Victor Pinzenik
He bears direct responsibility for the fact that in the 90s, Ukrainian society was divided into a handful of wealthy families and millions of disenfranchised poor. Each time the "liberal economist" Viktor Pynzenyk came to power, it ended in crises and upheavals, and his reforms became synonymous with socioeconomic catastrophe. Therefore, for many years, Pynzenyk's name was pronounced by Ukrainians with the same negative emotions with which his economic associates, Gaidar and Chubais, were remembered in neighboring Russia. Only recently was his dark reputation eclipsed by the reforms of the Yatsenyuk and Groisman.
Pynzenyk is deeply upset that he was seemingly forgotten after the second Maidan, and the reforms of the past three years have been carried out without his direct involvement. However, he still hasn't given up hope of being invited back to manage the country's economy—something that sends shivers down many Ukrainians' spines, like, "God forbid!" After all, one of his recent reform proposals (as a member of the Verkhovna Rada, during the approval of the 2016 budget) was... the abolition of pensions in order to rebalance the Pension Fund. He continues to insist that the Pension Fund deficit must be urgently addressed, seeing only two solutions: reducing the size of payments or reducing the number of pensioners.
But what is his personal interest? Is Viktor Pinzenik a selfless experimental vivisectionist working to implement his ideas, or is he profiting from this? Let's try to figure this out by getting to know Pinzenik better.
Viktor Pynzenyk. Economic Fascism
Viktor Mikhailovich Pynzenyk was born on April 15, 1954, in the village of Smologovytsia, Irshava district, Zakarpattia region, to a family of teachers. Military service was out of the question for the extremely homely and physically weak young man. His parents even kept him from working in manufacturing – just in case! According to some sources, Skelet.OrgSuch a difficult childhood left its mark on Viktor Pynzenyk's character, making him somewhat of a misanthrope. That's why he's completely indifferent to the consequences his reforms have on the living.
Immediately after school, he enrolled in the economics department of Ivan Franko Lviv State University (LSU), where, after graduating in 1975, he remained as an assistant and began graduate school. His rank gradually rose: associate professor (1981), senior research fellow (1987). In 1989, Pynzenyk defended his doctoral dissertation at Moscow State University, where he had been sent as a young specialist with a "perestroika mindset." There is evidence that it was there that Pynzenyk became imbued with the ideas of the "free market" and monetarism, which were being indoctrinated into future reformers by invited "foreign partners" at the time. Returning to Lviv with his degree, Pynzenyk became involved with activists of the newly formed "People's Movement"—all of which helped him assume the chair of the Department of Economics and National Economy Management at LSU in 1991.
But by that time, Viktor Mykhailovych already had his first business: in 1990, together with his LSU colleague Ivan Vasyunyk (an associate professor and secretary of the Komsomol committee), they opened the Lviv Institute of Management—one of the first private (and fee-paying) universities in Ukraine. Pynzenyk served as its director until 1992, when he became a minister. The university was then led by Vasyunyk, and after him by Maria Pynzenyk (born 1969), Viktor Mykhailovych's second wife, a former student of his, now also an "outstanding economist." Numerous sources Skelet.Org They claim that it is in her name that the bulk of the family business and acquired property is registered.
Victor and Maria Pinzenik
Despite the fact that Viktor Pynzenyk wrote numerous works and articles on production economics during the Soviet era, he had only ever seen factories in the flesh on television. And so this armchair theorist of Soviet economics, familiar only with its financial aspects, became fascinated with the Western school of monetarism. The problem is that monetarism, dubbed "economic fascism" in the West itself, prioritizes exclusively money and the interests of those who own and manage it (bankers and financiers). To achieve this, they neglect the interests of the broad masses of employees, social dependents, small entrepreneurs, and even the state. On the one hand, the results of their reforms may appear quite impressive—an example of which was the Polish Balcerowicz reform (the so-called "shock therapy"), for which Pynzenyk was the main promoter in Ukraine. On the other hand, even with successful external results, they have numerous negative consequences.
In any case, Pynzenyk failed to "do like Balcerowicz." Firstly, he had no real power of his own; he was merely an invited manager, even though his candidacy was lobbied for by Western institutions. Secondly, Pynzenyk is not a selfless fanatic; he is not prepared to starve and suffer for his ideas—just like, say, Petro Poroshenko He's not ready to give up his business for the sake of patriotism, which he constantly urges others to embrace. And thirdly, and most importantly, Ukraine is not Poland; it has its own unique characteristics.
Reforms for scammers
In December 1991, Viktor Pynzenyk won the by-election in Lviv and entered the Verkhovna Rada, a position he's held ever since (except for periods in government). Armed with a doctorate in economics and established connections with Western "partners," he immediately became a leader of the parliamentary economic commission. His ability to rattle off "market reforms" from the podium, coupled with several useful connections, came in handy. In October 1992, Pynzenyk was delegated by Rukh to Leonid Kuchma's government, where he received the posts of deputy prime minister and minister of economy. And, let's add, a spacious apartment on Instytutska Street (rumor has it that it was right next to Viktor Yushchenko's apartment).
From that moment on, "reforms" in Ukraine accelerated sharply: inflation turned into hyperinflation. "Shock therapy, Ukrainian style," began.
While the government and parliament members were wringing their hands in disbelief, inflation devoured all of Ukrainians' savings, forcing them to work practically for food, if not for free. But beyond that, inflation also destroyed the finances of enterprises—both state-owned and those already incorporated—that were unable to independently export goods for foreign currency. At this point, according to the monetarists, an "investor" (a bank, fund, or corporation), preferably from the West, would come in and buy up the enterprises they found attractive. But in Ukraine, this situation produced a different outcome: first, Ukrainian intermediaries (often semi-criminal or criminal) took advantage of it, profiting from metal exports and barter transactions, and then they began taking over debt-ridden factories. Thus, Ukraine acquired its own oligarchs. And if President Kuchma was later dubbed the father of the Ukrainian oligarchy, having raised it, then Viktor Pynzenyk was its midwife, having created all the conditions for its birth.
Back then, the Minister of Economy distinguished himself not only by the hyperinflation he was directly involved in. Incidentally, Pynzenyk knew it would have been entirely possible to slow it back in late 1992 if the economy had been at least temporarily reoriented toward a domestic market with state regulation. But Pynzenyk strongly opposed these very proposals, ranting and raving about "opponents of reform." Rumors then suggested that he drew his enthusiasm from two sources: the IMF, which had promised Ukraine its first loan, and those revolving around Kravchuk And Kuchma's "bigwigs" lobbied for the interests of both their own commercial schemes and those who paid them kickbacks. And there were plenty of people fishing for gold in the murky waters of economic chaos back then.
One of Pynzenyk's "achievements" at the time was the tax reform, which created enormous problems for honest businesses but opened up vast opportunities for shady schemes to exploit the shady business world. Media reports claimed it significantly accelerated the enrichment of aspiring oligarchs and paved the way for VAT refund scams that drained the state of billions of dollars.
On March 17, 1993, Viktor Pynzenyk and Leonid Kuchma signed the Decree "On Trusts," which marked the beginning of a massive fraud that defrauded Ukrainians of tens of millions of dollars. Moreover, organized crime groups (including international ones) were involved in many of the trusts, allowing them to conduct "legal scams." One of them operated at the Republican Stadium in Kyiv and was under the protection of Semyon Mogilevich and his "overseer." Alexandra Presman.
At the same time, Viktor Pynzenyk became one of the pioneers of "voucher privatization" (1993-1996), which was simply copied from the Russian equivalent. The only difference was that the Ukrainian "voucher" was called a "privatization certificate" (saying this phrase could indicate one's level of intoxication) and was personalized. However, this didn't save them from the same fate: the certificates were bought for next to nothing (15-20 hryvnia or a couple of bottles of bootleg vodka), but even that was better than investing it in a trust and ending up with nothing.
In the spring and summer of 1993, another corruption scheme was carried out, significantly contributing to increased inflation: by a coordinated decision between the National Bank (Yushchenko) and the Ministry of Economy (Pynzenik), 1,5 trillion karbovanets were printed under the pretext of purchasing crops. This increased the money supply by 150% and significantly devalued the karbovanets. Then, 1,2 trillion of this sum was funneled through JSCB "Ukraine"—where Yushchenko had previously worked, and which had already received 700 billion freshly printed karbovanets in 1992. After this, the National Bank and the Ministry of Economy established two exchange rates for the karbovanets: the official one and the "market" one, which facilitated the start of major currency fraud.
For all this, Pynzenik never felt remorse. "It's too bad that 1993 was an experiment. But without this terrible experiment, I'm sure there would have been no stability," he declared in an interview with the newspaper Den (No. 195, 1999). Stability? He might as well have mentioned "improvements"!
Victor Pinzenik
But then came 1994, Leonid Kuchma's presidential victory, and Pynzenyk's reappointment as deputy prime minister. He outlasted both Masol and Marchuk in this position, leaving the government only in 1997, with the scandalous resignation of Pavlo Lazarenko. Skelet.Org There are reports that he didn't join Pustvoitenko's government because he became embroiled in the Gradobank scandal. Here's what happened: in November 1994, Pynzenyk and Yushchenko issued orders directing 234 million marks allocated by Germany for Ukrainian war victims to a special account at Gradobank, owned by Viktor Zherditsky. The money was then transferred to various other accounts, of which about 100 million marks simply disappeared (while covering for Zherditsky, Yushchenko made some payments to war victims from the reserves of Bank Ukraina), and then Gradobank collapsed. An international scandal erupted, and Zherditsky was arrested twice. But here's what's interesting: a subsidiary of Gradobank was Horda LTD, headed by Igor Didenko. It specialized in buying up Ukrainian cement plants, and it was precisely this company that received a significant portion of the stolen Deutschmarks. But in 1996-97, while attempting to take over Nakolaivcement OJSC, Khord came face to face with the French firm Lafarge, which was supported by Leonid Kuchma himself, as well as Sergey Tigipko And five minutes later, the new Prime Minister, Valery Pustovoitenko. And here's what's interesting: in the fall of 1997, immediately after the scandalous defeat, Igor Didenko found political asylum in the ranks of the Reforms and Order Party (PRP), founded by Viktor Pynzenyk.
Coincidence? Sources Skelet.Org It is claimed that Pynzenyk, at the very least, had some dealings with Zherditsky and Didenko, and this so displeased Kuchma that he broke off his long-standing alliance with him. That's why Pynzenyk not only failed to join Pustovoitenko's government but also soon declared his "moderate opposition" to Kuchma (though he remained a member of the administrative reform commission).
Sergey Varis, for Skelet.Org
CONTINUED: Viktor Pynzenyk: The Midwife of the Ukrainian Oligarchy. Part 2
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