Why the only person who can challenge the mayor is businessman Sapronov, and what is the president's party doing in the city?
For the past two years, Kharkiv has been one of the hottest spots on Ukraine's political map. One of the country's most powerful Euromaidan protests, the thwarting of Russian security services and separatists' attempts to wrest the region from Ukraine, following in the footsteps of Donetsk and Luhansk, the largest influx of refugees from Donbas, a powerful and massive volunteer movement—it would seem that all this and much more should have changed the situation in the region, hitherto considered a stronghold of the Party of Regions and its predecessors. Meanwhile, incumbent Mayor Gennady Krenes remains firmly in the lead in the election race, leading a close-knit clan of city officials and entrepreneurs closely involved in budgetary management.
No matter which poll you look at, Kernes is the clear frontrunner among 11 candidates for mayor. According to the Gorshenin Institute, 51,3% of Kharkiv residents will vote for him, while the Situation Modeling Agency estimates 48,7% (we will refer to this study's data from now on). If the Gorshenin Institute were to conduct the poll today, its results might be slightly different, as the list offered to respondents includes MPs Oleksandr Feldman and Mykhailo Dobkin, who ultimately dropped out of the race, as well as the head of the regional state administration. Igor Rainin.
Kernes remains firmly in power, despite the fact that he is currently on trial for the kidnapping and torture of two Euromaidan protesters, and the prosecutor's office is investigating a raft of cases involving the illegal allocation of land plots for development by the city council and financial irregularities in public utilities. For years, local activists have accused him of every conceivable crime, from corruption to separatism and the use of "titushki" (illegal force) to suppress protesters.
Why do Kharkiv residents vote for Kernes? First and foremost: Kernes is the only figure in local politics who is seriously and consistently fighting for the mayor's seat, not just for a short campaign break, using any means necessary to achieve this. In fact, his campaign never stopped during his entire term as mayor. Kernes owns or somehow influences virtually every media outlet in the city—which, incidentally, is quite limited in the country's second-largest city after the capital.
Most of the local media outlets not controlled by Kernes belonged to his political opponent, current Interior Minister Arsen Avakov. However, some were destroyed during Avakov's escape from prison in Italy, while others were closed or sold by their owner. The few remaining outlets are clearly financed on a residual basis and are unable to influence sentiment in the region.
After the Maidan, Avakov firmly settled in Kyiv—especially since his Kharkiv businesses were also partially sold and partially destroyed. Contrary to numerous conspiracy theories that Avakov considers Kharkiv his fiefdom and is actively involved in the ongoing processes there, the minister himself does not seem to connect his political future with it and, accordingly, has no local projects.
Kernes actively uses media resources to boost his own ratings and combat his enemies. But his popularity stems from more than just that. Kernes is deliberately targeting his core constituency—the city's conservative population, still steeped in Soviet stereotypes, and the apolitical youth. His specialty has been the improvement of streets and parks, something none of his predecessors had ever undertaken on a comparable scale. During Kernes's mayoralty, a number of recreation areas and some city highways were completely renovated. One new metro station was added (no laughing matter here—for the Kharkiv metro, whose construction receives virtually no state funding, this is significant, especially since this station integrated a residential area with a population of over 100 into the system).
Dozens of new playgrounds and sports fields have sprung up in Kharkiv, the semi-abandoned, quiet Gorky Park has become a playground for amusement rides and entertainment, fountains that even the current generation of 40-year-olds can't remember ever functioning have begun to flow, and the notorious benches and trash cans have appeared near buildings and in neighborhoods.
Kernes' opponents point to the massive corruption involved in city projects, the fact that many of them are financed by local businessmen pressured into doing so by the city government, the complete lack of transparency in city finances and tariffs, and loans taken out not to address the city's serious problems but merely to show off for the electorate. But all this has little impact on Kernes's position—not a single criminal case has been brought to a conclusion, any lawsuits against the city government fall apart in Kharkiv courts, and, due to the aforementioned media situation, the current mayor's opponents' ability to reach a wider audience is extremely limited. Consequently, the dilapidated state of utility networks, the lack of any real attempts to address transportation issues, and the condition of most non-central streets, not to mention intra-city roads, remain largely unnoticed. However, solutions to these problems are significantly less visible to the electorate and, therefore, uninteresting. Kernes's achievements are in plain sight; few will bother to figure out what's going on, and it's unlikely that today there's a single figure with a serious political background who hasn't been the subject of similar accusations.
Thirty-four percent of respondents surveyed by the Situation Modeling Agency believe that the only competitor to Kernes who could influence the election results is independent businessman Yuriy Sapronov. Today, 8,1% of Kharkiv residents plan to vote for him.
Sapronov, tennis players and Dobkin
Sapronov is a very promising figure for Kharkiv. He has no significant negative connotations—his main business is not connected to Kharkiv, and no specific charges have been filed against him during his tenure as deputy to then-governor and current leader of the Opposition Bloc, Mykhailo Dobkin. In Kharkiv, Sapronov owns a golf club with a five-star hotel built on vacant lots on the outskirts of the city, publishes books by Leszek Balcerowicz, and sponsors tennis and humanitarian projects. Since the outbreak of the war in the east, he has actively contributed financially to the volunteer group "Station Kharkiv," one of the largest organizations assisting refugees.
Sapronov knows how to build relationships—with businessmen, journalists, and opinion leaders. If he makes it to the second round, he'll undoubtedly secure the votes of all those "against Kernes." Furthermore, it's possible that those who haven't made up their minds (26,4%) or aren't planning to vote will also turn out for the second round. Then the choice will be between Kernes and someone who isn't (their last name isn't so important). Thus, the Kharkiv elections hold two intrigues: whether there will be a second round and how it will end.
It's also important to remember that Kernes's victory in the previous Kharkiv mayoral election didn't appear entirely convincing. But even if we believe it wasn't the result of irregularities or outright fraud, we shouldn't forget that turnout in the 2010 Kharkiv elections was 40%, and it was from this total that Kernes secured his final 29,33% of the vote, beating Avakov by less than one percentage point.
So what about Kyiv itself? Clearly, a political victory for Kernes and the Renaissance Party list he leads, which consists primarily of city officials and businessmen closely connected to the city government, is a very bad outcome for the Kyiv authorities. This means that in frontline Kharkiv, a year and a half after the Maidan, nothing much has changed, and the same old Party of Regions is still in power. Meanwhile, the hastily created regional branch of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, led by Governor Ihor Rainin, is nominating local businessman and newly elected chairman of the Solidarity city branch, Oleksandr Davtyan, as its candidate. Davtyan runs a fairly stable family business, has no particular conflicts with anyone, and has repeatedly participated in electoral projects, but without much drive or success. He served as a city council member, a member of the city executive committee, and is now a regional council member.
In the 2006 elections, he supported Dobkin, and in 2010, Kernes (while, incidentally, heading the regional branch of the "Front for Change"). His statement about Kernes at that time is widely quoted: "Don't interfere with those who are working. I can't work like Gennady Kernes—20 hours a day. Today's team, although they are my political opponents, does more for the city than all the previous mayors combined. I know stones will be thrown at me now, but I knew all the mayors personally, worked with them, and I see that there is a completely different movement in the city now. As a city resident, it suits me." Clearly, Davtyan is not the figure who will unite the "pro-Ukrainian" electorate. It seems he's not particularly eager to do so; he doesn't even seem to be campaigning much. It seems that Davtyan’s 4,4% rating doesn’t bother Davtyan himself, nor Rainin, nor the Presidential Administration…
So the question arises: why? There's no clear answer, but there are theories. Some of them are based on the conclusions of local observers and participants in the trial that Kyiv has given Kernes the green light. Neither the heavy plastering of "Vidrodzhennia" ads on city transport nor the reports of administrative abuses in public organizations have led to any noticeable reaction from law enforcement or the regional government. Neither the head of the regional Solidarity party, Rainin, nor Davtyan, a representative of the presidential party, have allowed themselves the slightest attack on Kernes. This seems a bit odd for someone who is aiming to win.
The most popular explanation is that Poroshenko and Kolomoisky agreed to "surrender" Kharkiv to the "Dnipropetrovsk men." Clearly, such a situation could be advantageous for Kolomoisky, but only in terms of strengthening his position in negotiations with Kyiv. Sources close to the Presidential Administration deny this theory.
A more plausible theory is that Davtyan is a technical candidate, nominated only because it would have been improper not to nominate anyone, and Solidarity has no substitutes in Kharkiv. Rainin himself indirectly confirmed this in an interview with Ukrainska Pravda before Davtyan's nomination: "The search for a candidate is underway. I've made proposals to some people. Some don't want to get involved in politics, some don't have the resources. Some find other arguments. I've suggested the public nominate a candidate. There's also this mentality: remove Kernes, and then I'll go. You go and do it, and we'll help. There's this problem, which is why there's a slight delay in choosing a candidate."
Alexander Davtyan, nominee of Solidarity
Perhaps the problem was never resolved. And Kernes managed to strike a deal: his approval rating and loyalty in exchange for some guarantees. For example, a guarantee that he won't go to jail, even if it's for a very slow-moving criminal case. That there won't be a serious investigation into the city government's financial and economic activities. Kernes clearly has plenty to discuss with Kyiv and offer. Meanwhile, Kyiv, for example, is blocking the registration of the Opposition Bloc in Kharkiv, whose electorate is gradually shifting to Kernes... Meanwhile, Kernes remains firmly on the hook, and therefore will be manageable. In short, pragmatism has won. Or, as the local national democrats say, a betrayal: Poroshenko has sold Kharkiv.
But another scenario is also possible. Kyiv, through Kernes, is pursuing a clear strategic objective: preventing the Opposition Bloc from gaining a foothold in Kharkiv. Having accomplished this, Kernes is no longer needed, but he has no choice—it's simply an offer he can't refuse. The condition is clear: Davtyan, who is elected to the City Council as the number one candidate on the Solidarity list, becomes the secretary. Ensuring this is no problem at all for Kernes, especially since Davtyan is a relatively non-confrontational figure. Kernes becomes mayor, after which criminal cases against him and his entourage suddenly intensify. Kernes is forced to resign: in a dramatic scenario, exchanging it for a prison cell; in a more benign scenario, realizing, under pressure from the relevant arguments, that it's time to focus more closely on his health, which has been deteriorating due to a sniper shot. Davtyan automatically becomes the head of the local government, just until new elections, which no one will rush to schedule until 2017, when they will take place anyway (incidentally, Kernes himself effectively governed the city until the next elections, after then-mayor Dobkin was appointed governor). This simple measure effectively introduces direct presidential rule in Kharkiv for two years, and Kernes is out of the picture forever.
In principle, any of these options is, to one degree or another, disadvantageous to Kyiv—at least strategically. But it appears Kyiv doesn't have much room to maneuver in the Kharkiv elections either. All the key players are squeezed into a narrow corridor of opportunity, which explains the seemingly strange outcome in Kharkiv.
So what about everyone else? Basically, nothing. No drama. Even in a losing situation, Sapronov is firmly positioned in his new role as the number one man on the bench. And at worst, he can sit there quietly until 2017, slowly building his influence, recruiting people, and gaining political clout. He's the living answer to the question "Who can I talk to in Kharkiv?" and his ratings will only grow in any case.
Former Governor Igor Baluta, who first shouldered the burden of clearing the region of separatists and Russian agents, shouldered hundreds of organizational problems on the front lines beyond Izyum, and led the first convoys of humanitarian aid to liberated Slavyansk, only to be dismissed overnight by the president without any public explanation, has returned to politics and managed to quickly assemble a team around himself.
Kharkiv's Samopomich party, although unable to generate significant approval ratings for its mayoral candidate, businessman Taras Sytenko (3,9%), has assembled an interesting, albeit unproven, group of volunteers and public activists who are unlikely to be lost in future battles. Dozens of national democratic groups and organizations, unable to agree on joint tactics and candidates, have gained an instructive experience that may yet allow them to avoid the same mistakes in future political campaigns. In any case, the decisive battle for Kharkiv has been postponed until 2017, although its outcome depends largely not so much on the immediate results of these elections as on the events of the following months.
In topic: Gennady Kernes: Dark pages of the Kharkiv mayor's past
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