Vyacheslav Kirilenko
It takes a truly unique politician to fail to earn either a positive rating or even the animosity of voters after a quarter-century of turbulent activity. Posing as a principled right-wing patriot with youthful maximalism, Vyacheslav Kirilenko is, in reality, the epitome of a typical incompetent political conformist, willing to sell out his ideas for office or funding. The only thing this man has succeeded in is plotting against those who considered him their ally and betraying those who trusted him.
Philosopher from the Zone
Vyacheslav Anatolyevich Kirilenko was born on June 7, 1968, in the village of Polesske (formerly Kaganovichi Pervoye) in the Kyiv region. At the time, it was a relatively small town with a population of over 11, two factories, and three schools—his mother worked at one of them as a music teacher. The village's five-century history was cut short by the Chernobyl disaster: a plume of emissions enveloped it, raising background radiation levels to 500 μR/hour. Consequently, Polesske was included in the Chernobyl zone and subjected to the second wave of resettlement (the village is now abandoned and dead, like Pripyat).
This event radically changed the lives of all the residents of Polieskoye, including young Slavik Kyrylenko. At the time (1984-87), he was supposedly studying at the Kherson Maritime School (now the Kherson Maritime College), specializing in the operation of ship automation systems. However, for some reason, the college's website, as well as the websites of its former cadets, make no mention of their highly successful graduate.
Meanwhile, under the program to resettle residents of the 30-kilometer Zone, the Kirilenko family moved to Kyiv, to one of the high-rise buildings built for Chernobyl victims, which were then being hastily erected in cities across the country. The victims were not only provided with housing: conscripts from the Chernobyl Zone received long deferments and were even exempted from military service. This is likely why Vyacheslav Kirilenko's biography contains no mention of his military service. Furthermore, quotas were created for young people from the resettlement zone to receive preferential admission to educational institutions. Kirilenko took advantage of these quotas, enrolling in the philosophy department of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in 1988.
They say that Kirilenko's choice of faculty was guided by the fact that it didn't require knowledge of the exact sciences, in which he was not strong. Moreover, instead of pursuing a humanities education, Vyacheslav Kirilenko immediately plunged into perestroika politics. Since Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv had long been known as a breeding ground for "nationally conscious" cadres, it's not surprising that the student Kirilenko joined the late dissident movement. At first, he hung out at meetings of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, where gray-moustached veterans of the "voluntary suppression" explained to him that the Chernobyl disaster was the work of Moscow's eternal anti-Ukrainian policy. Thus, Vyacheslav Kirilenko became imbued with the national idea, and by December 1989, he had become chairman of the secretariat of the newly formed Ukrainian Student Union (USU). Oles Doniy, who studied at a parallel history department, joined him at the head of the USS.
Around the same time, Kirilenko became embroiled in his first scandal. His classmate was Vladislav Bugera (from Ufa), who had become fascinated with the ideology of "pure Marxism" and later returned to Russia, where he became a philosopher, professor at Ufa University, and left-wing politician (opposed to the Communist Party of the Russian Federation). In 1989, Bugera joined the Kyiv-based pro-Russian and pro-Soviet movement "Fatherland Forum," and frequently clashed with his classmate over their opposing political positions.
Vladislav Bugera
One day, unable to find any other arguments, Kyrylenko decided to resort to this purely "sailor" tactic and publicly accused Bugera of homosexuality, "using aggressive and derogatory language," as tolerance advocates would say today. Having thus silenced his stunned opponent, the future Ukrainian Minister of Culture subsequently used this method repeatedly, and not only against Bugera. Little did he know then that in European political circles, such insults would become unacceptable and even punishable. Therefore, years later, having become a pro-European Ukrainian politician, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko made sure no one remembered this scandalous incident from his political biography. However, you can't hide an awl in a sack...
Rising from granite
On October 2, 1990, about fifty members of the Ukrainian Student Union went to Kyiv's October Revolution Square (now Independence Square), set up camp beds and several tents, and declared an indefinite hunger strike, demanding the fulfillment of a number of their demands. Among them were the resignation of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR, Vitaliy Masol, the adoption of a law on a referendum, the adoption of a law on compulsory military service for Ukrainians only in the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, and the nationalization of Communist Party property. Thus began the "revolution on granite," later called the first Ukrainian Maidan, which brought its main participants into big politics: Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, Oles Doniy, and Oleh Tyahnybok (Read more about it in the article Oleh Tyahnybok: Sponsors and allies of the Ukrainian nationalist), Vladimir Chemeris, Yuriy Lutsenko (Read more about it in the article Yuriy Lutsenko. The "Terminator" of Ukrainian Politics) and many other “young and promising”.
Vyacheslav Kirilenko and Oles Doniy during the "Revolution on Granite"
Years later, when Ukrainian citizens stopped believing in spontaneous revolutions, many questions arose about what exactly this "revolution on granite" was. There are still no answers: former students continue to claim that "Ukrainian youth woke up" in October 90, while the officials and first secretaries of the time remain silent. However, a number of interesting features surrounding those events can be noted.
First, in the spring and summer of 1990, the KGB leadership in the Ukrainian SSR changed (including replacing district department heads), and the new leadership unexpectedly showed some sympathy for the idea of Ukrainian sovereignty. Rukh members were no longer detained and dragged in for interrogation; moreover, the KGB began to tacitly protect them from police detention. However, this protection was granted only to their "wards," who played by the agreed-upon rules. This was clearly evident during the "Revolution on Granite": police and "plainclothesmen" surrounded the hunger-stricken students and like-minded people hanging out nearby, making no attempt to disperse them and protecting them from hostile supporters of the USSR—who could be found in Kyiv at the time.
Secondly, the Kyiv students who participated in the protest were protected from expulsion from universities for truancy. During the day, Kyiv high school students were brought to the square in an organized manner, effectively serving as extras for photojournalists (a similar incident would happen again in November 2004). Thirdly, the protest enjoyed support in the Verkhovna Rada: not only among the ineffective "democratic opposition" deputies, but also among the team. Leonid Kravchuk, who had recently been elected its chairman. He personally brought student representatives (Doniy and Kirilenko) to the session hall and gave them the opportunity to speak from the podium.
And then this "revolution" suddenly ended—immediately after the Rada dismissed Vitaliy Masol. A few hours later, the students ended their hunger strike and began winding down their protest, just as they had begun it with the same orderly organization. Vyacheslav Kyrylenko and Oles Doniy seemed to have forgotten all their other demands, content with Kravchuk's formal promise to "review and adopt." Why? Some argue that the "revolution on granite" was merely a street show as part of a power struggle between two factions of the late Soviet elite. One of them first replaced the leadership of the republic's KGB with its own people, then installed Kravchuk as head of the Verkhovna Rada, and then removed Vitaliy Masol, a rival of its own, from the key post of head of the Council of Ministers (he returned to power in 1994, after Kravchuk's departure). To achieve this, they used the then-innovative method of "popular protest," implemented by Vyacheslav Kirilenko's "Student Union." It's unlikely that Kirilenko didn't realize he was merely a pawn in a larger game, and, moreover, that he was essentially working for the very "commies" he had called on his peers to fight. However, this role seemed to suit him perfectly. Perhaps because the leaders of the student hunger strikes reaped some profit from their action.
Supplement from SKELET-infoIn reality, it was a test, a rehearsal. The organizers of the event were interested in how politicians and the public would react to this event. The results, and significant adjustments, led to the so-called "Orange Revolution," which, in turn, was a test run for the "Euromaidan," which launched the civil war.
"And you, Brutus!"
And yet, the "revolution on granite" was the most striking episode in Vyacheslav Kirilenko's life. After all, his subsequent biography is the murky routine of a political functionary, occasionally lit by flashes of scandal that he tried to bury in oblivion.
In 1993, Vyacheslav Kirilenko graduated from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv and entered graduate school in the Philosophy Department, where he met his future wife, Ekaterina (born 1971), who had graduated from Cherkasy Pedagogical University with a degree in Russian Language and Literature. Later (in 1996), they defended their PhD dissertations almost simultaneously: Vyacheslav's on "Ukrainian Philosophy of 20th-Century National Radicalism," and Ekaterina's on "Mandelstam's Philosophy of Culture." The radically different topics of their dissertations did not prevent them from soon marrying and starting a strong family.
In 1992-93, Kirilenko himself headed the Ukrainian Student Union, which no longer engaged in any campaigns and was morphing into something resembling the late VLKMS: it spawned its own cells at Ukrainian universities, nominated candidates for elections, participated in conferences and congresses, and, most importantly, absorbed grants from the Western diaspora to support the national youth movement. This "grant-eating," a carefree existence on free money, had a significant impact on the formation of Vyacheslav Kirilenko's new personality. In the early 90s, many people threw themselves into business, but Kirilenko never even attempted to open his own company and trade metals, import goods, or build financial pyramids. His life's work became the pursuit of grants, subsidies, subsidies, and assistance (and, rumor has it, kickbacks). Kirilenko is one of the few Ukrainian politicians who does not own his own companies, enterprises, or even a run-down salon – and this allows him to appear an honest professional.
But Vyacheslav Kyrylenko demonstrated his professionalism elsewhere: in the intrigues and behind-the-scenes politics that are an integral part of life at the party's top echelons. Lacking the qualities of an independent leader, Kyrylenko always preferred a lucrative position in someone else's retinue. In 1993, he joined the People's Movement of Ukraine (NRU), where, with the help of Oles Doniy, he quickly gained the favor of Vyacheslav Chornovil. Kyrylenko made a successful trade: he brought the entire structure of his Ukrainian Student Union into the NRU, on the basis of which he founded and led (until 1999) the Young People's Movement. At the same time, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko became a member of the Red Council of the People's Movement (October 1993 – April 1994), then a member of the Central Leadership of the People's Movement (April 1994 – March 1999), and a member of the Presidium of the Central Leadership of the People's Movement (December 1995 – March 1999). In April 1998, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko was elected to the Verkhovna Rada for the first time on the People's Movement party list (No. 18).
Having lost the political independence he didn't really need, Kyrylenko latched onto the People's Movement's enormous (compared to the USS) financial resources. And they were indeed considerable: in addition to funds from the diaspora and the party's internal sponsors, the People's Movement received funding through the Foreign Ministry's business schemes (this ministry was considered a "Rukh fiefdom"). Thanks to this, in the 90s, the People's Movement was the largest right-wing party in Ukraine, confidently competing with both the left-wing Communist Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, as well as the pro-presidential "centrists" of the People's Democratic Party and the SDPU (o).
This played a fatal role in the subsequent fate of the party and its leader. On February 28, 1999, Yuriy Kostenko, deputy chairman of the People's Movement of Ukraine, organized a party congress at which he and his supporters overthrew Vyacheslav Chornovil and was elected the new head of the People's Movement. In this "palace intrigue," Vyacheslav Kyrylenko not only sided with Kostenko but actively supported him, using the structures of his Young Movement. In doing so, Kyrylenko effectively betrayed Vyacheslav Chornovil, who had welcomed him and had been his patron for many years—much to the latter's surprise and sincere chagrin. As the saying goes, "And you, Brutus!"
The reason for this coup was the upcoming presidential elections (October 1999), which Leonid Kuchma was determined to win at all costs. Therefore, it was decided to remove Vyacheslav Chornovil from the race, first by depriving him of his party's support. What benefit Kyrylenko, who participated in the conspiracy, might have gained from this remains unknown. But it turned out that, as in 1990, he once again worked in favor of those he publicly criticized as "the regime of former communists."
Be that as it may, the plan was only partially successful: just a few days later, a new NRU congress was held, at which Chornovil's supporters confirmed his authority. And on March 25, Vyacheslav Chornovil died in a car accident—which is believed to have been staged. His place was taken by Gennady Udovenko, who gathered most of the Foreign Ministry's "Rukh" members into his half of the NRU and, accordingly, took control of the Foreign Ministry's business operations (in the West, Ukrainian embassies still have a reputation as "smugglers' offices"). But Rukh had already lost the presidential election.
Found in the trash
With a rating of 1,5-2,5%, Kostenko and Kyrylenko's People's Movement (Narodny Rukh) could not compete for a seat in the Rada in the 2002 elections, and their mandates were in jeopardy. This particularly affected Vyacheslav Kyrylenko, who, due to a complete lack of political popularity with voters, lost every majoritarian election. His political future was saved by Viktor Yushchenko: in February 2002, both Narodny Rukhs joined the Our Ukraine bloc, on whose list (No. 20) Kyrylenko again received a parliamentary mandate, becoming deputy chairman of the Committee on Social Policy. A few years later, an angry Yushchenko would remark to the "young politicians" who had gathered under his wing that he had "picked them up from the trash heaps."
Kirilenko wasted no time, as he needed to demonstrate some exceptional qualities among Yushchenko's numerous allies to gain entry into his inner circle. He did this in two ways: by diligently serving as the presidential candidate's confidant and by befriending Kateryna Chumachenko. As he then became personally close to Yushchenko, he diligently copied all of his habits and hobbies: he began wearing an embroidered shirt and learned to make pots and whistles.
Of course, during the 2004 Maidan, Kyrylenko was practically a fixture on stage, but the crowd chanting "Yushchenko! Yushchenko!" hardly paid any attention to the unpopular, unremarkable "young politician" with his double chin. There was even a joke back then that Kyrylenko had the typical Bad Boy looks. The joke was not without reason: by growing closer to Yushchenko, Kyrylenko simultaneously distanced himself from Yuriy Kostenko, thus betraying his second "mentor." The fact is that Kostenko, the leader of the Ukrainian People's Party (UNP), which the People's Movement (Narodny Rukh) had become since 2003, had either diverged from Yushchenko on some issues or had simply been pushed aside by his numerous sycophants. As a result, it was not Kostenko, the head of the UNP, who stood behind the "people's president," but his deputy, Kyrylenko. In March 2005, an offended Kostenko left Our Ukraine and created his own electoral bloc – after which Kyrylenko, demonstrating his loyalty to Viktor Yushchenko, demonstratively left the UNP.
The efforts were not in vain: in February 2005, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko was appointed Minister of Social Policy and Labor in the Tymoshenko government (under the Our Ukraine quota), and after her scandalous resignation, he joined the Yekhanurov government (Read more about it in the article Yuriy Yekhanurov: Dark Spots in the Biography of the Kyiv Mayoral Candidate) as Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Affairs. There, he became embroiled in yet another scandal, this time involving corruption: Party of Regions MP Vasily Khara accused Kirilenko of placing his own people in the leadership of the Temporary Disability Insurance Fund (TDIF), after which the fund "helped" several sanatoriums win a tender for subsidized vouchers, receiving kickbacks from them. Kirilenko denied the accusations and even promised to sue Khara, but then, as usual, decided it was best to forget the incident.
Moreover, in March 2006, Kyrylenko was again elected to parliament on the Our Ukraine list (this time as No. 6). In August, he left the Cabinet of Ministers, and in December 2006, he became head of the party's parliamentary faction, thereby gaining Yushchenko's full trust. However, it was written that he owed this trust more to Viktor Baloha, who had become head of the Presidential Secretariat. (read more about it in the article VICTOR BALOGA. PHENOMENON OF THE TRANSCARPATHIAN GOD) who recommended him to Yushchenko as a "complete mediocrity" capable of being completely loyal and manageable under certain conditions. In April 2007, the level of trust increased, and Yushchenko personally nominated Kyrylenko for the post of head of the Our Ukraine party.
In the 2007 parliamentary elections, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko became the head of the political council of the Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense bloc (NU-NS) and was elected to the Rada as the second-ranked candidate (the party's honorary leader, Viktor Yushchenko, was listed as the first). According to the agreement between the winning parties (NU-NS and BYuT), Kyrylenko was to become speaker, but this caused extreme discontent among many politicians. Taras Chornovol compared Kyrylenko to Nero's horse.
Yushchenko ended up having an unpleasant conversation with Kyrylenko, after which he formally resigned and remained simply the leader of the NU-NS faction in the Rada. The speaker's seat went first to Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and then to Volodymyr Lytvyn.Read more about it in the article Volodymyr Lytvyn: Does Ukraine need a professional Judas?). But this represented the loss of those very conditions that had ensured Vyacheslav Kyrylenko's loyalty. Seeing the futility of his position, exacerbated by Viktor Yushchenko's declining approval ratings, Kyrylenko decided to leave him as well. In December 2008, he resigned as faction leader, but the "Bad Boy" couldn't simply leave without causing trouble. And in early 2009, Kyrylenko pulled some of the deputies out of the NU-NS, announcing the creation of his own movement, "For Ukraine!" (which he transformed into the purchased, marginal Party of Social Protection). This finally finished off the NU-NS, which had been split by the political crisis, and effectively marked its end.
If it didn't work out with Yulia, it worked out with Senya.
Kyrylenko's political maneuver was clear: realizing that Yushchenko was a political corpse and would not win the 2010 elections, he abandoned him and placed his bet on Yulia Tymoshenko. However, Tymoshenko refused to cooperate with Kyrylenko, for whom she had harbored deep antipathy since the 2005 political crisis, exacerbated by the split in the OU-NS-BYuI coalition in 2008. Therefore, Kyrylenko found himself in a difficult situation (under threat of losing funding) and ultimately supported Yushchenko in the 2010 elections—which, however, did not help Viktor Andreevich in the least. It was a disaster: the "For Ukraine!" party's ratings did not reach even 1%, and in 2012, Kyrylenko faced losing not only his mandate but also his livelihood (who would finance such a hopeless party?).
He was saved by the arrest of Yulia Tymoshenko and the merger of the orphaned Batkivshchyna with the Front for Change, resulting in the opposition bloc being led by Kyrylenko's old friend from Our Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk. In December 2011, they signed an agreement on joint opposition activities, and in 2012, Kyrylenko was again elected as a people's deputy on the Batkivshchyna list (No. 6). The politician, who had repeatedly betrayed his leaders and was often known for his downright boorish behavior toward opponents, was appointed chairman of the Committee on Culture and Spirituality. There, he distinguished himself with a number of rather controversial bills that had little to do with culture.
Thus, in 2013, Kyrylenko authored a bill recognizing OUN-UPA soldiers as "a party that fought for Ukraine's independence in World War II." This led to nothing but further exacerbation of the senseless political standoff in the Rada. And on February 23, 2014, the second day after the overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych, it was Kyrylenko who introduced to the Rada a bill "On the Repeal of the Law on State Language Policy." This bill repealed previously adopted provisions (in accordance with the European Charter) regarding the Russian language in Ukraine. The bill was voted on, but not signed by Acting Speaker Turchynov (Read more about it in the article Oleksandr Turchynov: Skeletons in the Closet of Ukraine's "Bloody Pastor"), who stated that the socio-political resonance would be unpredictable. And resonance did indeed occur: it was the announcement of Kirilenko's bill that sparked a rebellion by the pro-Russian population of Crimea and Donbas, which quickly escalated into separatism.
On September 10, 2014, the For Ukraine party joined the People's Front, and in the snap parliamentary elections, Vyacheslav Kyrylenko returned to the Rada as number eight on the bloc's list. In December, he then joined the coalition government, taking the post of Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Policy and Minister of Culture of Ukraine. In these positions, he once again distinguished himself only by further scandals. For example, in January 2015 (even before official decommunization), Kyrylenko announced that the Ministry of Culture would... encourage the demolition of Soviet monuments. He then drafted a law on the Ukrainization of music broadcasts on television and radio—a law that was opposed by such Ukrainian performers as Jamala, Tina Karol, Iryna Bilyk, and Potap.
Ekaterina Kirilenko
But the most high-profile scandal was surrounding the doctoral dissertation of his wife, Kateryna Kyrylenko, who in March 2014 (with her husband's support) was appointed head of the philosophy department at the Kyiv National University of Culture and Arts (KNUCA). In October 2015, she defended her doctoral dissertation, which several Ukrainian humanities scholars accused of plagiarism: allegedly, entire sections were simply copied from the scholarly works of Ukrainian and Russian authors. Furthermore, this dissertation was prepared between April 2014 and April 2015 and does not represent the "long-term scholarly work" claimed. What's more, immediately after his wife received her doctorate, Minister of Culture Kyrylenko announced a competition to fill the position of rector of KNUCA, after which the university began firing all faculty and department heads who could have competed with Kateryna Kyrylenko. The scandal spilled into the media, and luminaries of science appealed to the prime minister and the president. As a result, Ekaterina Kirilenko's dissertation was submitted to the Ministry of Education's expert commission, which declared it authentic. However, the process of promoting the deputy prime minister's wife to the position of rector of the Kyiv National University of Culture and Arts (KNUCI) was suspended. And Vyacheslav Kirilenko himself, although he joined Groysman's government in early 2016 (Read more about it in the article BVolodymyr Groysman: Dark Spots in the Biography of the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada) while retaining the post of Deputy Prime Minister for Humanitarian Policy, he was stripped of the portfolio of Minister of Culture.
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Vyacheslav Kyrylenko's future plans are easy to predict. The People's Front long ago lost any chance of winning the parliamentary elections again (primarily thanks to its ministers), and therefore it holds no prospects for Kyrylenko. Currently, he's clinging to it only because the coalition agreement between the People's Front and the Petro Poroshenko Bloc ensures the security of the People's Front's ministerial portfolios. And Kyrylenko can't yet abandon Yatsenyuk's bloc, lest he lose his post as deputy prime minister. But as soon as this coalition agreement expires, the political rollercoaster will roll on. He's surely already eyeing his new allies and patrons.
Sergey Varis, for SKELET-info
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