Yatsenyuk
Party brands are losing popularity in society. If you want to see for yourself, listen to conversations at public transportation stops, go to the nearest market, or simply sit on a bench outside your building. You'll hear everything people think about the country's political elite. And if you don't trust these sources, turn to sociology. It's a science, after all, and politicians often misuse it, but accurate information does occasionally emerge.
The day before, the sociological group "Rating" set out to determine public attitudes toward political parties and released the results on New Year's Eve, to further dampen their spirits. The question the sociologists asked respondents was lifted straight from the lips of political scientists: what if snap elections were held right now?
Most domestic media outlets took a lenient approach to their own political elite, publishing the most respectable figures: if the Verkhovna Rada elections had been held in early December, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc "Solidarity" (16,5%), the All-Ukrainian Union "Batkivshchyna" (12,3%), the Opposition Bloc (12,2%), "Samopomich" (12,2%), the Radical Party (7,9%), the All-Ukrainian Union "Svoboda" (7,8%), and UKROP (5,1%) would have entered parliament. The "Civil Position" (4,1%), "Vidrodzhennya" (3,6%), and "Nash Krai" (3,0%) are approaching the 5% threshold.
At first glance, there's complete pluralism and dominance of so-called "democratic forces," although recently, without bitter irony, any mention of the word "democracy" has become almost inappropriate only in quotation marks. A closer look at the initial version of the survey reveals that the figures cited above only reflect that portion of the electorate willing to vote and already determined their preferences. If we consider the total number of eligible voters, the picture is even more bleak. 8,7% of voters are prepared to support the ruling pro-presidential party, while 7,1% each support Batkivshchyna, Opposition Bloc, and Samopomich, leaving the remaining parties outside the parliament. Oleh Lyashko's radicals and representatives of Svoboda retain a modicum of chance; 4,4% and 4,3% of respondents, respectively, would like to see them in the future parliament.
The regional breakdown of electoral sentiment is interesting. While in the west, besides the presidential bloc, voters favor the national-patriotic parties Batkivshchyna, Samopomich, and Svoboda, in the center and north, Solidarity supporters hold the best chances, in the south and especially in the east, the Opposition Bloc is the undisputed leader. This once again underscores the country's disunity: supporters of rapprochement with Russia stand no chance in Galicia and Volyn, while Kharkiv, Odesa, and Donbas leave not only the nationalists from Svoboda, but even the president's friends from Solidarity, far behind the electoral threshold.
The high percentage of those refusing to vote in the elections is alarming. While in the western, central, and northern regions, the percentage of those unwilling to vote fluctuates between 23 and 28%, in the east and south, it ranges from 30 to 40%. The highest number of "refuseniks" is in Donbas. The national average for those unwilling to vote and those who have not yet decided is 43,2%. This alarming figure warrants consideration of the implications behind this figure.
In any case, it's safe to say that society is in a difficult situation. Among the plethora of parties vying for the people's favor, it turns out there's hardly anyone to choose from. The position of the People's Front, led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, is particularly telling in this context. Voters willing to support the prime minister and his team amount to a mere 0,6%. This is three and a half times fewer than the number of communist supporters, whom the current government has completely written off the political scene, banning them from participating in elections through legal action!
A logical question arises: can a politician with such public support be responsible for the entire executive branch in a parliamentary-presidential republic? In any democratic state, the dismissal of such a prime minister would be a no-brainer. But not in a country where not a single politician can boast of even a modicum of popular support. After all, how can one govern a country of 40 million people when the president's main support party, the Solidarity party, enjoys support that falls short of 9 percent? In other words, not even one in ten Ukrainians is a firm supporter of the president today!
You'll ask, "What's to be done?" and you'll cite a host of arguments in favor of the urgent need to maintain the fragile balance on the Pechersk Hills. After all, the country is in the midst of a war (and who started it and is doing everything they can to prevent its end?), an economic crisis (didn't the current government destroy economic ties with its closest neighbors with its own hands?), a difficult reform process is underway (but why does everything boil down to tightening the fiscal burden on businesses and individuals?), and a massive battle against corruption has begun (and what about the increasing incidence of bribery and mutual accusations among senior officials, including scandals within the presidential administration?).
You might say, but our sincere American friend and comrade Joe Biden holds the same view! Does Uncle Joe really represent the ultimate truth? Can his opinion really outweigh the convictions of the majority of the Ukrainian population, who utterly distrust this government? Both the political parties taken together, and the leading representatives of the political elite individually?
You'll remind me that any election costs a huge amount of money, which the country can't afford in such difficult times. I think that having a prime minister who leads a party with only half a percent of support costs the state far more.
Roman Stepnyak
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