Yuriy Kolobov: Financial Architect of the "Donetsk Families"
Do you know how life on Mars differs from justice in Ukraine? It's that signs of life, albeit microscopic, were found on Mars, while justice in Ukraine remains nonexistent. This is especially true for high-profile defendants like former government officials, who are no longer even wanted. Among them is former Finance Minister Yuriy Kolobov, a close friend of Serhiy Arbuzov, a good friend of Sasha the Stomatolog, and the mastermind of financial schemes and scams that cost the country hundreds of millions, if not billions, of hryvnias. He's currently basking not in a cell in the Lukyanivske pretrial detention center, but, according to Skelet.Org, in the sun in Spain, where he's long awaited citizenship rather than extradition.
Yuri Kolobov. The Dark Past of a Bright Mind
Yuriy Vladimirovich Kolobov belongs to that very small social group of Ukrainians who have known no poverty or problems since childhood. He owes this to his mother, Varvara Semenovna Shults (born 1951), who left her native village of Kozintsi (Vinnytsia Oblast) as a young woman, married a young engineer, Vladimir Ivanovich Kolobov (born 1948), and moved to the city of Pavlograd (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast), where they later acquired an apartment on Ushynsky Street. Their son, Yuriy Kolobov, was born there on April 8, 1973. He experienced rural life solely from the perspective of a grandson vacationing with his grandmother.
Kolobov's father worked as a simple Soviet engineer, while Varvara Semyonovna found work as a salesperson, eventually rising to the rank of store manager. And a Soviet store manager in the 80s was far more prestigious than today's small businessmen, as the opportunity to manage scarce goods brought them not only money (and other scarce goods), but also many useful connections. Therefore, Yuri Kolobov's childhood and adolescence were deprived only of the constant attention of his parents, who were busy with their work, but not of the material benefits that most of his peers only dreamed of. Then the store manager's son, with an excellent understanding of the prospects of commerce, decided to pursue an economics degree. However, he chose the somewhat unrelated Dnipropetrovsk Civil Engineering Institute (now the Prydniprovsk State Academy of Civil Engineering and Architecture), which had just established a department of enterprise economics. A strange choice for a young man who later developed a talent for "financial architecture"—why didn't he go to the Institute of National Economy?
Then, with some help from his mother, Yuri Kolobov found a job at Privatbank. But here's where Kolobov's biography gets confusing. It states that from 1995 to 2000, he worked at Privatbank's Kharkiv branch. However, many media outlets report that his boss at the time was Valentina Arbuzova, who took the quick-witted and helpful young employee under her wing and introduced him to her son, Sergei Arbuzov, with whom Kolobov became lifelong friends. However, in reality, Valentina Arbuzova served as the director of Privatbank's Donetsk branch from 1994 to 2006, and her son was also with her while studying at Donetsk University. This leads to two conclusions. Either Yuriy Kolobov actually worked in Donetsk, not Kharkiv—but for some reason, his second university degree, earned in the late 90s, is from Kharkiv University. Or his acquaintance with the Arbuzov family, which undoubtedly played a decisive role in his career, occurred much later, and not as portrayed by the Ukrainian media. Therefore, the question arises: what is the reason for this biographical discrepancy—journalistic inattention or a deliberate attempt to confuse and distort Kolobov's past?
Valentina Arbuzova
Here's another "oddity": in 2000, Yuri Kolobov moved to Kyiv (from where?) and got a job as a senior manager at the Credit-Dnepr bank, which belonged to Victor PinchukIt would seem that if Kolobov had been so closely connected to the Donetsk Arbuzov family, it would be unlikely he would have left them for Pinchuk, with whom the Arbuzovs had no contact at all at the time. However, it's worth recalling an episode from the Arbuzovs' own biography: between 1998 and 2003, Valentina Arbuzova and her son, Sergei Arbuzov, were involved in a number of fraudulent schemes at the Donetsk branch of PrivatBank, which effectively operated independently of PrivatBank's main office and was completely under the control of the Donetsk gang. Moreover, some of the schemes amounted to outright robbery of clients: large sums of dollars were accepted as foreign currency deposits, but the deposit accounts themselves were never opened, and the money was pocketed. These cases were then dubbed "bank robberies." In Mariupol alone, over $4 million was "squeezed" from defrauded clients in this manner! There was also information that one of the peculiarities of these schemes was the subsequent dismissal of employees directly involved in the fraud, with all traces of their work at the bank being erased. Only management (the Arbuzovs), who later bought their way out of criminal prosecution, and the scapegoat cashiers, who were blamed for everything, remained. Perhaps it is precisely these scams that should be sought for the reason for the strange discrepancies in Kolobov's biography? Who knows...
Web money money money
In 2001, Yuriy Kolobov moved to work at JSCB Societe Generale Ukraine, which was then purchased Serhiy Tigipko and renamed TAS-Investbank. According to sources Skelet.OrgKolobov's work at TAS involved creating financial schemes designed to funnel money offshore. But when Tigipko was appointed head of the National Bank of Ukraine (December 2002), Kolobov left for Oschadbank, where he took the position of treasury director—a lucrative position he held until 2008. And here's the interesting thing: he was recommended for this position. Artemy Ershov, then deputy chairman of the board of Oschadbank, previously known as one of the deputy directors of the Banking House, nicknamed "Bandit House" for its near-criminal reputation. The second deputy of the Banking House was Sergey LevochkinAnd here's a fact: in 2005, after the change of power, Bankova demanded Kolobov's dismissal, calling him "Donetsk." But why? Was it only because of his close ties to Yershov-Levochkin, or because of his previous dealings with the Arbuzovs? Or perhaps Kolobov had other connections to the "Donetsk" men who settled in Kyiv in 2003-2004?
Be that as it may, the then head of Oschadbank, Oleksandr Morozov, defended Kolobov as an "effective professional." It was only in the spring of 2008 that he was "rooted out," possibly at the insistence of Tymoshenko's team, which sought to take control of Oschadbank. But Kolobov only advanced: from June to December 2008, he became head of the board of the Ukrainian branch of BTA Bank, one of Kazakhstan's largest banks, which facilitated numerous corrupt financial transactions involving Ukrainian oligarchs and organized crime groups.
Then a gap appeared in the biography of this highly sought-after financial virtuoso—lasting all of 2009, right up until the spring of 2010. He was a man—and then he vanished, as if he'd fled. But Kolobov didn't flee; as became known much later, he'd taken up the electronic money business. More precisely, he was engaged in a struggle for monopoly control over this form of payment, which was then very popular (and almost the only available) among the growing army of internet users. Moreover, Kolobov was involved in this business not only as an experienced manager but also as a partner, albeit an indirect one. His mother, Varvara Shultz, and his godfather, Alexander Dubikhvost, were co-owners of Parfe LLC, which in turn was a shareholder in the European Technologies Venture Investment Fund. Other shareholders of this fund were the South-East Insurance Company CJSC of Sergei Dyadechko (dubbed the “black banker” for his scams at the Soyuz bank), and the New Technologies company, managed by Ivan Avramov, a partner of the infamous Yuriy Ivanyushchenko. Meanwhile, European Technologies, together with Quick Payment System Ltd., became the founders of GlobalMoney, a company that attempted to displace the famous WebMoney from the Ukrainian market and monopolize the country's electronic money system.
Yuriy Kolobov: Financial Architect of the "Donetsk Families"
From 2009 to 2013, these individuals, some using their connections and others their official positions, carried out constant attacks on the company WebMoney. Initially, its operations were blocked on the grounds that Ukraine had no law on "electronic money," so it was denied a license. However, immediately afterward, GlobalMoney received a license, with Oschadbank acting as its guarantor! However, WebMoney, through the courts, secured recognition that its "electronic money" was in fact a legal system for the transfer of property rights, confirmed by electronic receipts—in short, that it did not require any special license. Then, in 2013, the Tax Service descended on WebMoney's office and staged a "masked show."
After 2014, GlobalMoney lost administrative support, and its affairs deteriorated. Then it became embroiled in a scandal, accused of "financing terrorism." The fact is, even in 2015, the company continued to operate in Luhansk and Donetsk, including through "24nonstop" terminals, transferring money back and forth from Ukraine. With virtually all Ukrainian payment and money transfer systems for the population blocked by Kyiv's decision back in 2014, this became a gold mine for GlobalMoney. But why did the National Bank "forget" about GlobalMoney then, turning a blind eye to its illegal operations in territories not controlled by Kyiv? Apparently because many friends and business partners of Yuriy Kolobov and other GlobalMoney co-owners still remained at the NBU.
Yuri Kolobov. An Almost Legal Way to Steal
As soon as the Donetsk gang returned to power in 2010, Yuriy Kolobov was immediately offered a position: deputy chairman of the board of Ukreximbank, whose sole shareholder is the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. Given Ukreximbank's enormous role in financial settlements for Ukraine's foreign trade and the attraction of foreign investment and loans, Kolobov was effectively handed the keys to the country's currency treasury. He was soon joined by Serhiy Arbuzov, who first became a member of the bank's supervisory board and then chaired it. However, in December 2010, Arbuzov was appointed governor of the National Bank—and immediately appointed Yuriy Kolobov as his deputy. This, in fact, sparked media rumors of their long-standing acquaintance, dating back to the 90s, though these rumors are confusing and contradictory. These rumors only intensified when, in December 2012, the duo transferred to work together at the Cabinet of Ministers: Arbuzov as deputy prime minister and Kolobov as finance minister.
It was while serving in these positions that Kolobov committed financial fraud and other actions for which he would later be criminally prosecuted and labeled the financial architect of the Yanukovych "family" schemes used to funnel money out of Ukraine. However, Kolobov worked not only for the Yanukovychs (specifically, for Oleksandr Yanukovych, with whom he became close), but also for himself. Two such incidents were among the charges brought against him.
First, there's Kolobov's direct involvement as Finance Minister in the controversial $3 billion Russian loan (which Ukraine is currently suing over) secured by specially issued government bonds. He wasn't directly at fault; he was merely fulfilling his ministerial duties at the direction of the Prime Minister and the President. However, Kolobov couldn't resist a "small" (compared to the loan amount) scheme, during which the Russian company VTB Capital illegally received a $450 "fee" for the placement of these bonds. Skelet.Org There is information that a significant portion of this amount, through a certain scheme, then ended up in Kolobov’s foreign accounts.
The second charge also involved bonds, but it was a different scheme, and Kolobov profited significantly more from it. It began when Kolobov was deputy head of the National Bank to Arbuzov and continued when he himself became head of the Ministry of Finance. The essence of the scam was that the Ministry of Finance issued a series of bonds (one billion hryvnias each) to increase the capitalization of Oschadbank, which were then set in motion, causing enormous losses to the state. The following episode was cited as an example: having received bonds worth 1,44 billion hryvnias, Oschadbank sold them at virtually par value to the Cypriot company Qhenox Limited, which then sold them to Bank 3/4 for 1,64 billion, which then resold them to Ukreximbank for another 1,64 billion. The purpose of this cunning scheme was to embezzle funds and avoid responsibility. See for yourself:
- Oschadbank is completely legally selling the Cypriot company's bonds at par value. No claims have been raised against Oschadbank's management.
- The private company "Qhenox Limited" is legally selling these bonds at a premium of 200 million hryvnias to the commercial bank "Bank ¾." As the saying goes, long live the free securities market!
- Bank ¾ decides to sell these bonds for the same price it bought them for. It will be immune from any charges of speculation, or even simple profiteering (which is not a crime for a commercial bank).
- State-owned Ukreximbank buys bonds "at market price," not from "speculators," but from the honest Bank ¾. It's also difficult to find fault with Ukreximbank's management.
It would seem that everything is legal and honest, if not for one "but": the company "Qhenox Limited" and "Bank ¾" are two components of Kolobov's scheme, through which he, almost legally but not at all honestly, pocketed 200 million hryvnias – withdrawing them from the state-owned Ukreximbank. In addition to "Bank ¾" (chairman of the board – Vadim Ishchenko), Kolobov's scheme also involved the company "Central Broker" of the Perspektiva exchange group (Sergey Antonov, Iryna Filipskaya) and the National Commission for Securities Market Supervision (NCSMS), headed by Dmitriev Tevelev – a so-called "man of Akhmetov and Ivanyushchenko."
But this wasn't the only scheme Kolobov created during his tenure at the National Bank and the Ministry of Finance! There's also a third charge against Kolobov: embezzlement of 220 million hryvnias, which he allocated to build a special telecommunications network for Ukrtelecom during its privatization (the work was supposed to be paid for by Akhmetov, who bought it). It has also been reported that dozens more similar cases could be brought against Kolobov, since the Ministry of Finance generously financed other oligarch projects in 2012-2013. And that's not counting the hundreds of millions "semi-legally" made by Kolobov's companies from the resale of bonds. Surprisingly, with such "left-field income," and even the declared 1.5 million hryvnia salary of the deputy head of the National Bank in 2011 and dividends from deposits, Kolobov didn't hesitate to write himself off for another 78 thousand hryvnia in financial assistance!
Ministers of the Azarov government: Petro Poroshenko (Ministry of Economic Development) and Yuriy Kolobov (Ministry of Finance)
"Prison" with a sea view
It should be noted that the schemes created by Kolobov worked not only for the "Donetsk families" but also for the "reformers" who replaced them in 2014. For example, it was reported that the new participants were the ICU company and its Investment Capital fund and Avangard Bank, which belonged to the new owner of the National Bank. Valeria GontarevaPerhaps this is why Kolobov was able to safely leave Ukraine and travel to Europe. Although he was temporarily detained at the request of Interpol in March 2015, the joy of Ukrainians seeking truth and justice was in vain.
Spain was slow to extradite Kolobov to Ukraine, as his lawyers claimed "political persecution," while the Ukrainian side was unable to formulate a credible criminal charge. This was largely due to the Prosecutor General's Office's reluctance to expose Kolobov's schemes or to implicate those involved. And when his former deputy, Volodymyr Kotsiuba, who oversaw the Ministry of Finance's financial policy department, died in Ukraine in May 2015, allegedly of a stroke, Kolobov requested asylum in Spain. After that, information about him became very rare and patchy. It was reported that Kolobov was placed in a special detention center with all the amenities and a sea view—which, however, seemed like a real prison to him after living in a villa with a swimming pool, where he was detained by police. And here's the bad news: in January 2016, the National Court of Justice of Spain decided not to extradite Kolobov to Ukraine, and in October 2016, sources Skelet.Org It was reported that Kolobov received a residence permit in Spain. As they say, "hasta la vista!"
Meanwhile, in Ukraine, Kolobov's "friends" in the Prosecutor General's Office first failed to prove his guilt in the bond scams, and then also dropped the charge of embezzlement of 220 million. Moreover, they didn't even properly launch an investigation! This is eloquently demonstrated by the decision of Kyiv's Pechersky District Court, which in April 2017 prohibited the Prosecutor General's Office from conducting an in absentia investigation into Kolobov's case, citing the fact that the former minister was no longer even on the international wanted list. This was confirmed by Interpol itself, which reported that of the 27 senior officials and oligarchs previously placed on the Yanukovych regime's wanted list, only Viktor Fedorovich himself and his son, Oleksandr, remain. All the others were removed from the wanted list either at the request of their lawyers or by court decisions (including Ukrainian ones), easily defeating the poorly worded accusations of the Prosecutor General's Office.
The only thing Ukrainian justice could boast about in the case against Kolobov was the seizure of 200 million hryvnias in his mother Varvara Shultz's Fidobank accounts in the spring of 2016. The Prosecutor General's Office trumpeted this as a great victory. However, there are serious doubts as to whether these funds were returned to the treasury, or even whether they even existed. The fact is that last spring, when Varvara Shultz's accounts were frozen, Fidobank was already bankrupt and preparing for closure. And before that, investigators had uncovered multibillion-dollar scams within the bank: significantly inflated "fake" capitalization, the distribution of enormous loans to individuals and legal entities, the transfer of enormous sums abroad, etc. The mother of a financial virtuoso would not have kept 200 million hryvnias of "real money" in such a bank—which she would have lost anyway after its bankruptcy. Sources Skelet.Org It's been reported that these 200 million were most likely fictitious, possibly non-existent collateral for a loan that had long since been transferred from the ailing bank to a more secure location. Well, it seems the Ukrainian justice system, unable to return real money to the state, has become obsessed with seizing financial phantoms—like Varvara Shultz's accounts or Yankovic's notorious billions.
Sergey Varis, for Skelet.Org
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