Viktor Pinchuk: Ukraine's richest son-in-law

Viktor Pichuk, Interpipe, dossier, biography, compromising information, StarLightMedia

Viktor Pinchuk: Ukraine's richest son-in-law

The recipe for his success is to be born into the right family and marry well, twice. Such opportunities are not available to everyone, making Viktor Pinchuk a rather unique figure. This is particularly true because he managed to transform himself from a predatory oligarch into a sophisticated philanthropist before everyone's eyes, making Ukrainians forget exactly how and with whose help he built his billionaire career.

Viktor Pichuk. Jewish Major

While the nobility of the Russian Empire and the gentry of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had already degenerated by the early 20th century, and the titles of their descendants are utterly meaningless, the Jewish aristocracy has carefully preserved its status to this day. Therefore, a comfortable life and a good job were guaranteed to our hero even before his birth. Viktor Mikhailovich Pinchuk was born on December 14, 1960, in Kyiv, to a Jewish family with such venerable ancestors that he could have basked in the shadow of their glory his entire life—even if he himself had been utterly mediocre.

Pinchuk's paternal ancestors hailed from the city of Pinsk (now in the Brest region of Belarus), from which they adopted their surname in the early 19th century. At that time, decrees were issued by Emperor Alexander I, and then by Tsar Nicholas Pavlovich, mandating that all Jews in the western provinces be given a "passport" surname "to facilitate the resolution of disputes between them." Prior to this, they were referred to only by their given names, prefixed with the words "son of such-and-such" and "from Pinsk," and traced their lineage back to the mid-17th century. The family was highly respected: its members were either elected melameds (teachers in Jewish schools) or prospered in commerce. The last melamed was Aron Pinchuk, Viktor Mikhailovich's grandfather, who escaped the Holocaust thanks to the annexation of Western Belarus (Kresy Wschodnie) to the USSR in 1939 and his evacuation to the east in 1941. His son, Mikhail Aronovich (born 1934), moved to Dnepropetrovsk immediately after Viktor's birth, where he spent his entire life as an engineer at a metallurgical plant. Therefore, Viktor Pinchuk's biography lists his birthplace alternately as Kyiv and Dnepropetrovsk.

Mikhail Pinchuk, SofaPinchuk

Mikhail Aronovich and Sofa Iosifovna Pinchuk (left)

His maternal ancestors bore the surname Tsindlicht. Their family originated in Austrian Galicia (now the western regions of Ukraine), where Jews were given "German" surnames as early as the late 18th century. They then migrated to the Russian Empire and were known for their rabbis. However, after the events of 1917-1920, they were forced to learn new professions, and young Iosif Tsindlicht, after seven years of schooling, earned work experience in a mine in Donbass, then entered a military-political school. He served in the war as a political instructor in the Red Army, became a political commissar in the Soviet Army, and lived to the age of the patriarch, dying in 2009. His wife was Fanny Tsindlicht (maiden name unknown), and his daughter was Sofa Iosifovna Tsindlicht, the mother of Viktor Pinchuk. She worked her entire life as a teacher at the Dnepropetrovsk Metallurgical Institute (now the Metallurgical Academy).

Yossi Tsindlicht, Fani Tsindlicht

Joseph and Fani Tsindlicht

You could say that by Jewish standards, Viktor Pinchuk was a rich kid. Of course, unlike Soviet rich kids from the families of party bigwigs, he didn't race around in a Zhiguli with girls or throw elite parties at his grandfather's dachas (he would make up for that later). Moreover, Viktor Pinchuk didn't have the character of a mischievous "alpha male." He was an obliging teacher's pet, and grew up a typical Jewish boy—he even tried to learn the violin. However, he never inherited his ancestors' talents. First, he failed with the violin, and then with admission to medical school, where, for some reason, he was rejected—supposedly because of his ethnicity. But Pinchuk's origins had nothing to do with it; in fact, he had good protection in the person of his future father-in-law.

Victor Pinchuk, classmates

Victor Pinchuk with his classmates

He met Elena Arshava back in school—she was in the same class as him, and by the seventh grade, they had developed a friendship, then their first love. However, their relationship would have been futile, as it didn't receive their parents' approval; some even speculated that they had brought them together. The result was a typical romance of convenience: a boy named Vitya, from a highly respected, intelligent Jewish family, and a girl named Lena, whose father, Vladimir Nikolaevich Arshava, soon became deputy head of the Dnipropetrovsk Regional Health Department. Therefore, the reason Viktor Pinchuk wasn't accepted into medical school must have been very compelling—for example, a complete lack of understanding of the relevant disciplines.

As a result, gold medalist Viktor Pinchuk was only able to enroll in the metallurgical institute, in his mother's department.

Naturally, he graduated with honors. During his first two years at the institute, Viktor Pinchuk worked part-time: as a lab assistant during term time, and as a night watchman at an auto repair plant and in student construction teams during vacations. He hardly needed the money that much, but it taught him to spend his time productively, rather than wasting it on idle youthful amusements. Then, in 1980, Viktor Pinchuk and Elena Arshava married. Their daughter, Maria, was born on August 25, 1982.

Victor Pinchuk, classmates

Victor Pinchuk (left) with classmates

In 1983, he found work at the Dnipropetrovsk Pipe Industry Research Institute (research intern, engineer, senior engineer, junior researcher, and senior researcher), where he immediately entered graduate school and defended his PhD dissertation in 1987. Pinchuk had the prospect of a career as director of the institute, perhaps even a transfer to the ministry—quite a promising prospect by the standards of the time! However, two events soon occurred that would dramatically change his life for the better. First, the winds of perestroika blew across the country, and the first "cooperatives" began to appear. Second, Shmuel Kaminetsky arrived in Dnipropetrovsk, sent by the Lubavitcher Rebbe himself, the tzaddik (righteous sage) Menachem Mendel Schneerson, to revive the city's Jewish community.

Victor Pinchuk. From a money grab to a divorce from his wife.

It was said that Viktor's father-in-law, who was deeply frustrated with his son-in-law, who lived on a single salary, inspired him to pursue business. However, unlike most future oligarchs, who began their careers in consumer goods and office equipment, Pinchuk's first commercial venture was somewhat unusual. In 1987, he created a sort of inventors' cooperative, which attempted to take a cut (7,5%) from the profits or savings generated by their innovations. Essentially, Viktor simply selected the most promising patents from his research institute colleagues and promised to help them implement them and collect royalties. It was said that his parents, who had extensive connections in the metallurgy industry and were skilled at negotiating, handled the implementation, while Viktor himself "watched and took note." This scheme ended in a typical scam: of the 76 rubles that were supposed to be transferred to the cooperative, only half arrived—and that money ended up in the research institute's account, whose management announced it would only pay small bonuses to the cooperative members. Considering that the deal was handled by the Pinchuks, father and son, it would have been better to ask them about the fate of the money.

In general, Viktor Pinchuk is no stranger to appropriating someone else's property, even publicly.

Thus, in 2006, while talking about his business, he declared, "I started pipe production from scratch!" A rather bold statement, considering that all of Pinchuk's pipe plants at the time were built and launched back in the USSR, and it wasn't until 2012 that the first plant he built, Interpipe-Stal, began operations.

After the failure, the innovators' cooperative quickly disbanded, and the Pinchuks decided there wasn't much to be gained from implementing their inventions, so they turned to commercial ventures. Nevertheless, their next venture, Interpipe (1990), was called a "research and production group"—apparently in memory of the Pinchuks' business beginnings as a cooperative at a research institute.

At first, it was simply Dialog-Optima, a small enterprise run by father and son Pinchuk, which acted as an intermediary between a pipe plant and its customers. Then, Vladimir Arshava joined their business, offering to help them expand their operations. Vladimir Arshava was a longtime friend of Pavlo Lazarenko, who had risen from second secretary of the district committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to deputy chairman of the regional executive committee, and in 1992 became the presidential representative in the region. Arshava also introduced the Pinchuks to such important figures in Dnipropetrovsk as Sergei Tigipko ( read more about him in the article " Sergey Tigipko: Komsomol Oligarch Covers His Tracks "), Gennady Tymoshenko and his daughter-in-law Yulia Tymoshenko , future Prime Minister Valeriy Pustovoitenko, and future President Leonid Kuchma.

Lazarenko, Timoshenko

Pavel Lazarenko and Yulia Tymoshenko, mid-90s

In 1991, the Interpipe Scientific and Production Group was created on the basis of Dialog-Optima. Its co-owners, in addition to father and son Pinchuk, included Elena Arshava, Alexander Dementienko (the illegitimate son of Grigory Vorsinov, the future Prosecutor General and Lazarenko's godfather), and later Russian businessman Mikhail Shchegolevsky. His presence was easily explained: in 1992, the Pinchuk-Arshava Interpipe, together with the Tymoshenko family's Ukrainian Gasoline Corporation, under the direct patronage of Pavlo Lazarenko, created the Sodruzhestvo Corporation. For the next several years, Sodruzhestvo served as the Ukrainian dealer for the Russian gas company Itera. From that moment on, the Pinchuks' financial fortunes, having participated in the Tymoshenko-Lazarenko gas schemes, soared.

The Pinchuks had so much money that they decided to privatize the metallurgical plants they worked with. In 1995, they also purchased the Dnipropetrovsk Municipal Bank, renaming it Credit-Dnepr. Elena Arshava became its shareholder and deputy chairperson of the board. During this same period, intoxicated by the abundance of money, Victor Pinchuk began buying works of art and booking concerts – thus beginning his fame as a great Ukrainian philanthropist. However, it wasn't just the money that went to his head. From mid-1995, the Pinchuks' relations with their partners began to deteriorate. First, they fell out with Tymoshenko and Lazarenko, which resulted in the dissolution of Sodruzhestvo, which was replaced in the Ukrainian gas market by the UESU corporation, founded in November 1995. This, in turn, provoked a rift between the Pinchuks and the Arshavs – although the reason was not only about money

In the summer of 1996, Ukrainian media were rocked by the sensational story of Viktor Pinchuk's kidnapping: unknown assailants were demanding a $5 million ransom for him. However, the details of the story remained behind the scenes and were later revealed by participants and witnesses who wished to remain anonymous. The story went like this: Viktor Pinchuk had become infatuated with very young mistresses, and during one of these rendezvous "at the girl's place" (say, she was a fake), a gang of "athletes" captured the pair, beating Pinchuk's bodyguard to death. Viktor Mikhailovich was held in that same apartment, with demands being made: either $5 million in cash or an increase in Elena Arshava's stake in Credit-Dnepr Bank. The last demand clearly indicated that the kidnappers were either acting on orders from Pinchuk's wife or wanted to frame her – and in any case, they weren't doing this just for the ransom.

Ultimately, in 1996, Victor Pinchuk and Elena Arshava began divorce proceedings, which were accompanied by a multi-year division of their businesses. Arshava did indeed receive a controlling stake in Credit-Dnepr Bank, which she personally headed from 1997. In turn, her stake in Interpipe was reduced to 12,5%—the same as Alexander Dementienko's—and the Pinchuks became the owners of a controlling stake in the company. However, they still hadn't fully divided their businesses, so after some time, due to the business partnership and the declining influence of the aging Vladimir Arshava (the main instigator of the split), they became good friends—as close as is possible in Ukrainian business.

Tigipko rushes to the rescue

One of the people who played a significant role in Viktor Pinchuk's fate was Serhiy Tigipko, who in 1996 headed Privatbank, which he founded with Igor Kolomoisky, Gennady Bogolyubov ( read more about him in the article " Gennady Bogolyubov: What is Privat's Other Half Keeping Quiet About ? " ), and Leonid Miloslavsky. Little is known about their relationship in the first half of the 90s, but it was Tigipko who rushed to rescue the kidnapped Viktor Pinchuk through his informal channels of communication. His intercession also fueled his feud with Pavlo Lazarenko, who had already been trying to gain control of the Privat Group. Their conflict reached its climax in April 1997, when Lazarenko initiated a comprehensive investigation of PrivatBank and the arrest of Tihipko. Tihipko was saved only by his personal acquaintance with Leonid Kuchma and his daughter, Olena, who had worked in the economics department of PrivatBank from 1995 to 97. It was said that Tihipko not only facilitated Pinchuk's release but also brought him into close contact with Olena Kuchma, who was then in the process of divorcing her husband, Igor Franchuk (whose surname she shared with Franchuk, the son of the Crimean governor who became the head of Chornomornaftogaz). This connection proved to be a trump card in Pinchuk's fate.

Elena Pinchuk, Elena Kuchma, Elena Franchuk, Victor Pinchuk

Elena Pinchuk (Kuchma-Franchuk) and Victor Pinchuk

The reason for Tigipko's sympathy for Pinchuk is unknown, but rumor has it that it was not without the influence of Rabbi Shmuel Kaminetzky, who had long wanted to attract the descendant of respected rabbis and melameds, who was also rapidly becoming rich, to his "flock."

Shmuel Kaminetsky, Dnepr Jewish Community

Shmuel Kaminetsky

It's worth clarifying here that Rebbe Kaminetzky, who has been rebuilding the Jewish community of Dnipropetrovsk almost from scratch since 1990, is a follower of Chabad, a branch of Hasidism also known as Lubavitch Hasidism. Kaminetzky was one of the foremost disciples of Tzadik Menachem Mendel Schneerson, the seventh Lubavitcher Rebbe, who was greatly revered by Rebbe Henoch Hendel-Lieberman (1900-1975), and many followers consider him the Moshiach (Messiah). However, even Hasidim of other branches, not to mention more liberal Jews, have mixed feelings about Chabad, so their community remains somewhat isolated from others. Of course, this is a typical religious dispute, just like the competition between different Christian churches. And any religion strives to increase and strengthen the ranks of its flock, especially at the expense of wealthy people (after all, the community needs something to live on and build itself).

However, Kaminetsky's interest in Viktor Pinchuk and Igor Kolomoisky was not solely driven by their wealth. "These people's wealth may have been earned through the tears and prayers of their righteous ancestors," Kaminetsky once stated, recalling that Pinchuk's ancestors were rabbis, while Kolomoisky's maternal ancestors included the tzaddik Barkhu-Baruchshmo of Berdichev. For the leader of the Chabad community, attracting the descendants of rabbis and tzaddikim means raising the prestige of his teachings. And today, the Dnipropetrovsk Jewish community is the largest, wealthiest, and most influential in the country—even though its spiritual leaders belong to the Chabad movement, which is less popular in other regions of Ukraine (or even in Israel). This situation is somewhat reminiscent of the Kyiv Protestant church "Embassy of God": although Sunday Adelaja has gathered many influential residents of the capital into his flock, the church itself stands in stark contrast not only to Orthodox Ukraine but also to other Protestant churches.

Bogolyubov, Kaminetsky, Kolomoisky

G. Bogolyubov, Sh. Kaminetsky and I. Kolomoisky

Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov became Kaminetsky's parishioners back in the early 90s, and they were also the main sponsors of the construction of the Minora Center in Dnipropetrovsk. Kaminetsky is not only a spiritual leader, but also helps his congregation members resolve their worldly problems, including resolving business disputes and rescuing them from difficult situations. Therefore, Tihipko could have come to Pinchuk's aid at the request of Kaminetsky, with whom he was likely closely acquainted through Kolomoisky—even though Tihipko himself is not a Chabad adherent or even a Jew (nor are Tymoshenko or Poroshenko). The fact that Shmuel Kaminetsky is a controversial and rather complex figure is demonstrated by his recent condemnation of "neo-Nazism" in Ukraine, particularly his criticism of Azov's use of symbols resembling Nazi runes. These condemnations from Kaminetsky would have seemed perfectly logical, if not for one "but": it's unlikely he didn't know that the sponsor of the Right Sector is his favorite, Kolomoisky, and that of Azov is the oligarch Alexander Feldman, whom he respects so much, through whom Kaminetsky hoped to spread Chabad's influence to Kharkov...

Victor Pinchuk, however, didn't become a regular parishioner immediately, but rather after his "miraculous salvation" in 2002. Victor Pinchuk and Elena Franchuk had just officially married after many years of a "common-law marriage" (Elena only took her husband's surname in 2010) and flew on a private jet to Moscow, where they planned to attend the premiere of the musical "Nord-Ost" that evening. However, Pinchuk suffered a "panic attack," forcing the couple to cancel their plans and return to Kyiv. Only when they got home did they learn that the theater had been seized by terrorists during the performance. Perhaps the "panic attack" (the medical term) was caused by an age-related hormonal imbalance (an involuntary release of adrenaline), but Pinchuk himself saw it as God's hand and immediately turned to Rabbi Kaminezki. In gratitude for the “miracle,” Pinchuk built a children’s educational center, Beit Zindlicht (an elite kindergarten and school of Judaism), at the Menorah, named after his grandfather, a political officer.

Victor Pinchuk. Big Son-in-Law's Big Business

Within the first year of his close relationship with Olena Franchuk-Kuchma, Viktor Pinchuk received more "bonuses" than in his entire previous life. In 1997, after the fall of Lazarenko and the EESU corporation, he nearly restored Interpipe's business relationship with the Russian Itera; the companies even planned to exchange a 30% stake. However, the following year, a serious conflict erupted with Itera's founder and owner, Igor Makarov, who accused the Ukrainian side of fraud and "stealing." This story has never been reported in detail, but it is known that in the 90s, EESU and Interpipe failed to pay Itera for significant volumes of gas received. As a result, Interpipe and Itera split in 1998. And later, when in 2001-2002 the Russian Gazprom bought up Itera shares along with the debts of its Ukrainian partners, this became one of the reasons for accusing Ukraine of “gas theft.”

After this, Pinchuk focused his business on metallurgy and energy: specifically, rolled metal products, pipe and wheel set production, and the acquisition of shares in regional power companies. In 1998, with Kuchma's support, he began the privatization of Dniprooblenergo, Zaporizhzhiaoblenergo, Mykolaivoblenergo, Ternopiloblenergo, and Luhanskoblenergo. His partner there was Konstantin Grigorishin ( read more about him in: Konstantin Grigorishin. Distinguished Oligarch of Ukraine and Russia ), with whom Pinchuk had formed a partnership back in 1995-96, when he was doing business with Zaporizhstal and Dniprospetsstal. In 2002-2003, Pinchuk (Interpipe), Grigorishin (Energy Standard), and the Russian Federal Grid Company, which is linked to Anatoly Chubais, will create a holding company that will acquire shares (from 16% to 100%) in ten Ukrainian regional power companies – most of which will then be resold to other oligarchs.

Konstantin Hrygoryshyn

Konstantin Hrygoryshyn

However, in the process, Pinchuk's relationship with Kolomoisky, who was engaged in a veritable business war with Grigorishin, soured somewhat. Kolomoisky, in his characteristically aggressive manner, reacted to Pinchuk's support for Grigorishin, and they also began dividing spheres of influence (the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant). It was only through the efforts of Rabbi Kaminetsky that the oligarchs' dispute was resolved civilly, in foreign courts, with mutual concessions and reconciliations. Kaminetsky simply had no interest in siding with one of his VIP parishioners and losing another. It's worth noting that Rabbi Kaminetsky's arguments aren't based solely on Torah verses: he has extensive business and political connections in the United States, Israel, Great Britain, and Russia.

Pinchuk's relationship with the Surkis brothers ( read more about them in Grigory Surkis: How to Divide Ukraine Fraternally ) was smoother, although there were far more contentious business issues—for example, the privatization of regional power companies. Not only did Pinchuk seize control of several regional power companies from the Surkis brothers in 1997-1998, but he and Grigorishin also bought up shares during the second wave of privatization in 2001, which the Surkises were prevented from participating in thanks to the efforts of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. In 2004, Grigorishin, in alliance with Kolomoisky, took over their stakes in three regional power companies. But the Surkis brothers, whose power lingered in the 90s, wisely avoided antagonizing the president's son-in-law and instead began to sway him to their side. Moreover, by that time Pinchuk had begun a dispute with Privat over the division of the acquired capital.

Grigory Surkis, Igor Surkis, Victor Pinchuk

Grigory and Igor Surkis with Victor Pinchuk

In 1996, Interpipe and Boston Trading Conn (also reportedly owned by Pinchuk) entered the Belarusian market and participated in the privatization of the Mogilev Metallurgical Plant, acquiring 38,8% of its shares for $5,4 million. Under the terms of the deal, Interpipe was supposed to revive the plant from stagnation and then receive another 25% of its shares. But Alexander Lukashenko, convinced he had been cheated, and having heard about Pinchuk's problems, refused to honor the agreement. This is where Viktor Pinchuk's status as the president's daughter's boyfriend soon came in handy: in 1998, through Leonid Kuchma's personal intervention, Interpipe was finally sold another stake in the Mogilev Metallurgical Plant, leaving "Batka" (Batka) high and dry.

In 1997, Interpipe began the takeover of the Nizhnedniprovsk Pipe Rolling Plant (NTZ), which involved buying up shares from the workforce at 8 hryvnias 30 kopecks. This culminated in the classic division of the company into a profitable production unit (renamed Interpipe NTZ) and the disposal of "social burdens" and "excess space." This plant became Interpipe's core enterprise: in 2008, its net profit exceeded $90 million—even though much larger sums were siphoned offshore through complex schemes.

In 1999, Pinchuk took over the Nikopol South Pipe Plant, which he then plundered for eight years. First, 11 Pinchuk-owned closed joint-stock companies were created at the plant, which, along with Dniproblenergo, plunged it into debt. Then, a restructuring process began, culminating in the sale of 96,67% of the shares in 2007 for 352,62 million hryvnias (the plant's annual profit). From 1999 to 2006, Pinchuk similarly took over a similar enterprise in Novomoskovsk, renaming it Interpipe Novomoskovsk Pipe Plant OJSC. Between 2001 and 2004, Pinchuk and Grigorishin divided Dneprospetsstal between themselves, after which, in 2006, Grigorishin transferred his share of the company's shares to Pinchuk in exchange for Pinchuk's share in Luganskoblenergo and Dneproblenergo.

By the end of 2004, Interpipe also owned (in whole or in part) Yuginformatika JSC, Dnipropetrovsk Passenger Car Repair and Construction Plant, Promarmatura OJSC, Setab Ukraine, Dnipropress Plant CJSC, Dniprovsky Metallurgical Plant OJSC, Vtormet OJSC, and Nikopol Repair Plant CJSC. In 1997, Pinchuk invested in the new newspaper Fakty i Kommentarii (Facts and Comments), which between 1999 and 2002 became the main pro-government publication (subscription to it for government agencies and businesses was mandatory, like Pravda in Soviet times) and had the largest circulation in Ukraine. Together with the Derkach family , Pinchuk gained control of Era TV and Radio Company and the STB and ICTV television channels. Interpipe also owned Ferrotrade International CJSC, which held an 86% stake in Ukrsotsbank, the fourth-largest bank in Ukraine, through which Pinchuk's businesses were managed and financed. In 2007, he sold the bank to UniCredit Group for $2,07 billion – the largest such deal in Ukraine! And as a final touch, Pinchuk acquired the Sumy-Stepanovskiy, Nizovsky, Burinsky, Chupakhovsky, and Pivnensky sugar factories.

In the late 90s, Viktor Pinchuk made several joint acquisitions. For example, Interpipe acquired a 32% stake in the Alchevsk Iron and Steel Works and a 55% stake in the Alchevsk Coke and Chemical Plant, co-owned by Akhmetov's Industrial Union of Donbass. In 2004, Pinchuk sold his shares in these enterprises to Akhmetov, and that same year, the two partners pulled off their largest and most controversial acquisition: a 93% stake in Kryvorizhstal for $803 million, creating the Investment and Metallurgical Union (IMS) with equal shares held by Interpipe and System Capital Management. As is well known, this purchase was later annulled by the court, and the reprivatization of Kryvorizhstal netted the state $4,8 billion (which was ultimately embezzled and stolen).

Pinchuk Taruta Akhmetov

V. Pinchuk, S. Taruta and R. Akhmetov

Viktor Pinchuk's joint deals with the Privat Group also ended in scandal. Between 2002 and 2005, they acquired the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant (NFP), the Kryvyi Rih Iron Ore Combine (KZhRK), the Stakhanov and Zaporizhzhia Ferroalloy Plants, and the Ordzhonikidze and Marganets Mining and Processing Plants—all of which were supposed to be managed by their joint holding company. However, by 2005, Privat accused Pinchuk of Interpipe engaging in fraud by concealing profits from joint ventures and failing to pay dividends. The dispute culminated in an attempted corporate takeover of NFP by Kolomoisky's men, which sparked a serious political uproar.

This may have been Kolomoisky's response to Pinchuk's demands for a share of KZRK shares in exchange for his role in orchestrating the privatization of Ukrrudprom. Furthermore, Kolomoisky wanted to recoup the $100 million he had contributed to the 2004 election fund in exchange for a 40,1% stake in Ukrnafta. Kolomoisky effectively began squeezing Pinchuk out of their joint venture, who filed multibillion-dollar lawsuits in international courts. A dispute between the oligarchs ensued that would drag on for a full decade.

Victor Pinchuk. Lucky

Kolomoisky had several opportunities to crush Pinchuk, taking advantage of the changing political climate in the country: in 2005 and in 2014. However, he didn't do so, even though Pinchuk's main patron was already a former president, and therefore practically a nobody. The only explanation for this uncharacteristic "nobility" of Kolomoisky's is Kaminetsky's intercession. But it turned out that the rabbi was also interceding for Leonid Kuchma, who had invested in Viktor Pinchuk as a reliable supporter in his old age. Indeed, when discussing former President Kuchma's business, no one can name a single major enterprise or foundation personally owned by Leonid Danilovich. All of the Kuchma family's businesses are joint ventures of his daughter and son-in-law.

Victor Pichuk, Kuchma, Clinton, Franchuk

V. Pichuk, L. Kuchma, B. Clinton and E. Franchuk
in the Livadia Palace (Crimea)

Perhaps it's no coincidence that the "young people" spent five years getting used to each other, while Kuchma kept his eye on his son-in-law. It's also no coincidence that their marriage took place in 2002, when Kuchma began actively preparing for his political retirement—revising legislation, accelerating privatization, and negotiating with potential successors. Incidentally, Viktor Pinchuk suggested that his father-in-law choose Serhiy Tihipko as his successor, as he seemed the optimal candidate. This option was considered until the very end, until, under intense pressure from the "Donetsk people," Viktor Yanukovych was nominated. Pinchuk was forced to forge a friendly relationship with him at the very last minute, but his haste was in vain.

How Pinchuk managed to fall out with Viktor Yushchenko remains unknown. But in 2005, Ukraine had two oligarchs officially hated by the new government: Rinat Akhmetov and Viktor Pinchuk.

But, again, both suffered virtually no harm—except for the seizure of Kryvorizhstal. Even the scandal surrounding the Nikopol Ferroalloy Plant was later resolved by Pinchuk and Kolomoisky through mutual concessions. It was said that Kolomoisky initially went all-in because he had a long-standing dislike for Pinchuk (even though they attend the same Menorah) and tolerated him only because of his father-in-law. After the change of power in Ukraine, he decided he no longer needed Pinchuk. Furthermore, Kolomoisky enlisted the help of the new Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko, who had fallen out with Pinchuk back in 1996. But Viktor Pinchuk proved to be an unusually resilient tin oligarch: as power in the country continued to shift, he successfully developed the Pinchuk-Kuchma family's businesses, transforming himself from industrial oligarchs into philanthropic oligarchs. Although, according to Skelet.Org , Pinchuk simply agreed with Yushchenko that he would "pay" for "Ukrainian culture"—all sorts of Trypillian "lubochkas" and any "beekeeper"—Yushchenko, and organize various cultural and business events (for example, YES – the Yalta European Strategy) around the world at his own expense, not the state's.

Pinchuk's control over a number of central media outlets helped him achieve this: in 2009, he merged his television channels Novy, STB, ICTV, QTV, M1, and M2 into the StarLightMedia holding company, headed by Elena Franchuk (since 2010, Elena Pinchuk). It seems he was also "infiltrated" by the editorial boards of other television channels, as they began mentioning Pinchuk infrequently, and only in reference to reports from exhibitions and concerts (financed by Pinchuk's foundations) and his "authoritative opinion" as a politically neutral figure. And in just two or three years, Pinchuk's image in the eyes of Ukrainians truly changed; everyone seemed to forget that he was Ukraine's largest industrial oligarch and began to perceive him as an aristocratic "prince" with immense wealth of mysterious origin.

Yes, it's worth noting that Pinchuk's personal political projects have always been losing. He spent a fortune on the "Winter Generation" project, which was led by Khoroshkovsky (see background on it: Valeriy Khoroshkovsky: What is the Ukrainian General-Oligarch Hiding in His Closets? ) and Bogoslovskaya (read about her: Inna Bogoslovskaya: A Woman Without Inner Complexes and a Politician Without Principles ). However, the project's strategists failed to take into account the Ukrainian mentality. As a result, "Winter Generation" was a complete failure.

Pinchuk's net worth was truly colossal: in 2008, Korrespondent magazine valued it at $8,9 billion, and Focus magazine valued it at $10,5 billion—thus ranking him among the richest people on the planet. However, after the crisis, his metallurgical plant shares plummeted in value: in 2011, Pinchuk's net worth was estimated at only $2,97 billion, and in 2012, even less—$1,79 billion. By the end of 2016, Forbes estimated Pinchuk's fortune at $1,2 billion, while Kolomoisky and Bogolyubov's were worth $1,3 billion each. Incidentally, it turns out that Viktor Mykhailovych sponsors not only Ukrainian musicians and the Dnipropetrovsk synagogue, but also the US Democratic Party: he donated $8 million to Hillary Clinton's campaign fund. Of course, Pinchuk has a long-standing relationship with the Clinton family (since the late 90s), and Elena Pinchuk is the chair of the Ukrainian branch of the Anti-AIDS Foundation, headed by Bill Clinton. But is it legal to finance an election campaign in another country?

In December 2016, it became known that the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU) was receiving "patronage" from Pinchuk and, possibly, Kolomoisky. The scandal erupted after it was revealed that in May, the head of the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), Nazar Kholodnytsky ( read more about him here: Nazar Kholodnytsky. Chief of Corruption or Chief of Anti-Corruption? ) had demanded that Prosecutor General Lutsenko ( read the background story on him here: Yuriy Lutsenko. The "Terminator" of Ukrainian Politics ) hand over all cases related to Pinchuk and Kolomoisky to the NABU. Six months later, when journalists decided to find out how long they would have to wait for sensational results from the investigation, the NABU told them they had never even seen any cases involving Pinchuk. Well, it's safe to say that Rabbi Kaminezki's VIP parishioners will successfully survive this government as well...

P.S.: In the context of all of the above, it's worth considering Victor Pinchuk's article in the Wall Street Journal, published before the New Year of 2017. It contains three points that are understandable to Skelet.Org :

1. Ukraine should not strive to join NATO;

2. The path to the EU is currently closed for her, and it is better to focus on internal problems;

3. The issue of federalization is acute, and its resolution lies in elections in the ORDLO, which should be held as quickly as possible.

Given Pinchuk's connections in the US, we can safely assume he conveyed to the Ukrainian elite what the US elite demanded of them in exchange for support for Ukraine.

In response, Pinchuk was met with a barrage of criticism from so-called "patriots".

But... We'll see where this all leads. Especially since Trump's inauguration isn't far off.

Sergey Varis, for Skelet.Org

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