against corruption is being promoted as a key element of cooperation with Ukraine.
But the formation of the "Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office" was diligently hampered by both the Prosecutor General's Office and the influential politicians behind it, who were far from keen on the emergence of a new, influential decision-making center with virtually unlimited powers. On the eve of the elections, the authorities were forced to finally give the go-ahead for the election of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor, after ensuring full control of the process.
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office: Create, Don't Slow Down
"Prokurorskaya Pravda" has already reported on the NAB's performance, which, so far, has been limited to scandalous competitions for leadership positions, questionable management behavior, personnel selection (often even more questionable), detective selection, numerous training courses, and the misappropriation of budget funds. Meanwhile, the NAB is consuming ever more funds, yet there's no result, not even a hint of prosecution of corrupt officials. This is due not only to the bureau's own inefficiencies and the difficulties of its formation, but also to entirely objective reasons. Specifically, the absence of an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office.
Anti-corruption prosecutors must exercise procedural leadership in NAB corruption cases. NAB detectives cannot initiate proceedings without the approval of a procedural leader, who can only be a prosecutor from the specialized anti-corruption prosecutor's office. This prosecutor is selected by a specialized selection committee approved by the head of the specialized prosecutor's office—the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. This prosecutor, in turn, must be selected by another committee consisting of four representatives of the Prosecutor General's Office and seven delegates elected by the Verkhovna Rada.
Based on the logic outlined above, the actual start of the NAB's work is being pushed back to some distant future, and the formation of commissions and various competitions allow the process to drag on for quite some time. While one commission convenes, it takes time for it to make a decision, and while another convenes and makes the same decision, everything is being pushed back to 2016.
Until then, the NAB can recruit detectives, train them using American, European, or Japanese methods, and send them for internships at the Shaolin Monastery—but this agency will still produce no results. Until the anti-corruption prosecutor's office is fully formed, the NAB will remain a "toy regiment" designed to demonstrate the state's progress in the fight against corruption to both domestic and international audiences.
Without an anti-corruption prosecutor's office, any actions taken by the National Anti-Corruption Bureau are illegal. Investigations, evidence gathering, even databases on officials are illegal. Not to mention the impossibility of referring cases to court or even entering them into a unified registry. There's no one to submit or refer them to.
And although the creation of all these NABs is primarily aimed at the "international community," the latter already has experience communicating with the Ukrainian government, and is well aware of the colossal tangle of corruption schemes that permeates Ukraine like cancer metastases in a sick organism.
Therefore, they no longer trust declarations about the “fight against corruption,” but are making specific demands on which a number of the most important foreign policy decisions for Ukraine depend: both demands on the nature of the changes and on the implementation deadlines.
The EU explicitly and unequivocally emphasizes the direct connection between anti-corruption policy and further cooperation. For example, there is a direct link between the creation of an effective National Anti-Corruption Bureau and granting Ukraine visa-free travel to the EU. The Head of the EU Delegation to Ukraine, Jan Tombiński, spoke about this directly. Moreover, the EU monitors every stage of the NAB's development (right down to the selection and training of detectives), as it understands perfectly who it is dealing with.
In effect, they tell us: “In the morning, money (that is, the NAB, but not just any NAB, but an effective and functioning structure capable of truly fighting corruption), and in the evening, chairs (that is, a visa-free regime with the EU, as well as other aspects of cooperation, including financial assistance).”
This reduces the room for maneuver and forces the Ukrainian government to somehow implement the demands of its partners, while simultaneously seeking ways to minimize the negative consequences for itself.
What is so “dangerous” about the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office?
What threats does the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office pose to the entrenched Prosecutor's Office organized crime group "Prosecutors"?
According to the current version of the Law "On the Prosecutor's Office" (as amended on July 2, 2015), this unit of the prosecutor's office is not subordinate to the Prosecutor General of Ukraine and can initiate anti-corruption cases against the Prosecutor General's Office and authorize pre-trial investigations. The only person in the country who does not fall within their purview is the current President. The Prosecutor General of Ukraine, his or her First Deputy, and his or her Deputies are not authorized to issue instructions to prosecutors of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office or to perform other actions directly related to the exercise of prosecutorial powers. Written administrative orders concerning the organization of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office are issued with the mandatory approval of the head of the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office.
The prize is big and fat. Appointing an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor would be a blow to the omnipotence of Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin's clan and other representatives of the prosecutorial mafia. If, by chance, an "outsider" were to occupy this position, the problems could be more than serious, not only for their patrons in the highest political leadership. The absolute power of the "system" could begin to crumble. Therefore, the issue was taken very seriously.
Attempts to stall the process
Attempts to disavow the appointment of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor were made even at the stage of adopting the relevant amendments to the legislation on the prosecutor's office.
Thus, the first version of the law included a proposal for parity between representatives of the Prosecutor General's Office and the Verkhovna Rada (six each) on the commission that would elect the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. Such blatant impudence sparked widespread discontent. Even Serhiy Leshchenko, a member of parliament from the Poroshenko Bloc, expressed outrage at this provision, which allows the Presidential Administration to appoint an Anti-Corruption Prosecutor of its choosing (with six votes from the Prosecutor's Office and at least one from the BPP parliamentary faction).
Ultimately, this norm did not pass and the balance was established at the following number of representatives: 4 from the Prosecutor General’s Office and 7 from the Verkhovna Rada.
At the end of August, Viktor Shokin's department finally selected its authorized representatives. Each of them has a closet full of skeletons, and one can recall a litany of scandals that have dogged them for a long time.
Thus, Yuriy Grishchenko was the immediate supervisor of the "diamond prosecutor" Vladimir Shapakin, who is currently under investigation for a number of corruption offenses.
Roman Balita, a figure in the Prosecutor's Truth publications, previously served as the first deputy and acting prosecutor of the Zakarpattia region in 2014, and activists have repeatedly spoken out against his inaction.
Mykola Sadovyi also featured in the pages of "PP": after the scandal surrounding the career of daddy's boy, the odious Zhytomyr prosecutor Ilya Titarchuk, it was Sadovyi who accused journalists of interfering in Titarchuk's personal life. During Vitaliy Yarema's tenure as Prosecutor General, the newly appointed member of the selection committee for the anti-corruption prosecutor served as deputy to the infamous Deputy Prosecutor General Anatoliy Danilenko, nicknamed "Tolya the Supermarket."
As for Yuriy Sevruk, our publication wrote in detail about the reasons for his promotion to the position of First Deputy Prosecutor General in a separate article.
Naturally, all this failed to provoke a public reaction. For example, the Anti-Corruption Committee demanded that the Prosecutor General's Office change its "four."
However, no one paid much attention to this, because there was still too much at stake for the “prosecutors” to be “liberal.”
However, the demands of the “Western partners” were becoming increasingly insistent, and it became clear that it was no longer possible to delay the “Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office.”
Who was "selected" in parliament?
Of course, theoretically, the legislation allowed for a simple solution. If the Verkhovna Rada had delayed appointing its representatives until the end of the month, the four "prosecutors" could have elected the prosecutor themselves. However, such a scheme, despite all its obvious advantages for the Presidential Administration and the Prosecutor General's Office, could not be implemented, as it would have failed to achieve the main objective—to demonstrate to the West a commitment to fighting corruption.
Therefore, everything had to be done "beautifully." They used a proven strategy. The vote itself was scheduled for the last minute, tying it to the Verkhovna Rada's ratification of Ukraine's foreign debt restructuring that day. Naturally, the restructuring became the number one news story. Furthermore, the selection of commission candidates was delayed until the last minute. For example, Volodymyr Filenko's nomination became known on the day of the vote. As usual, the rationale was "the urgent need to fulfill the demands of Western partners."
Finally, on September 17, the Verkhovna Rada delegated seven of its representatives to the commission for conducting a competition for administrative positions in the specialized anti-corruption prosecutor's office.
The following were elected by preferential voting: Mary Butler (current US Attorney); former Constitutional Court judge and Honored Lawyer of Ukraine Viktor Shishkin; anti-corruption activist Vitaly Shabunin; former MP Volodymyr Filenko; former Minister of Culture Yevhen Nyshchuk; analyst at the Institute of Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Volodymyr Gorbach and president of the International Women's Human Rights Center "La Strada - Ukraine" Kateryna Levchenko.
What do the above-mentioned individuals have in common? After all, it's not that difficult to find a certain system in any such appointment.
Regarding Mary Butler and Vitaly Shabunin, everything seems simple. They were appointed to the commission to demonstrate impartiality in its formation. Shabunin is a prominent public "anti-corruption fighter," known to many thanks to his numerous television appearances. Butler, of course, is not as well-known in our country, but the weight of the United States behind her adds to her stature. We shouldn't forget former Constitutional Court judge Shishkin, who was recently dismissed by Petro Poroshenko and subsequently became one of the main critics of the presidential constitutional amendments. All these people are called upon to demonstrate transparency, pluralism, and openness in the process of forming the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office.
Moreover, of the initially nominated candidates, such well-known public fighters against corruption as Oleksiy Shalayskiy (Nashi Groshi) and Karl Volokh ultimately failed to make it through.
Lutsenko's trail
The remaining four candidates, however, are much more interesting. Tellingly, most of the elected candidates represent the Petro Poroshenko Bloc.
People's Artist of Ukraine Yevhen Nyshchuk has already participated in the election of candidates for the position of head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau. Back then, he made a mark, perhaps by "speeding up" his colleagues when he ended the debate, announcing his departure for a performance. Overall, Nyshchuk is very useful to the Presidential Administration and the Prosecutor General's Office, as he is well-known in society as the invariable "host of the Maidan" and enjoys respect in society, yet is extremely distant from the Prosecutor's Office and all the processes taking place within it. Therefore, he is very convenient as a controllable figure.
Analyst Volodymyr Gorbach is notable, first and foremost, for being an active participant in the so-called "Third Ukrainian Republic" civic initiative, led by Yuriy Lutsenko, the current head of the Poroshenko Bloc faction in the Verkhovna Rada. He is also notably distant from the prosecutor's office or the fight against corruption.
Volodymyr Filenko, along with Lutsenko, was one of the founders of the aforementioned civic initiative. In fact, Filenko has had a long-standing connection with Lutsenko, maintaining contact even during Lutsenko's time in prison. And after Lutsenko joined the Poroshenko Bloc, Filenko also "migrated" along with his longtime ally. So, the Presidential Administration can certainly rely on him.
Yuriy Lutsenko also has long-standing ties with Kateryna Levchenko. Since 1999, she has headed the International Women's Rights Center "La Strada – Ukraine" (a typical grant-eating organization). In 2004, Levchenko became an advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine on gender issues and human rights, a position she held until 2006. In parallel, in 2005, she became a member of the Public Council on Human Rights at the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. It's easy to recall that Yuriy Lutsenko was the minister at the time. After Lutsenko's conviction, Levchenko issued statements in support of her former "patron."
So, of the four parliamentary representatives on the commission, two are loyal to Poroshenko Bloc Chairman Yuriy Lutsenko. Apparently, he personally selected them. The other two are people far removed from the prosecutor's office and the fight against corruption, but over whom Lutsenko also has influence (there's a good chance they'll simply sanction the "right" decision).
Consider Shokin's four candidates, and it turns out the Presidential Administration will always have the six votes needed to elect the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor. So there's no longer any need to worry about a dangerous "random person" becoming the new Anti-Corruption Prosecutor.
Operation "Cover"
At the same time, the operation itself to form the commission to elect the prosecutor went very “beautifully.”
Formally, both foreigners and public activists were involved, but their role remains minimal. They legitimize the process, but they themselves have no influence on it. Thus, it was possible to minimize the threat posed by the "anti-corruption prosecutor's office" to the current prosecutorial mafia, while simultaneously doing so in a way that would not cause public outcry and satisfy "Western partners."
Finally, on the day of the vote for the commission to the "Anti-Corruption Prosecutor," two other important events occurred: the insolvency of Finance and Credit Bank (a systemic bank for our economy), and the Verkhovna Rada's vote on debt restructuring, which also provoked, to put it mildly, a mixed reaction in society.
Thus, all the key issues were lumped together, distracting public attention. Moreover, the Prosecutor General's Office also carried out a brilliant cover-up operation, which instantly diverted public attention from all the key issues.
The issue concerns the publication of compromising evidence against Radical Party MP Ihor Mosiychuk, which culminated in his immediate removal of immunity and his arrest in the Verkhovna Rada. This theatrical performance, in which Shokin himself played a leading role, was deeply imprinted on everyone's memory, overshadowing all other events of the day. Of course, this was primarily a political decision, but the cover-up of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's case obviously also played a role.
The bottom line is this: The commission for selecting the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office was effectively formed within the Presidential Administration and the Prosecutor General's Office. It's clear that this commission will select a useful and effective person who won't interfere with the Prosecutor General's Office or the Prosecutor's Group. Thanks to effective public relations, this fact has gone virtually unnoticed in Ukrainian society, despite the fact that the formation of the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office is arguably one of the most important decisions in Ukraine's recent history.
In connection with the above, Prosecutor's Truth has a number of questions:
— In whose interests will the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor appointed by Shokin and Lutsenko work?
— Was the entire complex process of forming the "Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office" solely intended to "fool the brains" of Ukraine's EU partners and present them with the semblance of a fight against corruption?
— What other "aces up his sleeve" in the form of criminal cases does Prosecutor General Shokin have in store for the consideration of other high-profile issues?
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